OUR "LITTLE WARS."

Auckland Star, Volume LI, Issue 104, 1 May 1920, Page 13

OUR "LITTLE WARS."

DERVISH DEBACLE IN SOMALILAWD. ■■MAMIEI) IX THREE WEEKS. AKKOPLANK TRIUMPH. (Krnm (Mir Special Corrcspradeut.) LONDON", February IS. Will ever tlic British Empire be "all at peace"? Hardly a week passes but we get fugitive glimpses of fighting in which soldiers of the King, white, black, or brown, are taking purt, and uo sooner H. weenie ban one "little war" ended than another one mines along. (if nil the spaces within the Empire's limits Hint luive provided our gallant .-"Klii'is with the opportunity of "salting it down with their bones,"' few tracts ni countn have provided mere than Somaliland, but to-day ivt may at least hope that for many years to come our military budgets will not contain bisr itemot expenditure in connection with that country. According to Colonel Amory's statement in Parliament yesterday—the first entirely satisfactory account we. have had concerning military operations there isince the Protectorate was established livp and twenty years ejro—wo have at length fairly "hurst up" the power of ihe Mad Mullah, a gentleman who has been a very active thorn in Britain's side fur twenty yiurs. I'irst heard of as making trouble some twenty years afro, the Mullah has ever since been a thorn in tin- side of British power in the East. Pretensions to 11 Divine mission, iiud to possession of supernatural powers, were his primary credentials among the trib/smeii whom he gathered to his standard; but a much more potent recruiting agent was the repute which he soon established as a fighting chieftain who was able to set at defiance the authority of a European Power. His savage raids upon the tribes England had undertaken to' protect were, answered by repeated eli'orts to suppress Jiim by military force. Ag;iin and again defeated, he was never captured, and was able to indict in his turn blows which sent British prestige in the country down with .a bang. Finally, in 1900, Mr. Asquith's Cabinet took the grave decision to withdraw from the whole of the interior and confine British administration to a coastal strip—-or, rather, to the coastal towns, leaving the Mullah and liia Dervishes to work their gweet will in the wild country over which they had been chased in vain by our forces. It was a big triumph for the Mullah, and a very nasty blow indeed to British pride and prestige. INatufafly Mohammed Bin Abdullah took full advantage of the withdrawal, and in one way and another made himself so objectionaible that in 1913 the position became so intolerable that our politicians felt themselves compelled to initiate a policy of re-occnpation. One of the first re3uK.3 was a disaster to the Camel Corps which set England by the ears, and a new and determined effori to deal with the Mullah effectively was on foot when Germany declared war' and completely distracted attention from SomaJiland. The best we could do against the Mullah during the war left 'him in undisputed possession of a big half of British Somaliland, and in his ■domain it is said "'untold sufferings" were inflicted on the inhabitants by his savage rule. When th e war was over the ■Government decided that an end must be made of the Mil Hall's power, cost! ■what the effort might. Plans were made, and on Januray 21 bhe campaign opened. In something less than three weeks the power that had terrorised the country for two decades was, Colonel Amery assured itiho House of Commcms, "entirely destroyed." the Mullah having •los-t "the whole of 'his force, all his stock, and all Oiis belongings. , ' The man (himself escaped, but bis is being systematically hunted through the desert. Whether he is captured or not Colonel Amery is convinced that his powers for mischief have g-one for good. The crushing character of his defeat glrrs good grounds for the Colonel's convictions; certainly the Mullah has never suffered anything comparable to the disaster which has' fallen upon him now. The cause of its'completeness, and, indeed, the mninspSing of the campaign was air-power. A single unit of the Royal Air Force, co-operating with a comparatively small number of native and Indian troops, has secured this remarkable result, "with practically no casualties and with a minimum of expenditure." The moral and material effect of aerial bombardment of the Dervish positions was the decisive thing; and Colonel Amery points out that this is the first time that the aeroplane has been "deliberately employed as the primary striking instrument, and not merely as an auxiliary weapon." From the point of view of military science, these operations will be historic, but it may be recalled in this connection, that an attack by aircraft was under consideration early in 1014, as a. method of dealing with the lightning mobility of tlie Mullah's horsemen. At that time the employment of a single Parsifal airehip was contemplated; and any euocess which might have ■ attended that experiment could scarcely have been gained with anything like the swiftness and annihilating effect-of the low-flying aeroplane attacks described by Colonel Amery. The attack opened on January 21, when aeroplanes attacked the forte at Jidali. and the Mullahs camp at Modishe, inflicting heavy casualties and damage. Subsequent bombardments on January 23 practically destroyed the enmp and set it on fire, the Dervishes fleeing to tlio hills to tlie north and north-east. On JanuaTy 28, Jidali was occupied Camel Corps, which had moved up from Elufweina, the garrison having previously escaped northwards into tlie hills. Meanwhile, on January 2i, a force of the King's African Kafles, (from 1,-as Khorai, had occupied Baran, most of the Dervish garrison being killed, and destroyed the fort. Aeroplanes co-operated throughout by reconnaissance work, and by bombing the Dervish forts and parties wherever found. On January 2S, the Mullah, together with his personal following, and the Dervish leaders, left the hills "northwest of Jidali, making southwards. The Camel C-orps took up tlie pursuit, and <m .January :J1 uoroplanes located the Mullah's party cast of Elafweina, and, descending to ]<K>ft, bombed and machine-gunned them, scattering the party and stampeding the riding animals. n. tribal levy 1500 ftrong, under the command of'a British officer, moved eastwards up the Nogal Valley towards Tale, and on February 0 intercepted tjje Mullah's party, capturing large quantities of stock and rifles, as well as the Mullah's personal effects. The Mullah himself escaped into Talc, a walled town, surrounded by thirteen forts, which had already been bombed and set on fire bj- aeroplanes on the previous day. It was now surrounded by. the tribal levy, ami, in ep;te of the,, enormous thickness, of the.

fortilii-atioiis ami walls, was captured by them i<ll t'ebrunry 0. The Mullah himself, with a small party of seventy horaciucn. .escaped, but all tho rest of the dervishers in the forts either surrendered or won; raptured, and largo quantities of stuck ami arms were seized. In tho meantime the force of the King's African Killed, who had occupied Bernn. and naval landing parties from His .Majesty's BUips had been -roundmg up the dervish parties scattered in the hills north and north-wont of Jidali. and hud destroyed tho smaller forts established in the hills and on the const. Here also considerable raptures of rifles and of stock were math l , and to sura up matters organised resistance was at an end.