tion of Louvain and Reims Cathedral has naturally called forth the ire of some of its subscribers, who have made indignant protest; but the mental obfuscation—so unexpected in a quarter to which we are accustomed to look for absolute straightforwardness and common sense—to which we have adverted, has, happily, not prevented the American paper from finding space for a fitting reference to the loss which the world in general and Ireland in particular has suffered by the annihilation of the great and historic Belgian monument of learning. Indirectly, Ireland is indebted to Louvain, indeed, for the saving of her spiritual life; for it was, under God, to the Irish College in Louvain that the preservation of the Faith in Ireland in the penal days was largely due. 'The loss of its vast and well-selected library, the accumulation of ages of scholarship,' says an Irish contributor to *America*, 'has been deplored by the world of letters; the destruction of the institution itself will be felt more poignantly by many an American priest, and indeed by the whole American Church, which owes to it many of its most distinguished bishops and missionaries. The Irish Church and people will feel it still more. In the penal days it was preeminently the seminary of Ireland. Archbishop Conry of Tuam, with the aid of Philip II. of Spain, founded in 1616 the Irish College at Louvain, and from it went forth the majority of the heroic priests who saved the faith in Ireland. There a Gaelic press was set up, and from it Ward, Colgan, and O'Clery, three of the "Four Masters," issued besides numerous works of Catholic defence, *Lives of the Irish Saints* and *Irish Martyrology*, and moulded into shape the imperishable *Annals*. They and their successors had gathered into the library of the college the most valuable collection of Irish literary and historical records in or outside of Ireland. Some of these were transferred to Brussels by the Bollandists, whose *Acta Sanctorum* Ward had helped to initiate; but all the rest is destroyed, and much of it is irreplaceable. When John Redmond assembled the Irish Catholics of London to do honor to Cardinal Mercier, he was paying a well-earned tribute to the University with which that prelate is identified; and the Cardinal's cry of "God save Ireland" was but a prayer for the continuance of what Louvain had helped powerfully to realise in the past, the saving of Ireland's spiritual life.'

Japan and the American Attitude

There can be little doubt that whatever anti-British sentiment is to be found in America in relation to the war is almost entirely the outcome of Britain's action in inviting Japan to participate in the struggle, and has little if any reference to the original *casus belli*. It is true that there are a very large number of Germans in America, particularly in some of the large cities. The German immigration into the United States during the nineteenth century totalled 5,009,280, as compared with 3,871,253 from Ireland, and recent statistics show that the inhabitants of New York comprise 322,343 born in Germany and 761,795 of German parentage. Native Germans constitute very nearly two-thirds of all the foreign-born in Cincinnati, three-fifths in Milwaukee, very nearly three-fifths in Louisville, more than one-half in St. Louis, and very nearly one-half in Baltimore. It is estimated that before the United States gained their independence 225,000 Germans had settled there, mainly in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. But notwithstanding the presence and influence of this large German element in the population, there does not appear to be any definite or substantial pro-German sentiment amongst the American people—by which we mean any real belief that Germany is in the right on the original issue, or any real desire that she should come out victorious. Some slight anti-British feeling in some quarters there certainly is: but, as we have said, this arises entirely from irritation at the appearance of Japan on the scene of operations, and at the success which has attended her bid for recognition as a world Power. Even the papers to whom the thought of Japanese advancement is as gall and wormwood frankly admit that on the merits of the original quarrel Britain was wholly and absolutely in the right. The *Philadelphia North American*, for example, in the course of a comprehensive survey of the position from the American standpoint, observes: 'The brutal violation of Belgium's neutrality, in defiance of solemn treaty obligations, made Britain's participation in the war demanded by honor as well as national safety. The position taken by Sir Edward Grey in his telegram to the British Ambassador at Berlin offered irrefutable proof of a genuine desire for peace: "I said to the German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward (concerning the dispute between Austria and Servia) which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go to the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it, this Government would have nothing further to do with the consequences; but otherwise, I told the German Ambassador, if France became involved we should be drawn in." This (continues the *North American*) was masterly diplomacy, in view of the effect which it must have upon the opinion of the world. But it was also honorable and obviously sincere. We would not unsay a word of the praise which we gave to Great Britain's course in meeting the gravest crisis in her national life.'

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But the spreading of the conflict to the Far East it regards as a development which may be more ominous for civilisation than the struggle in Europe; and for this 'false step,' as it calls it, it holds that British responsibility is clear and unmistakable. It sketches the course of the present development in a few swift sentences: 'The threatening condition is due primarily to aggression by Germany several years ago, when she formed a coalition to obstruct the ambitions of Japan; secondly, Japan's deliberate purpose to force recognition as a world Power and to demand a share in the European settlement; thirdly, and most emphatically, to cold-blooded selfishness on the part of Great Britain, which has led her to endanger the future security of Western civilisation in order to serve her immediate interests.' Here is the detailed history of German move and Japanese counter-move: 'Germany's responsibility dates back to her intrusion in Oriental affairs in 1895. Japan had decisively beaten China, and exulted in the holding of Chinese territory on the Feng Tien Peninsula as a prize of war. The German Emperor thereupon proclaimed that the white races were menaced by "the yellow peril," and induced France and Russia to join him in "advising" Japan to withdraw. The Japanese yielded with what grace they could, in the interest of "the lasting peace of the Orient"; but they never forgot nor forgave German influence for blocking their plans. Nineteen years later the opportunity for reprisal has come, and Tokio, in turn, offers the "advice" that Germany abandon her holding in China, phrasing the demand, with calculating insolence, upon that made to Japan by Berlin in 1895. It would be hard to find in history an instance of nicer revenge. But Japanese resentment over being compelled to relinquish territory formally ceded to her by China in the treaty of peace was to be still further inflamed. Within two years Germany herself had seized a slice of China, and had begun the erection of a strongly fortified naval base within striking distance of Korea and the southern part of Japan. In 1897 two German Catholic missionaries were murdered in the province of Shan-tung. This gave Germany her chance. She made four demands upon China; First, a formal apology: second, indemnity for the families of the victims; third, compensation for the expenses incurred in investigating the outrage, and, fourth, the lease of a naval station. China readily agreed to the first three requirements—and Germany did not wait for an answer as to the fourth. Within ten days of the murder a German squadron was on its way to the coveted territory, and within two weeks Kiao-chau bay was in German hands, controlling a large part of the rich province of Shan-tung. Having no other recourse, China agreed to a ninety-nine-year lease.'