viction must stand. In the present case the question is whether there was evidence to go to a jury in support of the charge that on this particular Sunday liquor was exposed for sale in the accused's hotel. It appears from the evidence that shortly before 3 p.m. Sergeant Gilbert saw a number of men going in and out of the hotel, and a woman going in and out of the door and looking up and down the street, apparently on the watch. The sergeant went for a constable, and when he came back the woman was still there. Then, in about fifteen minutes they saw fifteen or sixteen men going in and out. Then the two went to the back door, and met two men in the passage coming out. Then they saw the landlord in the bar with his coat off, the slide of the bar up, and four men in the passage in front of the slide. Two of them had glasses in their hands with liquor in them. There were three other glasses on the leaf of the slide, apparently recently emptied, and two empty glasses on the slide in the King Street passage with fresh froth on them. All the four men said the landlord had shouted for them, and the landlord said the same. All the men gave false names. It is a matter of common knowledge that in a publichouse the bar is the place where the liquors are kept, and the Magistrate, like a juryman, was at liberty to apply to the subject before him that general knowledge which any man may be supposed to have. If the slide of the bar is up so that any one looking into the bar could see what was in the bar, the contents of the bar are exposed, though no witness may come forward and say he has actually seen what was in the bar. If the liquor is thus exposed, and the surrounding circumstances lead to the conclusion that liquor could be had by discreet persons on paying for it, then the liquor is exposed for sale. The evidence, to my mind, abundantly supports this conclusion. The point made, however, in the present case is that there was another information laid against the accused, for selling liquor on the same occasion during prohibited hours, that both informations were by consent heard together on the same evidence, and that the Magistrate dismissed the information for selling, but convicted on the information for exposing for sale. It is contended that as the Magistrate dismissed the information for selling he must have believed the witnesses who swore that the liquor was given them; and that if there was no sale to these persons there was no exposure for sale. What reasons the Magistrate had for dismissing the information for selling I am unable to say. It is impossible to suppose that the Magistrate, as a sensible man, really believed the evidence of the witnesses that the liquor was a gift. I should rather conclude that he did not quite appreciate the effect of section 170 of the Act of 1881, thought that the question of the proof of sale to any particular person might be *in dubio*, and decided on what he thought the surer ground of exposure for sale. The dismissal of the information for selling, like any other verdict of acquittal, means in law no more than that there is no sufficient proof of sale, and is not an affirmative finding that there was no sale. In order to prove an exposure for sale it is not necessary to prove an actual sale. Evidence that might leave it doubtful whether there had been a sale to any particular person might well be sufficient to satisfy any reasonable man that the bar was open for the purpose of selling liquor. Of that there is ample evidence in the present case; and the only question for this Court is whether there was any such evidence. Rule discharged.