France-A Nation Divided

Auckland Star, Volume LXXI, Issue 177, 27 July 1940, Page 1 (Supplement)

France-A Nation Divided

THE Doumergue Government of political truce was too much for the French. It was kept in power till November only by the "chantage de la rue" (the blackmail of the streets). Any attack on the freedom of the French people has always been followed inevitably by a popular reaction. This has been true of the last sixty years of French political history. Doumergue wu approaching senility and the basis of his National Government was too often mere spite against the Socialists and Communists, who had been driven to sign a Front Common Pact by the growing strength of the Croix de Feu (Cross of Fire), now the rallying point of all the conservative youth. Doumergue tried to tamper with the. Constitution. The Radicals (the Centre party) turned and overthrew him. It was not the Socialists or Communists; democracy had won its first victory over Fascism. De la Rocque himself admitted later that the Croix de Feu had intimidated Parliament with the full approval of Doumergue. It is interesting to note that in Domrtiergue's Cabinet were several men, now notorious as the Bordeaux Government — Laval, Petain, Denain and Marquet, the ex-dentist of Bordeaux, always considered a great potential Fascist leadt-.r. Better known, perhaps, than Doumergue himself wae the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Barthou, who typified the older tradition, "security" at all costs against Germany. Barthou ee.t out to build up a system of defensive alliances against Germany. If meresy for the sake 'oi appearances he kept the.m within the framework of the League, and Germany wa« free to join them if she wished.

It was Barthou who brought Russia into the League of Nations an<J paved tlic way for the Franco-Soviet pact. It was also his ambition to reconcile Italy and Yugoslavia and thus to organise security in the Mediterranean. The English Government was always rather cool to Barthou. Unfortunately his policy wns not finalised at the time of his assassination. Laval succeeded him as Foreign Minister.

What are the factors that led proud France, first to bend a submissive knee to the assault of Nasi Germany, and then to adopt a totalitarian Government herselft In an article last meek Mr. Yor.kne y. a distinguished New Zealand scholar who spent tteveral years in Fiance, tectuihtg for a period at the Teachers' Training College in Gascony, dis cussed characteristics of the French and the growing fight for poxcer between the Leftist and Rightist groups in the Government. The part played by Doumergue, Barthou, Laval De La Rocque and others are dealt with in this article.

By C. S. W. Yockney, M.A.

Laval had the reputation of being a ' defeatist" during the. Great War, and ■since then had moved gradually towards the Right. He soon hinted that he intended to initiate direct conversations with Nazi Germany. He considered Italy much more important than the. Little Entente. He aimed at keeping them both happy by little concessions.

French policy was dominated in 1935 by the Rome talks, and it must 1* agreed that Mussolini completely "bamboozled" Laval. Mussolini, ostensib'.y, joined the Stresa Front against Germany. With her Italian frontier freed, France felt secure, and this security Laval had no intention of jettisoning for the sake of Abyssinia.

Laval must be held largely responsible for the Hoare-Laval agreement. He thought, as many Frenchmen did, that the moment sanctions' were lifted. Mussolini would at once return to the Stresa front. If Mac Donald. considered the question of Abyssinia irrelevant, why should France take it any more seriously? When the British public showed its strength in demanding sanctions, it «eemed that France would have to decide between England and Italy.

The French Press was largely in Italy's pay. It went wild in diatribes against England. Laval, when France surrendered to the demand for economic sanctions, side-stepped, and -was thus instrumental in weakening the League to such an extent that it never recovered. Mussolini repaid him by announcing hi*

adherence to the Rome-Berlin policy , within a few days of the lifting of sanctions. After long and troublesome negotia- ' tions the Franco-Soviet pact had been signed in early May. It was a norin.il , League treaty, open for Germany to sign if she wished. If the League failed to agree as to who was the aggressor. Fiance and the Soviet promised to come to each other's assistance. The pact was signed, but Laval used every effort to delay its ratification, which was left to the Sarraut Government in the following February. Without a military pact, however, the pact remained little better than a symbol of platonic friendship. Internally the Bank of France began to show its power and wrecked' two Governments in quick succession because they refused to submit to deflation. The Chamber of Deputies held out unhil Laval finally formed a Cabinet which acceded to the demands of de I Wendel and the bank. Laval, too, was i thought to be too friendly with the > Fascist groups. 1 The Popular Front The people were so united in their ' hatred of anything that resembled open . Fascism that it was proposed to form ' a united front of Radicals, Socialists ' and Communists. The proposal came from the rank and file of the Radicals, ' who approximated to our Liberals in " outlook. The leaders were not too ' friendly until July, when Daladier 7 came out in support of it. Laval had r lost any confidence he may have enjoyed, and Sir Samuel Hoare's resigna- " tion led to his downfall. It was at this - time that Germany reoccupied the t Rhineland. The Popular Front was born out of 1 the tremendous popular/outcry against - the excesses of the Fascist elements 7 and the sinister influence the Bank of " France had exerted. It was not its ' aim to establish Soviets in France. The t farmers, too, were in violent protest 5 against the big milling and fertiliser trusts. Such was the popular enthusi--1 asm that the Right was scared and s Petain, on the eve of the poll, appealed e for National Reconciliation, a nice c appeal in typical Croix de Feu language, s The Popular Front were elected; the e verdict was against Fascism, deflation, I. the Bank of France, the armaments * ring, and National Government. ,

