

For this reason New Zealand put forward an amendment designed to give the Assembly powers sufficiently wide to permit it to consider any matter within the sphere of international relations. We also proposed that when sanctions were called for by the Security Council endorsement by the Assembly should normally be required, and that all members should thereafter be bound by the Assembly's decision. Our attitude on the questions relating to the Assembly was shared by the majority of the smaller Powers, and it is gratifying to be able to report that considerable modifications were obtained in the original Dumbarton Oaks text.

Another major issue in which New Zealand was actively concerned was the rule of unanimity, or the veto of the Great Powers on the *Security Council*. A statement of the issues involved and the part played by New Zealand in Committee discussions is contained in the report on Commission III, Committee 1, elsewhere in this document.

At the Plenary Session on 3 May I dealt with the viewpoint of the New Zealand Government on this question, and stressed what we considered were the grave defects of a security system as laid down by the Great Powers in the Dumbarton Oaks text and at Yalta. As indicated in my remarks on that occasion, I felt it my duty to oppose the adoption of the undemocratic veto, and during the Committee discussions I took every opportunity to request explanations and modifications. In particular we were concerned about the veto which could be exercised by one of the permanent Powers in the Security Council in respect to aggression by other nations. It could be argued from a literal reading of the Yalta text, though, personally, I was unwilling to admit the possibility of such a rigid interpretation, that a Great Power could, if it so desired, use the veto to prevent any discussion on the aggressive action of a smaller nation against another. This particular feature appeared to be capable of reducing the work of the Security Council to futility.

At the outset of the Conference I stated that the veto as a whole should not and could not survive as a permanent arrangement, and that the New Zealand delegation were firmly of opinion that if its adoption in some form was inevitable then its operation should be restricted exclusively to enforcement action and not to peaceful settlement. When the Australian delegation introduced an amendment on these lines the New Zealand delegation gave it their fullest support. Especially did I protest against the perpetuation of the veto in the procedure for amendments whereby alterations to the Charter agreed upon by an overwhelming majority of the United Nations could be blocked by the dissent of any one of the permanent members of the Security Council.

It became clear very soon during the Committee discussions that the majority of the Powers present were opposed to the veto. It was made equally obvious that without the veto the sponsoring Powers would not agree to the adoption of the Charter. This situation, in the last analysis, presented the opponents of the veto with the alternative of voting against it or of abstaining.

In the final meeting of Commission III, I took the opportunity to place on record in the following terms the reasons why New Zealand adopted this latter course:—

“The sponsoring Powers, particularly the three Powers responsible for the initiation of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and the Yalta Conference, felt and indicated their decision that the rule of unanimity among the five permanent members of the Security Council was imperative. They emphasized that it could not be altered or deviated from in matters of substance that might involve serious consequences, and that the veto was a pre-condition of the formation of the new world organization. That was an attitude expressed very clearly, much more clearly than the explanation of the actual detailed effect and working of the veto. There was, on the other hand, at the beginning of the Conference the obvious and apparent inability of the majority of