The Press Tuesday, August 16, 1921. Lord Kitchener.

Press, Volume LVII, Issue 17225, 16 August 1921, Page 6

The Press Tuesday, August 16, 1921. Lord Kitchener.

It is difficult to imagine any valid excuse for publishing, five jears after the death of Lord Kitchener, a book of which the sole object appears to be to lower him in the estimation of the nation whom he served eo well* If that, at least, is riot the object of Lord, Esher's new book "The Tragedy of Lord "Kitchener," the cabled extracts - of the'writer's statements and opinion do neither him nor the book justice; if that is not the effect of the book it will be because the British people are loyal to their heroes and having decided that a man is worthy of their admiration are not lightly moved from their opinion. "Detraction cannot harm him "now envy obliterate his fame. '" For all time Lord Kitchener is en- " shrined as the legendary figure of the "Great War." So wrote Lord Esher soon after the loss of, the Hampshire. fWe do not know what meaning the word "detraction" conveys to Lord Esher; to. our mind there is no difference between it and the criticism with. which he now seeks to belittle Lord Kitchener's reputation and fame. His book, he explains, "is intended to em- " phasise the tragic spectacle of a great "man. called to a great task with the "full consciousness that the powers "which had served him steadfastly in . "the past had deserted him." We believe we are right in declaring that were ia so warrant in anything Kit-.

chener said or did for such an assertion. His critic, who as a member of the Committee of Imperial Defence was brought into close contact with the Secretary for War, admits that Kitchener"s vision 1 was clear, but says that he was unable to communicate it to others. Yet the nation as a whole accepted, against its will, his forecast that- the war would last at least three years. He realised that if Great Britain had' to play a fitting part in a Continental war she could only do it by developing an army on a Continental scale. At the same time Continental opinion was dead against the possibility of creating such an army in war-time. "I felt myself," Lord Kitchener told the House of Lords "that though there might be " some justice in this view, I had " to talce the risk and embark on what "may. be regarded aa a gigantic experi"ment." That was not the language nor the action of a man who, if we are to believe Lord Esher, had "lost " hia self-confidence," whose "steps " faltered," and who was "powerless " before the Cabinet"—it ia notorious that not all the Ministry accepted his views. Nor did the country's magnificent response to his call for men to serve "for three years, or the duration " of the war," look as though Kitchener were unable to communicate Mb clear vision to others. Kitchener undoubtedly made mistakes, as who among the civil and military leaders in the greatest orisis in out history did not. He was, in some respects, unfitted by nature and training for the position of Secretary of State for "War. He knew nothing of politics, and loathed them, he had all his life been used to acting independently, and was, no doubt, as Lord Esher. says, at ai disadvantage .in the collective action required of a Cabinet of politicians. He was aocustomed to having things done when he wanted them done, and to disregarding the gospel of expediency which enters so largely into the creeds of most Governments. He was intensely, auperhumanly, industrious and. preoccupied with his work, and was, therefore, one imagines, naturally irritated with the slackness and muddle of Government Departments, not excepting the War Office. Add to this that he was no speaker, and waa apt to baffle argument by silence, and it is easy to understand why he was not happy at the War Office, and not wholly popular with his colleagues. These limitations notwithstanding, the fact remains that Lord Kitchener's acceptance, at "the outbreak- of war, of the onerous post of Secretary of State for War, ijras welcomed more heartily by the nation than that of any otter man would have been. He had already won a place inpublio esteem second to none. His name was associated with victorious campaigns which $e nation had yet to learn were aa skirmishes compared with the grim • struggle tipon which countiy had entered. People knew him as one inspired fcjr lofty ideals of piiblio duty, as one who spared neither himself nor those 'who worked under him. His very reticence and reputed sternness increased what ia best described as his " mana." His value to the country and the Empire in the earlier part of the war was immeasurable, for it was due. fo the unquestioning oorufidence reposed in him that the Empire rose as one main ifco imeet. the common danger. On this aocount, r if for no other reason, he well deserved Foch's description of him as "an organiser of victoiy," and on this account he deserves, andi will continue to reoeire long after his critics are forgotten, the tribute of the British - people's grateful remembrance, ; -