

challenged that under this draft real power would be with the executive, but so it is to-day in most democracies; and it is at least arguable that increasing experience would induce the Chinese to extend the sessions of their People's Congress, and possibly also to institute a smaller standing committee meeting at frequent intervals.

Other criticisms, however, attack the Nationalists not for their Draft Constitution, but for the dictatorial regime which now exists. It is perfectly true that to-day the executive, closely allied with the army, wields dictatorial powers. It is perhaps not unexpected, in view of the length of the war and the fact that the Japanese are still advancing. In our own emergency in 1940 we conceded to the Government powers as absolute as those enjoyed by General Chiang Kai-shek's Government, and we are only cautiously withdrawing them. The test is not how much is necessary for the successful conduct of the war, but what may be expected to remain when the war is over. The Draft Constitution furnishes some evidence upon the latter point, and if it contains some provisions strange to the Western eye, China is to be congratulated that she has at last ceased to construct faithful replicas of Western constitutions quite unsuited to Chinese habits of thought. Some of these abortive Chinese constitutions may be found within the pages of scientific journals.

A different, and weightier, criticism is that the Chinese Government does not always use its powers effectively. It is said that corruption, inflation, and military inefficiency abound, and the attitude to foreign officials has become unco-operative. The latter charge is serious, and was directly alleged in the United States at the time of General Stilwell's withdrawal. It is plain evidence that isolation, brought about by Japanese successes, is doing a good deal of harm. Japanese propaganda has fanned racial prejudice and revived the old sense of Chinese superiority, about which the foreigner complained so bitterly last century. Both have been accentuated by the humiliating defeats which Great Britain and the United States suffered in their early encounters with Japan. More re-

cently there has been irritation at the slow progress of operations in Burma, and magnitude of Anglo-American successes, both in Europe and the Far East, has not yet been assessed. When the Western expert talks of Chinese inefficiency and corruption, his Chinese colleague is apt to retort that these are not completely unknown in the west either; although argument of this kind is profitless to either side, and will change nothing in the Sino-Japanese War until supplies are pouring into Chungking either through a port or by a land route. That will at one and the same time allow China for the first time to fight on more equal terms and dissipate the pessimism and discontent which has recently been growing.

China is to-day as much the testing-point of the diplomacy of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union as Poland is. Divergent policies would lead to internal disorder, an irreparable weakness in the Far Eastern security system, and almost certainly another Pacific war. Conversely, an agreed policy in respect of China cannot assist China to compose her own feuds, and to resume her struggle for prosperity, which was interrupted in 1937, but will make it possible to regard China as the pivot of any Far Eastern security system. Conducting an internal political and social revolution, as well as a long-drawn-out war against an invader, has put a strain even upon China's capacity to endure and remain cheerful, and some of the recent pronouncements of her spokesmen show some evidence of frayed tempers. Can anything be done to improve the position.

The only thing which is likely to be decisive is an extension of the recent successes in the Pacific to the Chinese mainland and the opening-up of direct communications with Chungking. The next would be the preparation and initiation of large-scale measures of industrial development with the very greatest speed. In such a framework there would be far better chances of composing the differences between Nationalists and Communists than there are to-day. However much other allied nations may suggest, only the Chinese can compose their differences, and it might be possible for them to do so if the Draft Constitution