

keeping themselves and their families housed, fed, clothed, and warm.

The result of this failure of the young, the war-time generation, will be that the generation at present directing world affairs in war must continue to direct them in peace. The average age of the generation at present administering the affairs of the world is sixty years. It is the old generation. It has seen World War II arrive in stages after World War I. In twenty-five years' time it will have died out. It will not see World War III. But it has a close and detailed knowledge gained by experience of the causes of World War I and of the factors which gradually but inevitably led to World War II. Its duty is to pass this knowledge on to the new generation that in the normal course would be fresh and eager to carry on from the point of potential progress reached at the end of the war.

The unreadiness of the war generation and the consequent continuance in control of the old generation will result in a hiatus between the old and new generations in the conduct of international affairs. The sides of the gap will draw wider apart as the years go on. The extended period of exclusive control by the old will increasingly qualify them for control at one end of the gap while it increasingly disqualifies the new generation at the other end.

The same artificial gap between generations developed after the last war and for the same reasons. The failure after 1918 to unite the wisdom and experience of the old and established generation with the freshness and eagerness of the new had disastrous consequences. The war generation after the last war, divorced from the control of international affairs, grew increasingly forgetful of the bitterly learned lessons of the past. The necessity for maintaining in peace the degree of struggle carried on during war was forgotten. After about ten or fifteen years two events took shape. The generation of the Great War, because of the death and decadence of the older generation, began to take part in world affairs. And still another generation, the war generation of the next war, began to grow up.

In the meantime the root causes of war, selfishness and complacency in the face of wrongdoing by individuals and nations, had begun to assert themselves. Another war approached, steadily and inexorably. Neither generation clearly saw its approach. Because they had been separated from the lessons of the past, they were repeating the mistakes of the past. And then war came—came as the inevitable penalty for the world's failings since 1918. Of these failings, one which was avoidable, was the failure to prepare the Great War generation for the peace as soon as peace arrived, the failure to hand on the torch in time, the failure to bridge the artificial gap between one war generation and the next.

The first seeds of another war by 1970 have already been sown. The process described in relation to World Wars I and II has already commenced to go round in another cataclysmic cycle towards World War III. The whole process will inevitably be gone through again—stage by stage—unless steps are taken now to prevent it.

The general propositions expressed above lead to the conclusion that what is urgently required now is the diversion towards preparing for the peace of a sufficient proportion of the talents of the current war-time generation contrived in such a way that it results in no undue risk of compromising military victory.

It is therefore proposed :—

(a) That the Allied Nations immediately select a group of their best war generation talent and divert its activities towards research into the immense and complex problems of peace and towards evolving plans for peace by the end of the war.

(b) That such group, or International Youth College, should be selected mainly from the fighting fronts of the Allied Nations—from their Armies, Navies, and Air Forces in the field, on the sea, and in the air—from the war generation which is doing the fighting and knows the nature of modern war.

(c) That they should include representatives of all the Allied Nations.

(d) That the men selected should be approximately between the ages of twenty-five and forty-five. That they