HITLER’S WORRIES

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 64, Issue 147, 1 April 1944, Page 5

HITLER’S WORRIES

SIX FRONTS TO MAINTAIN. SHORT OF TRAINING RESERVES. LONDON, Feb. 2S. Increasing German difficulties of manpower and specifically her inability. to hold a large number of trained troops as strategic reserves constitute the most important factor that has emerged from recent informed surveys of the European position. In addition to certain specific information from sources inside Europe, a number of pointers clearly indicate the German shortage of central strategic reserves. The shortage is so great that some authorities consider that, with the opening of the Western Front she will have practically none. These pointers include: 1. Reports that Germany will continue to rely on a system of bastion furongpoints for defence against attack from the west, in spite of the failure of similar “hedgehog” systems on the Russian front. 2. The failure ol' the German High Command to supply reinforcements from any central pool for the relief of defeated armies on both the northern and southern sectors of the Russian front. Flar for Western Front.

3. In the attempt to push the Anzio beachhead (south of Rome) into the sea, the Germans brought reinforcements from the south of France. Perseverance with the strongpoint defence plan for the Western Front seems to be imposed on Germany by lack of manpower necessary to hold long fronts. This lack is felt very strongly at the present stage, when Hitler can only guess where the Allied blow, or blows, will fall. He will try to hold troops in conveniently spaced back areas, ready to move where they are needed. It is reported that the Germans may evacuate at least part of Norway so ,ns to concentrate on surrounding the Reich with a move closely integrated ring of defences. If Finland makes peace with Russia, such a move seems almost inevitable, though, if it is made, Hitler is likely to try to tie it up with an attempt to guarantee continuing power for the Quisling administration. Holding down occupied countries is one of Germany’s primary manpower problems, eating up so many men that it must in itself be regarded as an additional “front” for which Hitler has to provide. Internal Resistance. If the now effectually split Russian sectors are regarded as tivo fronts, this makes six for which the Germans must plan —two Russian, one Balkan, one Italian and one western, plus a garrison for the occupied territories. Organisation of internal resistance in France and the Low Countries has now reached such a pitch that invading forces should be able to count on a degree of partisan help comparable with that received by the Russians in their advance. This was one factor, though not a vital one, in beating the German hedgehog system on the Reich’s eastern front, and it must be equally important when the western campaign begins. H Already it is reported that the Germans, fearing a rising m the French southern provinces, have allocated an army group there. When Marshal Broz Tito’s Yugoslav forces and Russians from the southern Ukraine are able to join their attacks, Germany’s south-eastern armies, in the absence of substantial reinforcements, will be worse off than before. Invasion Strategy. The Anzio beachhead has demonstrated the importance of tactical air forces in invasion operations in culling enemy communications and relieving pressure on invading forces. At the same time, Anzio has confirmed what already has been demonstrated on other Italian fronts, namely, that the Germans can right, well and touglily, in spite of the absence of air protection. When the invasion begins, the British and American forces cannot expect to have the same command of the air as they quickly achieved in Italy. It is easy to imagine circumstances in which, to be most effective, the invaders may have to he prepared to operate for a period under concentrated air attack.

Obviously it would be a grave handicap if file invasion were attempted with plans limited either by a slavish determination not to move land forces without complete air domination, or by a general lack of the audacious flexibility which is necessary to exploit fully advantages of even local surprise.