AN ELECTIVE EXECUTIVE.
Tub remedy proposed by Major Steward, and the score or so of members who tfynk 'with h|n», for the pre,sei}t admitted evils of party government is well worthy of consideration by the electors. Indeed it is with that view that the matter has been taken up; for it was not to be supposed— nor do we understand it Avas ever aupp^sec}—th,|*t. jt} W^ld be adopted by the House as soon as submitted. The proposal iii question is simply that, instead of the Ministry being selected, as now, by one man from one side of the House, its members shall be chosen by the whole House, fjfp %\w whole ifouse, and that the Government so selected shall hold office for the term of the Parliament (subject to a power of removal which we will presently refer to) ; and that there shall be a new election of the Government immediately upon the assembling of the npw Jfpus,e after every general election. The "power off removal would be by requisition to the Speaker, signed by a substantial majority (say two thirds of the whole House, and fflight aPPty to one, or more, or all the members of th§ Government. Such a scheme would do away with the loss of time now involved m want-
of-confidence debates, and, it is contended with mifoh feason, would enable Parliament to despatch its business much more expeditiously and completely than is now possible. Not only would there be no longer the loss of time now witnessed over struggles for place and power, but it would become possible for measures of legislation and finance to be discussed and decided on their merits ; because there would be no question of confidence or no confidence m the Ministry involved m their acceptance or rejection. As was pointed out by the member for Waimate, when addressing his constituents prior to the present session of Parliament, under the existing party system measures of legislation and public policy often are not decided upon their merits, because members are debarred from voting upon the simple issue, the question as to whether this or that proposition should be accepted or rejected on its merits being complicated and confused by the fact that the acceptance or rejection involves a change m the occupancy of the Ministerial benches. That such a condition of affairs is not a necessary part of Parliamentary Government is proven by the fact that it does not obtain at all m Switzerland. There the Government or "Federal Council" is elected for three years by the two Chambers of the Legislature. Want-of-confidence motions are unknown, and Ministers, as well as private members, are free to vote on every question on its own intrinsic merits. There can be no reason why a system which works well there should not work equally well here; and m view of the enormous saving of time and money which it would certainly bring about, this elective Executive proposal may well be considered by all sensible business men. The " silversmiths "of * party will doubtless jeer at the proposition, and raise the cry " great is Diana of the Ephesians," but it will be for the same reason that it was raised by Demetrius of old—namely, that their craft is m danger ; and for that reason the public will know how to value their opposition. That there is a good deal m ♦he , suggestion which has been put forward we verily believe, and we feel sure that the question will yet be earnestly taken up by the public, which has long been disposed to cry, m regard to parties as at present and for a long time past existing, " a plague o' both your Houses."
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AN ELECTIVE EXECUTIVE., Ashburton Guardian, Volume VII, Issue 2491, 14 August 1890
AN ELECTIVE EXECUTIVE. Ashburton Guardian, Volume VII, Issue 2491, 14 August 1890
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