

Of the matters referred to the Committee, one only provoked no discussion beyond compliments. This was merely the reporting of a decision of an Arbitral Tribunal that an outgoing member of the Executive Board might not be re-elected unless he were a member of his country's delegation to the session of the General Conference at which the election took place. The decision of the Tribunal was held to be very elegantly argued.

There was more discussion, at the initial meeting of the Committee, on a draft amendment to Article IV of the Constitution, referred from the Beirut Conference. The effect of this amendment was to deprive of a vote at the General Conference any member State in arrears with its financial contributions, unless the General Conference decided otherwise. The discussion was over a further—Australian—amendment that such decision should have effect for one session only, which, in the end, the Committee held was needless. One or two delegations were opposed to this amendment, and one voted against it in General Conference.

A draft amendment to Article V, paragraph 3, of the Constitution arose from the necessity of adjusting the terms of office (normally three years) of members of the Executive Board to the situation arising from the holding of three sessions of the General Conference so close together. Members can be elected only by the General Conference. The question was whether, in order to get into step with sessions held from the present one onwards, some members should be given an extended term, or one slightly shorter than three years. There was a great deal of discussion over the constitutional theory in the abstract, though the difficulties were nullified in reality by the fact that outgoing members were almost bound to be re-elected at this (Paris) session. It was possible, therefore, in the end to persuade the Committee to adopt the common-sense solution (supported by New Zealand), which, in the outcome, was justified by the resignation of two outgoing members two months before the completion of their constitutional term of office. A draft amendment to Article V of the Constitution must now be circulated to member States before it can be adopted by the fifth session, and will need consequential alteration to Rule 97 of the Rules of Procedure.

When it came to discussion of Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, it was thought best to call on a sub-committee. This rule was ambiguous, for as it stood it seemed both to infringe the competence of the International Court of Justice where interpretation of the Constitution was concerned, and to leave vague the delimitation of competence between the International Court and a possible Arbitral Tribunal. Some delegations were much concerned about simple majorities and two-thirds majorities, and there were in all