

America might be able to impose its own peace upon Japan and upon areas which must be removed from Japanese domination, such as the mandated islands. But America cannot impose peace upon its Allies. To do so would result in a fatal process which Walter Lippman has described: "A realignment of the powers, with former allies seeking alliances with former foes."

Within the United States there will be isolationist opposition in the assumption of responsibilities extending to the East China Sea and to Vitiaz Strait. There will be sour comments in Congress about "making Funafuti safe for democracy" or "a quart of milk a day for every Solomon-Islander."

Outside the United States, in the countries of the British Commonwealth and in whatever French government may emerge, there will be reluctance to make concessions in national sovereignty even over the remotest and most neglected territories.

Both of these divisive and obstructive elements will be given free rein the moment peace is restored, while neither can exert much influence during hostilities.

A great source from which bitter opposition may be expected is the civilian population of Hawaii. The five largest islands of this group, concentrated at the south-eastern extremity of the chain, have achieved a degree of economic and social development unequalled elsewhere in Oceania. For years before war came to the islands there was agitation for statehood. The politically conscious sections of the populations of Hawaii are oriented toward the north-east, toward the United States, rather than to the south.

But the island of Oahu must always be the nexus of any system of maintaining peace in the Pacific.

If Hawaii were included in a Confederation of Oceania, there is no question that it would quickly assume a position of leadership in the affairs of the entire area. Geographically, Hawaii is the narrow end of the funnel through which all traffic to the North American continent must pass. Commercially and

economically, Hawaii is so much more highly developed than any other island group that it would instantly become the natural middleman between North America and the rest of Oceania. Militarily, Hawaii is certain to be the strongest position between California and Singapore, so long as the United States bases a major portion of its fleet there for the dual purpose of policing the Pacific and defending the West Coast.

Constitutionally, the inclusion of Hawaii in a Confederation of Oceania would pose many problems, and a final detailed solution cannot even be outlined until it is clear what form of United Nations organization will emerge from the war, or rather from the peace.

But a provisional settlement can be made, and in my opinion it must be made without delay if an ocean-wide system of military and political co-operation is to become effective as soon as hostilities cease, and is to have a chance of spontaneous growth in the years immediately following.

On the military side, the "articles of confederation" must provide for a commander-in-chief of all armed forces in Oceania.

If any critic, civil or military, should argue that there will be plenty of time after the war to worry about military establishments in Oceania, since Japan will be supine and we shall have all the installations and material we need, the answer must be: there is not a moment to lose.

For every moment that we lose in instituting a permanent system we lose some of the value of the temporary system we have now established at such great cost. The base facilities which have been constructed, under the impetus of war, have been constructed for the express purpose of winning that war. They were not designed to stand forever, as monuments to the democracies' preparedness as were Pearl Harbour and (ironically) Singapore. These base facilities in Samoa, the Fijis, New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, and the Solomons must be taken in hand as soon as war ends, and must be re-equipped for a long-term, peacetime service. Not only these, but others which cannot now be named.