The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. MONDAY, MAY 17, 1920. GALLIPOLI AGAIN.

Auckland Star, Volume LI, Issue 117, 17 May 1920, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

MONDAY, MAY 17, 1920. GALLIPOLI AGAIN.

; -:, For the cnuie the.l lacks aiHetancw, For the wrong that needs retistance. For the future in the distance. And the t/ood that we can. dz-

Xo other British general engaged in the war has literary gifts equal to Sir lan Hamilton's, and the extracts from bis Oallipoli diary, published in our cable news to-day, indicate that the Look has the qualities one has learnt to associate with his dispatches. It is vivid and unconventional, ivnd bears the stamp of the writer's strong and romantic personality. The light he throws on that tragic chapter of the war is of extraordinary interest, yet what he says has the effect rather of throwing what is already known into sharper relief than of revealing new facts. The interview with Kitchener is highly illuminating. Kitchener discussed the coming operations at the Dardanelles with Sir lap., and spoke with the utmost, candour of the conllict between the Eastern and Western schools of strategy in the dispt; =Ui..r. of troo-.s. Then he cal'H >n the chief and deputy-chief of the Imperial General Staff, and told them ot the contemplated attack. It was. apparently the iirest that cither had heard ahout it. though fhr proposal should have been placed before them ami their colleagues for their approv.il. There is revealed the- greatest weakness of Kitchener as a War Minister. lie tried to be Minister and Chief of Staff in the same time, though under the circumstances it is doubtful whether ev*en Napoleon could have Sllcd both positions successfully. So Sir lan Hamilton went oil to the Mediterranean at a moment's notice to undertake a task a!.out which there had been very little dear thinking. Kitchener is depicted by Sir lan as feeling sure that the licet would force the Stniits. and that the Turks would thereupon rise and overturn their Government, in which case there would have been little or no need

for a large and well-organised army, j Lord l-'isher. the chief naval adviser of j the Government, did not favour the] naval operations. The commander of] the Army was given no information.j He set out without any clear knowledge; of the role his army was expected to j play, or of the strength of the enemy. ; ""The Intelligence branch wan a blank," be says. Yet somewhere in the War | Office there must have been information, j about Gnllipoli. Long .before the war ' the Cieneral Staff had considered the question of forcing the Dardanelles, and reported against attack. That report.! for the framing of which much valuable information about the defences of Gal- j lipoli must have been obtained, lay somewhere in the pigeon-holed of the j War Office, but nobody seems to have turned it up. Perhaps none of the | officers concerned knew of its cxi.-tenee. When Sir lan Hamilton had estab- ! lisheil himself at (Jallipoli he -worried j Kitchener about reinforcements. The j truth was it was impossible to send him j as many as he wanted. Britain was ' building up her great army, which was not to be really effective till 1017, and j the Western front had first call. Kit- j ehener told Sir lan Hamilton that the i General Commanding in Egypt would ! help him, but General Maxwell refused j help "because he had his own show to i run." Here again the weakness of the i central control is displayed. It was the business of the Imperial General Staff to distribute the troops among the various I theatres of war: it was for them, and I not for Sir John Maxwell, to say what j troops should be retained in Egypt, j Kitchener had absorbed the functions of the Staff, and it wud not until Sir William Robertson became Chief that they were restored. Sir lan Hamilton's version of the last failure | at' Gallipoli is painful reading. Every- I thing depended on the success of the! operations at Suvla Bay, but they failed j when they should have succeeded. As! he says, the failure within an ace of sue- . cess was enough to break a general's heart. The primary cause of the failure wan lack of determination in the local commanders. "Driving power was re- ' (quired," said Sir lan Hamilton in his ! Idifspatch at the time, "and even a certain i I nithle.ssncsß, to brush aside pleas for a Respite for tired troops. The one. fatal ! error was inertia. And inertia preIvailed." He himself, knowing that things were going wrong, went to Suvla Bay after much precious bad been ]:ist, and ordered an immediate resumption of the advance, but it was too late. Sir lan [ Hamilton had begged Kitchener to sp.nd ! young and energetic generals with tho j force that was to operate at Suvla Bay. docs oir Tan mulic sufficient allowjance for the difficulty of getting such I men? It has always seemed to us thai. lin judging the military failures of .Britain during the earlier stages of Hie war. not sufficient allowance has been jmade for the enormous difficulties inivolved in the rapid expansion of her : armies. Officers h0.71 to be picked up I from anywhere, and staffs improvised. j Eight years was the tim<; set down by Wellington for the education of a staff ofiicer. and much more is required of ; such a man now than a century ago. iThe local command at Suvla Bay was a tragedy, and, judging bj r what Sir lan Ifamilton says, one that might have been prevented. But, taking the whole operation into consideration, Suvla Bay was the result, not so much of individual i failure, as of the new and quite unforeseen conditions of war that Britain suddenly had to face.