On the Right, the Conservatives and c Popular Democrats won 122 seats; the 1 Centre parties, the Left Republicans J and Independent Radicals 116; and the j Front Populaire (Popular Front), con- i sisting of the Radicals, Socialists and Communists, 380 seats. But in French politics divisions between parties are not absolute. Many Radical leaders, although in the Popular Front, were not of it and were never Socialist in any sense. In his opening speech Blum declared his intention of carrying out the Front Populaire within the framework of the existing regime. He believed in a peaceful transition to the Socialist State. The first "stay-in" strikes at the beginning of his term of office were a spontaneous movement, started by the ordinary worker, because it was ' felt that Blum would never overcome the resistance of the Senate unless he was supported, or rather, pushed, by the working class. A certain section of the British Press used them to paint France a hotbed of anarchy. This was not the case. I was in Paris at the time, and no- ; where was there any disorder or rioting. The 14th**of July procession was the most enthusiastic Paris had seen. The military demonstration in the morning had shown every section that the Popular Front was capable of looking after France's security. Fascists and Communists argued in friendly groups. The whole atmosphere was cordial. The stay-in strikes were quickly over | and the English Press was bewildered by the Matignon agreement which ter--1 minated them. It gave the workers only what English workers had enjoyed [ for years. The Front Populaire had some excellent things to its credit, and ' was the first Government which went a long way to nationalise armaments. ' Its work with the aeroplane industry | was particularly creditable. But Blum could not overcome the . financial difficulty. The Senate and Bank ; opposed him from the outset. Already, ' in February, he realised that he could not carry on the programme of the Front ; Populaire. He wanted to call a pause. [ The pressure of the banks increased, and 1 finally he submitted and agreed to name " a,, committee of orthodox financiers, including liaudouin, the present Foreign Minister, who effectively checked social I expenditure. > Ten milliards were found fo: arma- . ments, but nothing for public works. ? Social expenditure was impossible. The , pressure of the banks increased and the s Senate finally forced the Blum Government out in June, 1937. This was the

end of the real Front Populaire Government. The tragedy of France was now beginning in earnest, because what followed was not Front Populaire except in name, and was not supported by the [teople. j Chautemps and Bonnet were hated by the people; Bonnet had always conspired against the Front Populaire. By July, 1937, the workers had lost even interest in it. The rise of the Cagoulards (the hooded men) showed the lengths to which the Right would go. Front Populaire Government No. 3 followed, without even Socialist participation. That, ano the trouble in Spain, caused the workers to despair and drove them to strike. International Situation For in foreign affairs, Blum and Del'h)s, his Foreign Minister, were weak. The international situation was hopeless when they took power, so Blum decided on caution and rapprochement with England. Although it was overwhelmingly in the interests of France to support the Government in Spain, the Right Press conducted a furious ?ampaign in support of Franco. They went as far as appealing to Hitler to prevent the French Government supplying arms to the Spanish Government, although very little had seen sent. Britain had clearly told Blum that, should he take sides, and France be attacked by Italy and Germany, England would not consider it unprovoked aggression and would not come to France's aid Blum followed the English lead in non-intervention. For the same reason he refused to follow up the Franco-Soviet pact with a military alliance. Thus, the Munich mentality was already strongly developed in France.

Chautemps had resigned just before Hitler inarched into Austria, some said bccause he kne-v it was about to happen. Daladier took over and aimed at ruling by decree His Minister of the Interior, Sarrau f , openly declared that Communism was the enemy, not Gerimany. British finance was prepared to back Daladier, where it had refused Blum.

The visit of the English Royal Family to France cemented the alliance between the two countries. Daladier was prepared to work in with Chamberlain; Russia was cold-shouldered. Munich saw him rc dy to fall in line. The people found themselves divided bet-ween cowardly relief and a sense of shame. They had once more been *'sold," they felt, by their leaders.

The latter phases of France's poli|tical history will oe dealt with in a final article next week.