The Press FRIDAY, JUNE 20, 1941. Turkey and Germany

Press, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23360, 20 June 1941, Page 6

The Press FRIDAY, JUNE 20, 1941. Turkey and Germany

If the “ pact of friendship and non-aggression ” signed by the German and Turkish Governments goes no further than the published text, Whitehall’s unconcern is probably sincere and justified. By agreeing not to attack Germany , or any country allied to Germany, Turkey has removed herself from the dwindling list of Great Britain’s potential military allies. That is regrettable but, in the light of recent events in the Balkans, not at all surprising. The original agreement between Great Britain and Turkey (there was a parallel agreement between France and Turkey), pledged Turkey to take up arms on the side of the Allies if the war spread to the Eastern Mediterranean. When Italy became a belligerent this condition was fulfilled. The Turkish Government took the view, however, that the collapse of France had invalidated this part of the treaty with Great Britain and that Turkey’s interests" would be best served by a policy of peace. The decision not to fight was on this occasion understandable and excusable. But when Turkey stood aside while Germany occupied Bulgaria, and again while Germany used Bulgaria as the base for an invasion of Greece, the British .people wrote Turkey off their list of active allies. The question then was not whether Turkey would take up arms against Germany but whether she would allow the passage of German troops across her territory. The new treaty answers this second question in the negative and therefore means either that Germany has abandoned the idea of a major offensive in Asia Minor or that she will attempt the difficult feat of invading Syria or Palestine by way of the Aegean Islands. On the whole, this situation is satisfactory to the British Government; for as things are in the Eastern Mediterranean it is almost as valuable to have an assurance that Turkey will remain neutral and' independent as it would be to have her as an active ally. Indeed, the question must arise why Germany, assuming she has signed the treaty in good faith, has let Turkey down so lightly. Her control of Bulgaria, Greece, and the Greek islands screening Smyrna and the Dardanelles gives her a military advantage so overwhelming that, if it came to war, she could probably break Turkish resistance in a matter of days. One explanation is suggested by the curious fact that, although the British Government has - announced that it was kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations which preceded the treaty, there has been no such announcement by the Russian Government, notwithstanding that Turkey has in the last few years maintained closer relations with Russia than with any other country. If it is true that there is now acute tension between Germany and Russia, then the new treaty may be a Gcffman diplomatic victory at Russia’s expense rather than Great Britain’s, for ■it brings together the two Powers which control the „ entrance to the Black Sea. In : this connexion it will be noted that the’treaty contains no reference to the vital question of shipping ih the Dardarielles. Turkey has the right, under* the "Montreux Convention, to close the Dardanelles to . German merchant and naval vessels. Since she did not exercise this right when by doing so she could have prevented German forces from c/ccupying the Aegean Islands, it must be assumed that henceforth Germany will Tie allowed to use the Dardanelles as she pleases.