AIR WARFARE.

Auckland Star, Volume LXVIII, Issue 201, 25 August 1937, Page 6

AIR WARFARE.

EXPERIENCE IN SPAIN. EFFECT ON INFANTRY. It is in aviation that the main developments are to be noted (writes G. L. Steer in the "Spectator" in an article on "Lessons of the Spanish' War"). Aviation has in this war played a part proportionately greater than in any conflict in the paec, including the Abyssinian. That this is the view of either side is suggested by their renewed importation of foreign 'planes (and, in the case of the insurgents, foreign pilots) en masse, to wrest the mastery of the skies from their opponents. Neither side yet dominates the other in the skies; this has only occurred locally, as in the Bilbao offensive, where attempts to send 'planes to the defenders failed.. But the importance of it was clearly exemplified there, and it is perhaps worth while to see how it operated.

In Viscaya, where the insurgent air fleet of about 100 'planes was probably larger than any used except in the present counteroffensive to the west of Madrid, ground operations were usually restricted to a front of five or six kilometres against which "picked" infantry were thrown after heavy aerial and artillery bombardment. According to German reports, it was found that medium bombs of 501b were the best on entrenched positions. But in fact bombs of all weights up to 5001b were thrown indiscriminately. At the same time bombers dropped incendiaries upon cover (mostly pinewood) behind the trenches, while fighting "planes and cruiser-bombers machinegunned all the roads leading up to the front and other boni'ber squadrons attacked a select civilian population half way towards the base of Bilbao. In Bilbao itself war factories and part of the civilian population were continually under the menace of the aeroplane.

Effect on Nerves. Thus aid to the front in the matter of reserves of men and ammunition was paralysed by day, and an increasing nervousness and unwillingness for war was built up in the civilian population. This defeatist feeling communicated itself very easily to the militia, who as a military organisation were ba-sed on barracks in Bilbao, where most of their suffering families lived. The effect of aerial bombardment on the lines was not, en the smoke cleared away, impressive. Trenches were not seriously damaged, and, except where showers of light 'bombs weTe dropped, most projectiles fell wide of the objective. But death from shock under heavy bombardment was fairly frequent, and the nervous tension to which the untrained infantry were subjected was terrible to see. It was this nervous tension, the moral effect of appalling noise and obscurity, that seemed to me the most impressive work of the enemy aviation in Viseaya. From the moment when th(; distant drumming of the engines is heard to the south, everybody becomes restless and starts cursing and swearing. As the great 'planes approach in massive and perfect formation, the suggestion of dominance and invulnerability is tremendous. This is not a bang in the dark from a cannon: there the cannons are suspended above you, and calm as the sky itself. Everybody takes cover and waito. The whole earth shakes far more terribly than to the impact of artillery: and the noise that follows is more earsplitting. Outside the dugout or the trench it is impossible to see anything for the thick fog of dust and debris, which lies longer than in the case of artillery because it has no carry-forward: and is in all cases, wider and more opaque. It. is now impossible to see whether other 'planes are following up the bombardment, and it is therefore wiser to stay below. Meanwhile, the enemy infantry occupies the line.

Infantry Demoralised. The difference between artillery and aviation lies not merely in the weight of the projectiles and the volume of disorder caused •by bombardment. Mainly, it is the continued dominance of the aeroplane that infantry will not stand. Good officers keep their men in place, but there is always some weak point in the line. At the fame time one's own artillery are silenced by fighting 'planes, which, spotting the fl-a.sh, wireless to cruiser bombers to intervene immediately. A dominant aviation can completely paralyse counterbattery work. The same speed in contact is shown by fighting 'planes if the troops retire. Then is the moment for the machine gun and the small bomb on the back of a movirur target, and casualties are large. It is quite clear from the Spanish war that, given mass production of machines and pilots, the dominant air force wins every time. It may be a long process: infantry morale may be stubborn, but it breaks in the end.

How to meet this menace? Tt is the English theory of the moment that, since the boml>er always gets through, increased bomber production is the answer to enemy air fleets. But the Spanish war suggests that this may be an exaggerated view. The vast majority of 'planes brought down in Spain have been brought down in aerial combat. Successful bombing raids, for instance on Madrid, have generally cost the raiders one or two fighters a time. . . . It is possible to foresee a fleet of first-rate fighting 'planes sweeping the skies, and wars may be won and lost early in the day by their comparative efficiency.