ON THE SEAS.

Press, Volume LII, Issue 15499, 28 January 1916, Page 7

ON THE SEAS.

THE BRITISH BLOCKADE. INCREASING ITS EFFECTIVENESS. AN IMPORTANT DEBATE. BELLIGERENT V. ' NEUTRAL RIGHTS. (By Cable;— Press Association. —Copyright.) (Received January 27th, 8.40 p.m.) LONDON, January 2(5In the House of Commons, Mr A. Shirley Benn (Unionist) moved a resolution urging the Government to cnforco as effective a blockade as possible without interfering with tho normal requirements of neutral countries for their internal consumption. He said that if the Government had grasped tho .'nettle and used our sea-power to greater effcct they might have saved a ccrtain period of the war. He jiopod that the Government, in conjunction with our Allies, would prevent the whole of Germany's oceanic trado by means of tho blockade, and make everything for Germany and out of Germany contraband. He did not think Americans would objcct, as they were full of common-sense, and the majority of them wero keenly alivo to their interest in seeing that wo won the war. Mr F. Leverton Harris referred to Germany's ruses to get contraband through. Our Navy had seized "honey," which, on analysis, had proved to be a mixture of rubber and glycerine. Wo had also seized "rubber" disguised as onions, and metals described as "Japanese works of art'' wrapped in rubber. SIR EDWARD GRET'S REPLY. Sir Edward Grey said the subject was not as simple as might appear from speeches and reccnt articles. It was a, most difficult and complicated matter. There was real misapprehension in the House of Commons in regard to tho amount of trade passing through neutral countries to the enemy, and a vast under-estiinatc of what the Government were doing to prevent it. The figures which had recently been scat- | tered broadcast would not bear examination, and tho conclireion founded j upon thom had undoubtedly done great harm. The fact had been overlooked that in peacc time many neutral countries drew supplies from countries which wero unavailable in war time. Further, a large amount of stuff from tho United States which was believed to L'o destined for the enemy had never reached neutral hands, as it was in the British Prize Courts. In regard Bo the statement that the export of wheat from the United States to Scandinavia had increased from 19,000,000 bushels in ten months of 1913 to 50,000,000 bushels in 1915, sir Edward Grey said that those 50,000,000 bushels included exports to Spain. Portugal, Greece, and Malta, amounting to 23,000,000 bushels. The last-named countries had hitherto largely depended upon the Black Sea ports for their wheat supplies. We must also deduct several millions of bushels used for the relief of Belgium. He instanced several more deductions to show that the Scandinavian imports were not excessive. Wo could not stop tho leakage altogether, whatever system was adopted. We could not take over the administration of neutral countries, or prevent smuggling against neutrals' own regulations. It was impossible, however strict the supervision of our Navy, to ensure that no part of a cargo would find its way to the enemy. Sir Alexander Henderson's report showed that the maximum was being done that was possible without serious trouble with neu-, tral countries. Tho charge that the Foreign 1 Office was spoiling and undoing the Navy's work was grossly unfair, j and' was untrue. Sincc the beginning

of 1916 the Government had ouly released- three ships without consulting the Contraband Committee. Two of these cases wore discussed by Cabinet, and tho ships were released for special reasons. Tho third case was that of the Stockholm, about which the Swedish Government liad specially appealed. Wc telegraphed, said Sir Edward Grey, that if we received ccrtain assurances we would release the ship, but we had not received any undertaking. Was it not time that theso reckless statements were stopped ? The Foreign Office had done its best to retain tho goodwill of neutral countries from whom we wanted special supplies. We had to explain and justify our interference with their trade, and that was not easy. Wo had no right to say that tho Prize Court was the neck of a bottle through which all their trade must pass. Had wo attempted to go as,far as that the war might possibly have been over by now, because the whole world would have joined against us. and we and our Allies would have' collapsed under its resentment. Our correspondence with the United States would continue in justification of our policy. We were consulting France before replying to the last Note of tho United States Government, with a view to pursuing the same policy, and justifying it with the samo argument. We were putting the same case before tho world. We were perfectly ready to examine any moans of carrvingoutour policy of last March, which was likely to be raoro agreeable to neutral countries or less inconvenient in practice, so long as it was effective. Wo could not abjure our right to interfere with enemy trade and the British blockade. "W c could not exercise it without causing considerable inconvenience to neutral countries, who must answer 0110 main question—''Do they admit our right to apply the principles, which America applied to the war between the North and South, and do our best to prevent trade with tho enemy through neutral countries?'' If neutral countries answered "Yes" as in fairness they were bound to do, we say, "Mako it easy for us to distinguish goods which are bona fide destined for neutral consumption.'' If they answered "No," then we must definitely regard that attitude as a doparture from neutrality. The last Noto from tho United States contaiued proposals which, if conceded, would make it,absolutely imjjossible for us to prevent even contraband goods from going wholesale through neutral countries to the enemy. If wc conceded all that the Xoto asked, wo might as well give up any attempt to carry out the blockade. I3ut lie did not understand that the United States or any Government held that view. We wero entitled to claim the utmost rights recognised by International Law in previous wars. He did not intend to say what our conditions of pcacc would be, but he pointed out that wc must put an end' to Prussian Militarism which was a constant menace to peace. Tho whole of our resources were engaged in the war. Our maximum efforts—military, natal, and financial—were at the disposal of our Allies in carrying on the conflict, and we would exert all our efforts to put the maximum pressure upon our enemies. Part of that pressure might be the preventing of supplies going to tho enemy by using the full power of our Navy. Wc would relax no effort in common with our Allies to see the thing through to the end. Sir Edward Grey received a prolonged ovation at tho close of his speech. , The House was impressed by the weight of his arguments, and even the doubters realised the difficulty of the problem.

The High Commissioner reports:— l LONDON, January 26 (10.50 p.m.). In tho House of Commons, on the Llockade motion. Sir Edward Grey said the problem was not as simple to deal with as certain papers seemed to think. The figures those papers had -published were grotesque, and the- conclusions drawn from them had done harm, notably in the case of the wheat export of the United States. The business of the Foreign Office was to see that good relations between the Allies and neutral countries -were maintained. It. was true we had to look after our own interests firs-t, but we had no right to injure neutrals. If that were done we

should incur the enmity of the whole world. Hut ho had this to .say to neutral countries: "We could not give up our right to interfere with enemy trade, even though such interference inconvenienced them. He had one main question to ask neutral countries:—"Did they, or did they not, admit our right to apply the principles of the blockade of the American Civil "War to this conflict;''' If they did. then they should make it easy for us to distinguish between neutral and enemy trade. If their answer was that we had no right to interfere with the trade of neutral countries, then he had no hesitation in saying that they were breaking their neutrality. The answer that would be scut to the last American Note would be one in regard to which we were consulting France. and an answer would be sent as coming from both countries. and possibly from our other Allies also. If we assented to every demand made by the. last American Note, it would bo impossible for lis to prevent even contraband being sent into enemy countries. We were quite read- to carry out the policy which we decided upon last March in regard to this matter, and, if necessary, we would confer with neutral countries so as to make its operations as easy as possible for them; but we could not give up our belligerent rights.