

1885.
NEW ZEALAND.

NAVAL DEFENCE OF THE COLONY

(CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE).

Presented to both Houses of the General Assembly by Command of His Excellency.

No. 1.

The AGENT-GENERAL to the PREMIER.

SIR,— 7, Westminster Chambers, London, S.W., 3rd December, 1884.

I was lately requested by the Colonial Office to prepare a short memorandum for Sir Thomas Brassey, showing what had been done in providing for the naval defence of the colony in the following points: 1, ships; 2, naval reserves; 3, defence of harbours.

In accordance with that request I prepared the memorandum for Sir Thomas Brassey, of which I enclose a copy, and I took the opportunity of transmitting to him a copy of His Excellency the Governor's address, delivered at the New Zealand Institute on the 4th October last.

I now transmit to you a *Times* (3rd December, 1884) report of the statement which was made by Sir Thomas Brassey in the House of Commons last night.

The Hon. the Premier, Wellington.

I have, &c.,
F. D. BELL.

Enclosure.

MEMORANDUM for SIR THOMAS BRASSEY.

THE measures to be taken by New Zealand for the defence of her coasts are now under the consideration of the Colonial Government.

As regards ships, the colony has four spar torpedo-boats of the second class, 63ft. long, with a speed of seventeen knots, which were built last year by Messrs. Thornycroft. One of them has been fitted with gear for the Whitehead torpedo.

As regards men, the last return gives the strength of the Naval Artillery at 530, of whom 419 are efficient.

As regards harbour defences, full details were given in an address delivered by Governor Sir W. Drummond Jervis, G.C.M.G., C.B., on the 4th October last. In 1878 the Government procured from England a number of 7-in. and 64-pounder muzzle-loading rifled guns; but no arrangements have yet been made for placing them in position. Before these armaments could be properly turned to account it was necessary to prepare definite plans of the works, and with this object the services of an Imperial officer—Major Cautley, R.E.—were placed for a time at the disposal of the Government. Sir W. Drummond Jervis described the measures he would recommend for the defence of each of the chief ports, and proposed that a few of the large steamers trading to the colony should be made capable of being used, in case of need, as armed cruisers. He considered that his recommendations could all be carried out for £400,000, besides some annual expense, in addition to existing votes, for ammunition and stores and the pay of officers and men. These proposals are now before the New Zealand Legislature, which is in session.

F. D. BELL.

No. 2.

The AGENT-GENERAL to the PREMIER.

SIR,— 7, Westminster Chambers, London, S.W., 17th March, 1885.

I transmit to you herewith a *Times* report of what took place in the House of Lords last night upon a motion by Viscount Sidmouth for correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and the Governments of the Australasian Colonies relative to the formation and maintenance of a colonial naval force.

1—A. 6.

You will observe that the Earl of Northbrook, First Lord of the Admiralty, in answering Lord Sidmouth, said that the Admiralty did not think it desirable for them to initiate any scheme for a colonial naval force, and that it should be left to the colonies themselves to initiate one; but that, in order to facilitate the initiation of such a scheme, Rear-Admiral Tryon had had, before leaving this country, communications with the Admiralty and Colonial Office, so that he might be able to lay the views of Her Majesty's Government before the Australasian Governments. Lord Northbrook added that the Admiralty would be most happy to assist in every way those colonies that wished to form a navy, if their Agents-General would communicate with them upon the matter; and he added, "on this point I now publicly invite such communications to be made to us."

The Earl of Derby said that Her Majesty's Government could not bring forward any plan for naval defence until after the creation of some federal authority in the colonies, and could not deal with a question of that kind with a number of divided authorities. On the question whether the Imperial Government ought to take the initiative, Lord Derby said that Rear-Admiral Tryon was in possession of a plan which had been carefully prepared and considered by the Admiralty, in concert with the Colonial Office; and he added that, while on the one hand the colonies had a right to ask that funds locally raised should be expended for the purpose of local defence, on the other it was obvious that local defence could not be effectually provided unless it was part of a general plan, the adoption of which would be much simplified when there was a federal authority to speak in the name of all the colonies. His Lordship further said that Her Majesty's Government were making overtures to all the colonies on the subject, and that the papers thereon would be laid before the Imperial Parliament without delay.

As so distinct an invitation has now been made by Lord Northbrook, I should be glad to receive whatever instructions the Government may think necessary for my guidance in the matter.

The Hon. the Minister for Defence, Wellington.

I have, &c.,
F. D. BELL.

Enclosure.

[The *Times*, Tuesday, 17th March, 1885.]

THE COLONIAL NAVAL FORCE.

