

in which he sits. His hair is plastered down upon the head.

So much for the outward appearance. It may interest those who are constantly pointing to the war as a mark of the failure of Christianity to know that General Haig, like so many of the most capable generals on the western front, is a man of strong religious faith and deep piety—in his case, of the Presbyterian evangelical type. On the whole he is sombre; but he has humor, nevertheless, and he sometimes reveals it through the medium of an apt citation from the Scriptures, which he reads diligently. His intellect is markedly Scotch and metaphysical, and his favorite poet is affirmed to be Robert Burns. It is said of him that he never reads a novel. As a soldier, his real opportunity came in the South African war, for it was his work with the cavalry that brought him under the notice of General French and turned the tide of British disaster. Here it was that his piety especially came to the front. Haig does not swear or gamble or dance all night at revels or affect the dress uniform of his rank. This asceticism has always been understood, for he has the Presbyterian temperament markedly. The officers' mess was not, all the same, prepared for his reply to the quarter-master who asked him during the Colesberg operations if, in a brush with the Boers, he had lost anything. 'Yes,' confessed Haig solemnly, 'my Bible!' Not once did his countenance relax its gravity as he gazed at the grinning faces in his vicinity. To this day, Haig is grimly Scot in his spirituality, attending Presbyterian services every Sunday at the front, revelling in doctrinal sermons that are not at all brief. He suggests Gladstone in a certain passion for theology, and his private library, when he was general officer commanding at Aldershot, was well stocked with works on polemic divinity. Haig has a decided taste for reading, which, even when of a serious kind, is one of his relaxations. He keeps in close touch with the very heaviest periodical literature, and he can read German and French as readily as he reads English. He is, above all, a man of decision, and he profoundly impressed the members of the general staff in Berlin when he studied German army methods there several years ago. In Paris his name was a familiar one long before the present war brought him renown with the multitude, for Haig followed the manoeuvres in the Champagne country and elsewhere in the capacity of British military attaché. Altogether, both by personal qualifications, and by his previous experiences in Germany and France, the British Commander-in-Chief seems specially cut out for the responsible work which he has in hand.

### Peace Talk in England

According to Saturday's cables, a distinguished neutral resident of Berlin, who is visiting Sweden, states that the authorities in Germany 'are co-ordinating their efforts to secure a peace which will not brand them as having been defeated'; and we have been accustomed for some time past to the flying of peace kites and the publication of something not far removed from peace overtures by official or unofficial representatives of the fatherland. But it comes with rather a shock of surprise to find that serious journals and representative and influential men in England are also talking peace, or at any rate are pressing upon the Government the desirableness of making public the peace terms that would be considered satisfactory to the Allies. A writer in the *Fortnightly* declares that 'A careful examination of the speeches made by Ministers, since they discovered that Germany was not going to collapse quickly through starvation or want of men reveals so many discrepancies and contradictions between their most formal declarations that it is impossible to believe that their views are firmly fixed and their resolution unwavering and unyielding.' A contributor to *The Candid Quarterly* also complains that after nearly two years of war nobody knows what the Allied attitude is to be towards peace when the vague rumors emanating from the enemy which even now fill

the air crystallise into definite proposals. He scouts the idea that Mr. Asquith's famous Guildhall declaration was either clear or explicit, and he ridicules the notion that such an overthrow of Germany is possible, as was implied in Mr. Masterman's 'non-official interpretation' of Mr. Asquith's speech. To prove his point he dives into history. 'It is characteristic of truly great minds to arrive, even though by different roads, at the same end. They part on the road apparently never to meet again; but they meet at last and Mr. Masterman's idea of to-day is exactly the same as Napoleon's of a hundred years ago. There is only this difference: that what Mr. Masterman proposes Napoleon actually did. He did it all and more. After the Battle of Jena, in 1806, and the Treaty of Tilsit, in 1807, he left Prussia not only pushed back beyond the Rhine, but deprived of one-half of her territory, not only with her military domination, but with all her military power destroyed—destroyed as it then appeared wholly, finally, and for ever. For he did not leave her even her independence. His armies lived on her, ravaged her, ransomed her, and barred her, and he bound her never to have more than an army of 42,000 men. But it all proved useless. Stein found means to evade the limitation of the army; within six years after Jena, Prussia was found again among the enemies of Napoleon, and in 1813 she sent not 42,000 men, but nearly half the army of 290,000 men to the Battle of Leipzig, which finally defeated him and brought Prussia with the rest of the Allies to Paris and Napoleon to Elba. The truth is that it is harder than Mr. Masterman suspects to destroy Prussia and to keep her destroyed as completely as Napoleon intended.' The writer concludes by suggesting that it would be more modest and wiser to abstain from anything in the nature of 'tall talk,' the only effect of which is to strengthen our enemy.

Finally, a series of letters on the question of peace has been appearing in the influential London financial weekly, *The Economist*, and the views expressed are rather remarkable, coming as they do from men of high standing and acknowledged authority. In the first Lord Brassey reviews the general position thus:— 'As to the objects of the war, the Prime Minister has said again and again that we are out to put down militarism. But unless we are resolved ourselves to disarm—a policy certain, sooner or later, to invite attack—how can we demand that Germany shall be without an army? Do we not hear from the same quarters that we need a larger permanent force, backed by a strong reserve? In a recent letter to *The Times*, Lord Cromer has given us the lessons of his ripe experience and commanding authority. If, he says, the German armies could be completely vanquished, it would be a fatal effort to endeavor to impress from without any internal reforms on Germany. What is chiefly necessary is that the Germans should show signs of conversion and readiness to re-enter the comity of civilised nations. It may be submitted that such signs are not wholly wanting in the German Chancellor's recent speech. The circumstances of the hour would seem to point to the possibility of negotiations which might lead to peace. . . . Surely we may ask ourselves, is it worth while indefinitely to prolong the awful struggle, with its lamentable sacrifice of life, and the waste of resources not easily replaced?' Lord Loreburn, a man of high standing and a former Lord Chancellor, writes even more strongly, and his words may be quoted at length:— 'What are our objects in this war? The view generally held in this country is that we are engaged in what is really a crusade to prevent the odious military autocracy of Prussia from imposing its will upon us after having overrun the Continent. If either the commencement or continuance of war be necessary to defeat so preposterous a pretension, there is not a man worth his salt in the kingdom who would not at any time fight, and, were it needful, go down fighting rather than submit. There are, however, other things besides that and beyond that which require notice. Language has been used by Ministers, some of it explicit