AIR BLITZ

Auckland Star, Volume LXXII, Issue 90, 17 April 1941, Page 14

AIR BLITZ

BASING PROBLEMS.

"ALL-OUT" FACTORS.

WHAT 9-HOUR ATTACK MEANS (By Si I Ki;.MAN* B. ALTIC'K) (III.) 1 he pre\ ions articles have dealt with preparations necessary for the launching of SOOO tiemian bombers ngainst England in an nil-out assault. Consideration turns now to the matter of some 4000 fighting planes to escort and protect the bombers.

j In the 1940 blitzkrieg the Nazis at first, employed the Douhet theory of concentrated attacks with a preponderance of bombing planes compared to pursuit craft. Theoretically, the Germans would have been in command of the air over England at the end of the first day's continuous raiding. Theoretically, the Nazi losses would have tapered off a« the raid* continued. Actually they did not command the air and actually their losses did not diminish as the en*»affement progressed. ° °

Theory didn't work. So Hitler stopped the daylight raids, took inventory of what happened to his plan and resorted to sporadic night raids. Meanwhile, it is almost certain that he has been amassmg fuel, bombs and ammunition for another grand assault.

j What form might a new attack take? It is entirely possible that the Germans again will "put all their eggs in one basket ' and use bombers in a more extensive operation. But it is more probable that Hitler, profiting from experiences in the September reverses, will use increased fighter protection as a variatjon of the Douhet theory on the assumption th&t pursuit planes not only will reduce losses of the more costly bombing equipment, but also will increase the effectiveness of his combat force.

The Fighter Ratio. Thus. Hitler by protecting his bombers with a formidable array of fighter escorts, would be following the general belief of tacticians that fighter plane protection should be in the ratio of from three to nine pursuit planes to one bomber. This would not mean that the Nazis would need 24.000 fighters to provide a three-to-one protection for SOOO bombers, but it does mean fuelling, arming and basing problems for some 4000 fighters. Again we point out that this figure is arbitrary because it depends upon what type of fighter equipment Hitler uses or has available. If he uses single-seat, single-engine Messerschmitt 100 fighters] the force must be 4500. but if he has enough Messerschmitt twin-engine, twoplace 110's he needs only 3000. These figures do not include replacements. The varying size of the force is due to the fuel limitations of the 109's, which give them less than two hours in the *kir whereas the Messerschmitt 110's have slightly more than three hours' fuel capacity.

The (icrniaiia also have several new types of fighters they may trot out this spring. Ihe most formidable is the twin-engine Focke-Wulf FW-187 twoseater of approximately the same performance and fire power as the ME.IIO. Since the Nazis would not complicate their offensive by using unnecessary equipment it is reasonable to assume that the Messerschmitt 109's would be shelved on the Continent to meet R.A.F. "break-throughs" if there were enough Messerschmitt 110's for the patrol job. If not, the Germans undoubtedly would use all available 110's and augment them with what they considered enough single-seat fighters to protect the bombing waves over England. It is very likely that the Nazis have 30 fields in the Dunkirk-Boulogne ««rea along the Channel, capablc of handling 50 of the twin-engine fighters, the 110's. London is 22 to 25 minutes each way from the bases, enabling the Messerschmitt 110's to stay aloft against the R.A.F. for two hours 'before grounding for fuel. Fuel Gallons by Millions. When the first patrol took off. a second one would move into the bases from the rear to be fuelled and made ready to depart in exactly two hours and take over the patrol work. The first 1500, or what was left of them, would fly back for fuel and ammunition at the vacated bases. With reserve planes filling in blank spots, this patrol must be ready to take the air again in an hour to resume protection for the last waves of bombers.

Each engine on a Messerschmitt 110 burns slightly more than 100 gallons an hour. Thus 1500 would require 900,000 gallons for a three-hour mission. Four patrols to provide eight hours' protection bring the fuel requirements to 3,600,000 gallons, or 120,000 gallons on each of the 30 fields. This would mean the installation of five 15,000-gallon fuel reservoirs at each base, providing that ten fuel trucks would handle the other 15,000 gallons. If reserves filled in for eliminations the fuel tanks would be emptied by four patrols.

Lsing three gallons of oil an hour for each engine would require 108,000 gallons of lubricants, 3600 ga lions on each field. Mcsscrechmitt 110 s now are armed with five machine-guns and two cannon. Modern machine-guns fire at 1200 rounds a. minute and each gun has ammunition for 20 seconds' continuous firing, or 400 rounds. That would put 2000 rounds of the .50 calibre shells on each plane, or 3,000,000 on 1500 planes during each patrol, or 12,000,000 required for eight hours' work. Five explosive 20-millime'tre shells for each cannon per trip means 60,000 shells for the da}'.

j Armourers' Huge Task. ' 'lo get the fighters ready would require three armourers to each plane working j at top speed installing the shells. That's i 150 for each base or 4500 for the fighter complement. In the air the Messerschmitt 110's would require 3000 fighter pilots and 3000 gunners. For the sake of comparison let us see what 4500 Messerschmitt 109's would use and how they would operate. To give one hour patrol duty over London they would hove to be based at fields 20 to 22 minutes away so they could get back to refuel.

Roughly that's eight two-hour flights of 1500 single-engine planes burning 100 gallons an hour, or 2,400,000 gallons of gasoline for the day's work. That's also 72,000 gallons of 'lubricating oil at three gallons an hour. At the rate of four machine-guns and one 20 mm. cannoit for each .ship, 400 rounds for each machine and five rounds for each cannon, the armourers would have to install 19,200,000 machine-gun sheila and 60,000 cannon ammunition during the eight hours. These cannon shells are called half-pounders, but they weigh a little more than that.

Since the single-engine Messerschmitt 109's would have to take on oil and gas after doing an hour's patrol work, while the Messerschmitt 110's would have to land at the end of two hours, not counting the estimated hour flying to and from the English attack centre, the same number of bases could be used in either case. But the ground crews working on 109's would have eight hours of constant preparations because one 1500-plane patrol would be landing when another took off and they would have to keep the fuel pouring into the plane tanks and the -ammunition into the gun magazines to get the fifty that landed at each field 1 into the air again within 50 minutes. Ten crews fuelling the little 109's should be able to do it in six or seven minutes a plane, while the armourers would have to complete their work simultaneously. And What of Britain's Bombers? Bombing bases each require about 100 specialists and helpers, making a total of 10,000 on 100 airports handling five raiderg every 30 minutes. The fighter bases handling 50 planes every hour would require some 335 field workers, making 10,000 more or a total of 20,000 for the aerial blitzkrieg.

To sum up: A nine-hour all-out attack by 8000 bombers, coming in waves of 500 and protected by 3000-4500 fighting planes, would require 130 airfields, S).BbS,OOO gallons of gasoline and lubricating oils, 130,000 tons of bombs, 2670 tons of munitions, and 42,000 combat airmen, say nothing of the groung crews. No doubt Hitler has the 12,000 planes, the 42,000 flyers the 9.888,000 gallon* of gasoline and the 15.670 tons of explosives and munitions. The gigantic task would be to get them together in the comparatively small space of 130 airfields close to the British Isles. And still the job would not be finished. The planes, the men, the j»as and the guns would have to be hidden from or protected from the British bombers before and during the blitzkrieg.—"Auckland Star" and N.A.N.A.