METTERNICH

Press, Volume LXXI, Issue 21656, 14 December 1935, Page 19

METTERNICH

1 A NEW STUDY Motternich. By H. du Cowdray. Jona--816 tlSn Cape. 395 pp. (15s net.) {Reviewed by ANTOINETTE POCOCK.] It is a strange phenomenon in man that he does not learn from history. Great political upheavals usher in w hat is ardently believed at the time t 0 be the first golden age. Experience never teaches men that they are only redressing a former excess. “Le mieux est I’ennemi du bien” is n 0 more remembered than that no experiment in government is permanent or final. The belief in the inauguration of a new political method attempted by the League of Nations is disproved by the history of Metternich. Mr Cohen-Portheim has declared: “It is only in the most reC ent times that the idea of subjecting the relations between nations to the same moral laws as are recognised in the relations of individuals has begun to take root. .. . The League of Nations is the first hesitating attempt to translate the admitted truth into terms of practice. International politics have albeen untouched by morality everywhere.” This ignorance of the history of the early nineteenth century is all the more surprising in that Mr Cohen-Ponbeim was an Austrian. The reply to such inaccuracy cannot better be given than jn Metternich’s own words: “What characterises the modern world and distinguishes it from the ancient is the tendency of states to draw near each other and to form a kind of social body based on the same principle as human society. . . The establishing of international relations on the basis of reciprocity under the guarantee of respect for acquired rights . . . constitutes the essence of politics.” It is dangerously easy to identify political movements with a name. “Great innovations appear of them- ‘ selves and come about more thanks to a common impulse than to the guiding and express will of one or two personalities,” says Miss du Cowdray, the author of this new biography of Metternich. Thus neither Norman Angell nor President Wilson created the idea of the League of Nations any more than Metternich invented the “Concert of Europe.” His merit lies in the fact that he realised its existence and determined to establish it on a firm foundation. He knew the old Europe to be dead and ho set about to tyiild up the peace of Europe on an international basis. It must be remembered that he had no precedent to work on. and that he faced violent opposition among his own allies. His claim to greatness is justified in that he succeeded in laying the foundations of a European political system which secured peace for 40 years under the perpetual threat of revolution. The Congress of Vienna was his work, but did not end it. The most difficult part came in the ensuing years when it was constantly jeopardised. A comparison of the Congress of Vienna with the Treaty of Versailles should be salutary. It was drawn up in no spirit of plunder or of retribution. Metternich’s attitude to the defeated French differed essentially from that of the victors of 1913 to the Germans. He realised that Nanoleon was not France and that real peace was incompatible with revenge. Moreover, realist as he was, to him peace was identical with common sense and reason. “One does not govern with bayonets,” he said. In other ways he showed unusual strength of purpose; for he never allowed Austria’s interests to come before those of the “Concert.” He even deliberately sacrificed her, as in the case of her supremacy in Germany and in Italy, in order to preserve international security. “He had a definite attitude.” says Miss du Cowdray, “towards the future of Europe.” This attitude consisted of a policy for settling affairs by deliberation. Later on he sought for a permanent diplomatic centre, where the powers could meet. He wanted a “point d’appui.” He also brought forward the suggestion of an international army to defend the European Concert. It was some strange prophetic vision that made him declare: “I should have been born in 1900 and had the twentieth century before me.” i Posterity has justified his point of view, and it is significant that many biographies of Metternich have been written since 1920. Previously, however, he was quite misunderstood. The reason for this lies in the spirit of the nineteenth centry, but also in Metternich’s own behaviour. The French Revolution left a legacy to Europe of a crop of revolutions in nearly every country. It was the age of liberal movements, and its historians could not appreciate the objects which Metternich sought so hard to accomplish. They thought him “reactionary,” “obscurantist,” “narrow.” Actually, he declared that the reconstruction of Europe must include the independence and security of the smaller states; but he thought self-determination was opposed to federation. In Italy, therefore, he strove to form a federative state, though in vain; but he was more successful in Germany because . it was within the realm of practical i politics. In any case, as the author maintains, “it is permissible to doubt whether nationalism in itself has given anything of positive value to Europe.” There is a parallel to this attitude of Metternich’s in that of the politicians to the Bolshevik Revolution in 1918. They realised in the case of Russia and possibly of the coloured races, though on different grounds, that, as Miss du Cowdray says, “Revolutionary pro- > paganda, sooner or later, turns out- ! ward and merges with a policy of conquest.” In so doing, whether in the person of Metternich or of Lloyd George, these statesmen were only living in the spirit of their own age. “Intrepidity of thought rarely makes a good statesman,” says the author; or, as Metternich himself thought, “Necessity was the real guide for a politician.” Undoubtedly, Metternich laid himself open to attack by his conduct. He has been described as light, cask kal, and frivolous. He was the “Monsieur Papillon” of the scene When, not without reason perhans, men said “Le Congres ne marche pas; il danse.” His amours have only too often been described and over-accentuated. Women probably influenced him little politically. “Les affaires ce sont les hommes,” be said. All this, according to the * author, was part of a scheme to impress the Allies with Vienna’s wealth and also to disguise his unrelenting purpose; “It is often to a statesman’s advantage not to be too obvious.” It is equally probable that gaiety definitely attracted him. _ Wit certainly did; perhaps that is why he does not appeal to nineteenth century historians. It is a lost •art. “The spirit of earnestness .. . has descended upon politics and great solemnity stalks the hesitant footsteps of statesmen. To censure Vienna for its levity is only too easy

. . . But, censuring, we may expose our own limitations.” In no other respect has Metternich been more misjudged than in his relationship with Napoleon. It has always been stated that he was Napoleon’s bitterest enemy and that he sought and worked long for his downfall. Miss du Cowdray paints a very different picture. Metternich 'himself said. “Conversation with him has always had for me a charm difficult to define ; and on another occasion he spoke of Napoleon’s “remarkable perspicacity and the great simplicity of the processes of his mind. Admitting that Napoleon owed much to fortune, he yet concluded: “He would have played a prominent role in whatever time he had appeared. He admired his stark realism,’ his rejection of vague ideas, his love concrete results. Without perhaps realising it, he recognised in Napoleon ’that essential quality ot a'statesman which he himself possessed, the power of seeing the future, and of preparing the way for seizing that future. Metternich, Gentz said, had “L’avenir a 1 esprit to a marked degree. Yet he was fully alive to Napoleons weaxnesses He passed a final condemna tion *of him in the single phrase, “It was an unfortunate limitation to be convinced that self alone dictated men’s conduct in every circumstance.” He would have saved Napoleon if he could, and in the famous dramatic interview at Dresden in 1812 he did his utmost to induce him to come to terms of peace. He genuinely grieved when he warned him, “It will not be Europe that will succumb m the struggle.” It whs not only dlsinterestedness, of course; but had he merely hated Napoleon he would not have “wished to keep him, as he said on another famous occasion. This very admiration for Napoleon made him dislike the visionary idealism and unreliability of the other outstanding figure of the time, Alexander I- of Russia. The author of this biography has brought back to life a character of tremendous reality. Her observations and deductions are so penetrating and so apt that the final attention of her public cannot fail to be arrested by the writer herself as much as by the subject of her biography. It is the work of a subtle and clever mind and is of such scope and grasp that the ordinary critic can find no fault with it.