VISCOUNT SIDMOUTH rose to move for correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and the Governments of any of the Australasian Colonies relative to the formation and maintenance of a colonial naval force. The noble viscount said he understood that a great deal of correspondence had passed between the Colonial Office and the Admiralty on this subject. He wished to point out how very essential a navy was almost to the existence of our colonies. The naval force which we now sent out to the colonies was totally inadequate at present, and we had done very little indeed towards helping the colonies to establish a naval force of their own. The First Lord of the Admiralty seemed the other night to be under the mistaken impression that he had charged the Admiralty with being hostile to the establishment of a naval force in the colonies. He had not the slightest intention of making any accusation of that kind against the Admiralty, but he did maintain that the effort made by the colonies in providing themselves with ships did impose on the Admiralty some obligation to meet the natural wishes of the colonies. The noble earl the First Lord of the Admiralty had, he believed, said that some kind of assistance had been already given to the colonies, and that several naval officers were already there. He did not want to underrate that assistance, but it had never been definitely stated by the noble earl, and the information he possessed on the subject had been picked up piecemeal here and there. The colonies were extremely anxious for their self-defence, and were more or less waiting for the Admiralty to make some proposal to them. The noble earl was of opinion that the initiative should come from the colonies, but for his own part he ventured to think that they had already taken a step in advance. It appeared to him that two courses lay open to the Admiralty—they might either send out an experienced officer to organize the whole of the local marine, or they might name a certain number of officers to serve in the colonies for a limited number of years, their pay being defrayed by the colonies, and their promotion being allowed to go on in the same way as at present. The latter course would be acceptable to many naval officers who were now in a state of enforced idleness. Looking at the Navy List, he found that there were seventy captains, about seventy-five commanders, and between eighty and ninety lieutenants at present unemployed. As to the first proposal, there was a precedent for it, as in former days, when the East India Company maintained a navy of its own, the Admiralty used to send out a distinguished naval officer, who had the sole management of the Bombay Marine. What the colonies now required was a body of trained naval officers to enable them to form a navy. The colonies had a certain number of men who might easily be trained to the management of torpedo vessels to be used for the protection of their harbours. Such a torpedo force would be of the greatest value in protecting the local commerce of those colonies, which amounted to some 10,000,000 tons per annum, and their enormous coast-line. In conclusion, he begged to move for correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and the Governments of any of the Australasian Colonies relative to the formation and maintenance of a colonial naval force.

The Earl of NORTHBROOK.—I have been requested by my noble friend the Secretary to the Colonies to answer the questions of the noble lord opposite. The noble viscount asked whether applications had been made by the Australian Colonies—viz., Victoria, Queensland, and South Australia—for advice and assistance as to manning vessels of war. I have to state in reply to that question that such applications have been received, and that they have been in every case freely and fully complied with. I may further say that the Admiralty have received the warmest thanks for the way in which they have acted in the matter. I can assure the noble viscount that many

of Her Majesty's officers in the navy would be glad to go out to some of the colonies in the capacity of training-officers. I can also state that many suggestions have proceeded from the Government to the colonies with regard to the formation of a system of naval defence for the colonies. During the last few years there have been constant communications between the Agents-General for the colonies and the Admiralty on the subject, and our naval commander in those seas has also been in frequent communication with the Governments of the colonies in reference to their naval forces. In reply to the next question of the noble viscount, I have to state that there have been proposals made by the Admiralty as to a scheme of organization of a colonial naval force, but the Admiralty are of opinion generally that it is not desirable that they should initiate any such scheme, but should leave the colonies themselves to initiate it. In order, however, to facilitate the initiation of such a scheme Rear-Admiral Tryon, before he left this country as Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's vessels in the Pacific and in the Australian waters, had communications with me and with my noble friend the Colonial Secretary, in order that he might be able to lay before the Australian Governments the views of Her Majesty's Government on this matter. I need scarcely say that this question has been very carefully considered by Her Majesty's Government during the last three years. The next question of the noble lord, being based upon the supposition that nothing has been done in the direction it indicated, falls to the ground, inasmuch as the Admiralty have already stated that they will be most happy to assist in every way those colonies who wish to form a navy if their Agents-General will be so good as to communicate with them upon the matter, and on this point I now publicly invite such communications to be made to us. As to the question referring to nominations to cadetships in the navy, I have to say that those nominations have been thrown open to the colonies for many years, and the colonial young gentlemen are admitted to the navy upon passing a qualified examination. Such papers as can be properly published will be laid upon the table.

