SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS.

Auckland Star, Volume XLI, Issue 33, 8 February 1910, Page 4

SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS.

Though the Federal Union of South Africa is theoretically an accomplished fact, it must not be forgotten that the new constitution has yet to stand a practical test; and, according to present indications, the trial trip or the young Commonwealth Is not likely to be all plain sailing. One of the most encouraging features of the situation is that the Transvaal Boers, under the leadership of Botha, are still true to their compact with Dr. Jameson and the Cape Progressive party, and they are quite prepared to form "a non-party Union Government" on "fusion" lines. But there is another important factor to ba reckoned with in the person of Mr Merrlman, on whom the late Jan Hofmeyr's mantle has descended, and who is "by no means prepared bo follow In the wake of Botha and Jameson. The Cape Dutch party evidently clings to the principles of the old Afrikander Bond, and it is not difficult for Mr Merriman, one of the most astute and resourceful "of African statesmen.

to work up a case against the policy favoured by the Premier of the Transvaal and the ex-Premier of the Cape Colony. ! With his accustomed assumption of frankness, Mr. Merriman is now engaged in speaking his mind plainly. He is for South African nationalism—the old Afrikander ideal—and he has no patience with any kind of Imperialism that would subordinate the destiny of South Africa to the interests or necessities of Kngland. The South African purtr which he leads looks forward, he tells U3, to "managing ite own affairs without interference," and the 'progressive" policy of Dr. Jameson is to him a nondescript medley of British and colonial polities that can never command the confidence of the Afrikanders. In all this there is no doubt a great deal that appeals to the Nationalist sentiment which is yearly gathering strength in South Africa. But it is impossible to believe that Mr. Merriman is moved solely by patriotic impulses when lie elects to stand outside the projected coalition. He is an ambitious man, and he cannot easily induce himself to accept a relatively subordinate position, and follow tamely at the heels of Jameson and Botha. Again, Mr. Merrinwin's past history shows clearly enough that he has more srmpathy for the Boers than for the British Imperialists or the Progressives. But he is not inclined to submerge him self and his following in a united Divti-a. nation—witness his refusal to amalgamate the resuscitated Afrikander Bond with Het Yolk and the Orangia Unie;— still less is he prepared to see the Cape Colony, which the Bondites have so long regarded as the national centre of South Africa, sink into comparative insignificance beside the Transvaal. Personal ambition, jealousy of Botha and Jameson, an innate dislike of British Imperialism, profound confidence in the future of an independent Afrikander nation, and a firm resolve not to allow the Transvaal to usurp the place that the Cape Colony so long held as the natural leader of the South African States—these are the motives which appear to inspire Mr •Merriman just now; and he is a man of such ability and experience, and he exercises so commanding an influence over the Afrikanders throughout the sub-Continent that we cannot afford to ignore him in forecasting the probable course of political events in South Africa.