Protection v. Speed.

Press, Volume L, Issue 15016, 10 July 1914, Page 6

Protection v. Speed.

/Apparently no one now disputes' that in naval w&rfaro. attack has beaten defence. Above water the gun has beaten armour plate, and below water j the torpedo is master. Mr Churchill has drawn attention, to this in picturesque language. , "If you want to i " take a true picture in your mind of a " battle between great modern ironclad "ships you ranst not think of it as if it "wero two men in armour, striking at "each, s>ther with, heavy swords. • It is ''moro lik«i «t battle between two eggshells striking each other with ham- ' mors. ' ; t will have been noticed in our cable new s that naval architects aro considering th«» growing menace of the submarine* and are saying that tho attack can bo met only by destroyers of submarines or by' armour carried under the water line, which would mean | less speed. The design of battleships is. of comso c. compromise between armour, hitting power, and speed, but .the tendency has been-to increase speed. 'In twenty years ihe speed of the first/ j lino .(exclusive of battle-cruisers) has | risen frora 16 to between 21 and f/2 | knots, while tho latest vessels are s?nd to be designed for 25 knots. On the question whother it would pay to reduce speed u> secure greater dofe/isivo power expert is divided. : The first oonM'derations, says one powor and protection. Speed, has a strategical yajuo, but it is oipy the means of employing that hi£tin£ power which is. the decisfvo factor ia battle. A number of factors may interfere with speed, such as injury to fqnnols, bad coal, or the disablement of one unit in a line, which would se& a slower speed for all tho other sh/ps. The other school, lays stress <m the strategical and tactical v/due of "superior speed. It not only, enables a fleet to accept or decline ba/fctl© at will, but in battle makes it possible for the admiral to select his principal objects of attack, fight at his own ranges, concentrate his fire, place tho onefny between two fires, and prevent vessels from escaping. It is to the seaman to-day ' what the weather-gauge wijs in Nelson's timo. At the battle «»f Tsushima the Japanese seem to have gained m»ch by tho.higher speed : of, their,. unencumbered fleet. Again and again th/ 3 Japanese ships wero ablo to concentrate uheir fir© on special units-of tho slower Russian line. Theso opposirig views are ah interesting instance rof tho way experts often differ on a fundamental question. The Admiralty wfj doubtless make the experiments snggtistod to see whether addition of undcr-watcr armour will defeat the submarine's purpose, and then it will bo a question whether tho sacrifice, of speed is worth tho additional protection. And Trhile tho Admiralty is making up its mind, torpedoes may bo I made even more formidable than they j ore, and the experiments thereby j nullified.