

have thought of investing any other body with the power of applying sanctions. The very possibility that plural authorities might be set up, each with the power of applying sanctions, would have been considered a grave disadvantage. The answer to the question whether the task of imposing the major sanctions could be reserved to the Security Council no doubt depended upon whether there could be a formal agreement by all parties to the proposed Convention, including all permanent members of the Security Council, to accept as binding a decision by the Security Council taken by a specified majority without a veto. The New Zealand delegation saw nothing unconstitutional or contrary to the Charter in such a voluntary agreement. While aware of the difficulties, they felt that it was the solution which would best meet the indispensable practical requirements laid down by the Commission and respond to the spirit of the Charter.

At a later stage, in an effort to obtain a universally acceptable basis for the resumption of negotiations, *New Zealand* brought forward a resolution calling on the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission (Canada, China, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States)—

“To consult following this session, in order to determine when there exists a basis for agreement on the international control of atomic energy, and thereupon to reconvene the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in order to resume its activities, and in any event to report the results of their consultation to the next regular session of the General Assembly.”

This proposal was immediately accepted by the *Canadian* and *United States* delegations, and was subsequently incorporated in the Canadian draft resolution.

The delegation of *Australia* also proposed an additional clause to the Canadian draft resolution which *inter alia* requested the Atomic Energy Commission to renew and intensify its work with a view to resolving the differences in principle indicated in its reports between the majority and minority views.

At the same time the delegation of *India*, in a further effort at conciliation, submitted an alternative resolution, the operative part of which read :

“The General Assembly, therefore,

“6. Approves and accepts in substance the General Findings (Part IIC) and Recommendations (Part III) of the First Report and the Specific Proposals of Part II of the Second Report of the Commission as constituting the necessary basis for establishing an effective system of international control of atomic energy in accordance with the terms of reference of the Commission ;

“7. Recognizes the grave dangers to international peace and security resulting from the absence of effective international control of atomic energy ;