Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit. SATURDAY, JULY 25, 1925. NAVAL CONSTRUCTION.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume XLVI, Issue 10457, 25 July 1925, Page 4

Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit. SATURDAY, JULY 25, 1925. NAVAL CONSTRUCTION.

It is not surprising* that the British Cabinet should compromise regarding the naval programme tor the immediate future, as a crisis at the present juncture would have been disastrous ,to the country in view of the grave industrial outlook. The Government has decided that two cruisers be begun in October, two in February, and three yearly thereafter, with, in addition, the | construction of nine , destroyers and six submarines, besides certain auxiliary vessels, beginning with the next financial year. The position that has arisen is due to the fact that Britain is now 11 vessels behind the original programme laid down < after the Washington Conference, having but 20 new vessels under construction out of the world's total of 362. In 1923, the then First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr Amery, desired to construct 20 new units, including eight cruisers, to replace vessels that would be obsolete or worn out by 1935. But financial considerations necessitated curtailment. Then the Labour Government duringits brief tenure of office made the drastic cut, authorising only five cruisers instead of the eight under the programme fixed by the previous administration. Thus, on assuming office as First Lord, Mr Bridg-eman was faced with the necessity of overtaking' arrears in work that had been originally planned on a low basis. In his Estimates at the beginning of this financial year Mr Bridgeman did not provide for new construction, consideration of which wa's referred to a Cabinet committee entrusted with the task of examining the whole position and drawing up a programme of replacements of cruiser? and other vessels spread over a period of years. It was over this programme that the Cabinet differences arose. Urging that economies could be achieved with less risk than by postponing the replacement of essential ships, the Admiralty—according to one authority— demanded three cruisers in 1925 and four in 1926, while Mr Churchill, taking up his stand on financial considerations, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, was unwilling to agree to more than two next year and three in 1926. In the compromise the Admiralty has won the day, having at command for construction an additional expenditure of £527,170, which, however, is to be made up by economies! under other heads. As the advocates of a larger building programme pointed out, deficiencies in other respects may be met in times of emergency by improvising, but it is impossible to improvise ships.