The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. FRIDAY, JULY 18. 1919. THE TURN OF THE TIDE.

Auckland Star, Volume L, Issue 170, 18 July 1919, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

FRIDAY, JULY 18. 1919. THE TURN OF THE TIDE.

For the cause that lacks assistance, For the wrong that needs resistance) For tlw future in the distance, And the good tliat ice caa. do.

As one enters the long anniversary period stretching from the middle of July to the second week in November a line of Mr. Kipling's comes to the. mind. "The great days range like tidcp," he wrote in October last, "and leave our dead on every shore." The simile was well chosen. In those tremendous days of last year's summer and autumn Fate, moved like an ocean—vast, relentless, and overwhelming. But it not only left our dead on every shore; it bore Victory into every bay. And it was a year ago to-day that the tide began visibly to move with us and against the enemy. Our readers will remember the thrill of relief and joy with which the news of the counter-offensive on July ISth was received; at last the Allies were attacking! But it was too much for most people to think or hope that such wonderful developments _wo.ro at hand as the coming weeks disclosed. lYe did not knowit at the moment, but it was soon to be apparent; July ISth was a turning point in the war and one of the great days in history. Mr. John Buchan .says of Foch's success on that day that "no eye could pierce the future and read the full implication of his victory. Moments of high crisis slip by unnoticed; it is only the historian in later years who can poiut to a half-hour in a crowded day and say that then was decided the fate of a. cause or a people.'' In this case, the truth was clear in the course of weeks, not years. In the middle of July the Cermans counted on victory; in September they

gave up hope, of. even a. drawn game. History has never moved more swiftly or with sharper definition.

Looking back on that morning of July IS, when at dawn Mangin's and Degouttc's armies, preceded by a. great fleet of tanks, broke into the German positions' between Chateau-Thierry and Soissons, one is again astonished at the bitrprise. that befell the enemy. This flank attack was an obvious danger; why had the Germans not prepared against it adequately? Four 7,' ears before they had 'seen their grandiose plan go to ruin through neglect of a similar contingency. Strategy is both simple and complex, [which is the reason why the amateur finds it so hard to understand aud whyhe is often 60 contemptuous of the decisions of the professional. The theoretical opportunities of a commander are often I visible to the, man in tho street. Any intelligent man can see that it would be an advantage to outflank an army here and cut. its communications, or to attack in the centre there and roll up the wings. One often heard such suggestions throughout the war—why did not Joffre or Haig or Foch, or the British at Gallipoli or in Asia Minor, do this, that, or the other thing? Such critics forgot that they were looking only at the map, and were not considering the immense labour of moving armies, tho difficulties in the way of carrying out this plan or tho other, and the counter-plans of the enemy. The immense technical knowledge that a great general requires is enly understood by the student of war. Napoleon had such critics in mind when he said that anybody could plan the strategy of a campaign, but it required a great soldier to execute it. The position before July IS was that the Germans had created this great salient of the Marne, with flanks inviting attack. Anyobservant schoolboy, looking at the map, could have picked on this Soissons-Marne line as a suitable area for an Allied assault. But here we reach the line that separates theory and practice. Foch was not an outsider studying the map. He was responsible for the safety of the whole of the Allied armies, which in four ; months had sustained four great offensives. To make an attack where he did he had to collect special forces, and to do I this he had to weaken other parts of the front. The Germans could not have been blind to the. danger of a flanking attack. jßut their fatal mistake lay in thinking j that Foch had not the means of making I one. They were convinced that Foch's 'reserves were exhausted Foch's general-

'ship lay not jo much in choosing an I obvious point for a counter-offensive, but in so husbanding his resources that be was able to make his attack at the exact moment; in choosing that right moment,' in allowing the enemy just enough lati-: tude for his purpose, and in deceiving him as to his intentions. There is Mr. Buchan"s authority for tho statement that the decision to attack was reached only after anxious consultations between Foch, l?ctain, and Fayolle, and that more than one French commander "viewed the hazard with grave perturbation." Despite their check east and west of Rhoims, the Germans were still very powcirful. Xcap Amiens twenty-two fresh divisions threatened the British. Foch ran a great risk, not only because he was weakening other sectors, but because failure might have, compromised his whole position. Wheu he decided to stake everything on his attack be took, says .Mr. Buchan, "one of those risks without which no great victory is ever won." He was supported in the decision by Sir Douglas Haig, who "gladly consented" to the withdrawal ol eight French divisions from Flanders, and sent a British corps to the Marnc salient.

Tac.tics were the handmaid (Of strategy on July IS. Strategy spread over months placed Foch in the position to deliver his blow; tactics made the blow effective. The striking force was secretly assembled, and a great fleet of tanks, copying the methods the British had tried at Canibrai, forced a way for the infantry. There is no need to go into the. details of these first days of flow. What is more important to remember is that they showed Foch as the superior of his enemy and a master of war, and that their success was part of a great comprehensive strategical plan. l'ocb was "the incarnate spirit of the offensive, and that spirit, kept in leash for four arduous months, had grown with its confinement till, transmitted to every soldier of his command, it became a devouring fire." The Germans showed considerable skill in extricating themselves from the salient; they suffered heavily, but they avoided a great immediate disaster. But the first of a. series of decisive blows had been struck. The enemy, underrating the strength of his opponents, had failed in his final offensive, and was now retreating with severe loss in men, gi lnSa territory, and prestige, lie had lost the initiative, never to regain it. "'Four months earlier LudcndorlT had stood as the apparent dictator of Europe; four months later he and his master were fleeing to a dishonoured exile."