

imagery that is not shared by other observers close by. It is readily appreciated that such a discrepancy does not cast doubt on the validity of the external world that is derived from the perceptual world; instead, the exceptional experiences that occur under the influence of mescaline or in disordered cerebral function are classified as hallucinations. It will be realized that, when observers report one or other of these exceptional features of their perceptual worlds, the situation is customarily handled in a "common sense" way so that the concept of a real external world independent of observers is preserved. It suffices merely to mention our attitude to such perceptual experiences as dreams and day-dreams.

The conclusion is that every observation of the so-called objective world depends in the first instance on an experience which is just as private as the so-called subjective experiences. The public status of an observation is given by symbolic communication between observers, in particular through the medium of language. By means of this same method of communication, our inner or subjective experiences can likewise achieve a public status. We report such experiences to others and discover that they have like experiences to report to us. A large proportion of our literature is concerned with such verbal communications of inner experiences, either of the author himself or of the characters that he so creates.

When I re-examine the nature of my sensory perception, it is evident that these give me the so-called facts of immediate experience and that the so-called "objective world" is a derivative or representation of certain types of this private and direct experience. But this must not be interpreted as a purely idealist attitude, for the implication is that the perceptual world is my symbolic picture of the "objective world" and thus resembles a map. This map or symbolic picture is essential so that I can act appropriately within this "objective world"; and, as we have seen, it is synthesized from sensory data so as to be effective for this very purpose. It is built upon spatial relations, but also gives symbolic information in terms of secondary qualities. For example, colours, sounds, smells, heat and cold as such belong only to the perceptual world. Furthermore, it is part of my interpretation of my perceptual experience that my "self" is associated with a body that is in the objective world; and I find innumerable other bodies that appear to be of like nature. I can exchange communications with them by bodily movements that give rise to perceptual changes in the observer, for example by gestures or, at a more sophisticated level, by speech that is heard or by writing that is read, and thus discover by reciprocal communication that they too have conscious experiences resembling mine. Solipsism becomes for me no longer a tenable belief. There is a world of selves, each with the experience of inhabiting a body that is in an objective world comprising innumerable bodies of like nature and a tremendous variety of other living forms and an immensity of apparently non-living matter.

It is imperative when speculating on the whole range of the problem of mind and matter to avoid making apparently profound and compelling statements that in fact are merely wishful thinking. On the basis of evolutionary theory it is frequently stated by scientists that the association of mind and matter in the human brain must imply that there is a mental attribute latent in all matter; and that, as the organization of matter gradually became perfected in the evolutionary process, there was a parallel development of the mental attribute from its extremely primordial state in inorganic matter or in the simplest living forms through successive states until it reached full fruition in the human brain. This statement is often expressed as if it were scientifically established, which is certainly not true. It is a purely gratuitous assumption that inorganic matter or that the simplest organism has some mental attribute that is refined and developed in the evolutionary process. There is in fact, much evidence against the belief that there is a mental attribute in