The Earl of CARNARVON said that his noble friend might congratulate himself upon having elicited a very important statement, which was well worthy of the attention of the House, and their Lordships would read the papers moved for with very great interest, because he understood that many applications had been made, and that they would show what it was that the colonies wanted and what the Government were willing to do. It seemed to him, however, from the statement of the noble earl opposite, that the whole burden of initiating a colonial naval force had been thrown upon the colonies instead of Her Majesty's Government taking it upon themselves. It was in the memory of many members of that House that some few years ago an Act was passed for the purpose of establishing a colonial navy, and it was a question of no small interest why that Act had failed to answer the expectations of those who desired that it should be passed. That Act had, however, failed to secure that amount of naval discipline which was desirable and necessary in a colonial force, and to bring it into close connection with the British navy. One objection was that the Australian Colonies were either unwilling or, at all events, unprepared to accept joint liability for the defence of the Empire. The facts had disproved this, and there could now be no doubt as to what the disposition of the colonies was. But there was also another objection which claimed great consideration, and that was that Australian ships must never be removed from Australia for Imperial purposes. He was bound to say there was great reason in that objection. His own view, however, was that, first, they should be able to secure that any ship or ships created by Australian expenditure should be maintained on the Australian coast, and, secondly, that those ships should be brought into connection with the Empire, and, where practicable, interchanged, becoming part and parcel of the Imperial naval force. He owned he was disposed to go a step beyond his noble friend. He thought there would be no harm in arranging that every Australian officer in the Australian naval service should directly hold the Queen's commission; secondly, that they should give to the Australian Government or colony the same number of commissions as would be represented by ships which they established and maintained. These ships should be placed—and he would admit of no compromise on this point—under the direct control of the English Admiralty. Nothing short of this would secure the incorporation which they wished to see effected between the colonial and Home naval forces of this country. Either these colonial ships would be maintained on the colonial station or rendered available and interchangeable in time of extreme peril. It had been his lot to watch the growth of feeling in the colonies on this subject. In 1878 he made proposals to these great colonies with regard to incurring joint liability with the Mother-country in various matters, and among others in naval matters, and if his proposal had been adopted much of the trouble which had since arisen in the South Pacific would have been prevented. Still later he was chairman of a Colonial Commission, and there was then much more practical co-operation than before. That was four or five years ago. Since then they had advanced nearer to a common ground. He deprecated the conduct of the Government in not taking the initiative in this matter, and he sincerely trusted that the result of these communications would be to bring about the co-operation of the colonies with the Mother-country.

The Earl of DERBY said they were all agreed that it was desirable the colonies should provide for their own defence, but there would be no disposition on our part to drive a hard bargain. On the contrary, the disposition would be to deal liberally with the colonies. But he was free to say that he went further than this, and that he agreed with his noble friend that the time was very auspicious for the consideration of these questions. There was no doubt various circumstances had arisen to develop a stronger feeling of self-defence and co-operation with the other parts of the British Empire than had existed before. He did not think they could bring forward any plan of naval defence until after the creation of a federal authority. They could not deal with a question of this kind with several divided authorities. Then his noble friend said that this was a question as to which the Imperial Government ought to take the initiative, and that the Government ought not to leave the matter to the colonies. The question of securing joint action between the Australian and Imperial navy was one that had been carefully considered by Her Majesty's Govern-

ment, and he was able to say that the admiral who had lately gone out to that station was in possession of a plan carefully prepared and considered by the Admiralty in concert with the Colonial Office. He hoped that the result would be to create an arrangement which, whether permanent or not, would, at any rate, meet the necessities of the time. He was unable at a moment's notice to pronounce any opinion upon the plan sketched out by the noble earl opposite; but, to show that the subject was not one easy to dispose of, he might point out, on the one hand, that the colonies had a right to ask that the funds locally raised should be expended for the purpose of local defence; while, on the other, it was obvious that local defence could not be effectually provided unless it was part of a general plan. The matter would be much simplified when they got a federal authority to speak in the name of all these colonies; in the meanwhile he could only assure their Lordships that the matter was not neglected, and that Her Majesty's Government were making overtures to all the colonies on the subject, and that papers on the matter would be laid on the table without delay.

The motion was then agreed to.

No. 3.

The PREMIER to the AGENT-GENERAL.

ENDEAVOUR negotiate, subject approval New Zealand Parliament, for first-class cruiser, "Esmeralda" type, with most approved armaments, being specially built, if necessary. To be kept commission Admiralty, but stationed here. Vessel remain ordinary Queen's ship, but disposition controlled Governor with advice Ministers. To be available for coast surveys and educating shore forces, colony paying annually three and a half per cent. on original cost, also repairs, and two-thirds total expense crew and maintenance.

28th March, 1885.

ROBERT STOUT.

No. 4.

The AGENT-GENERAL to the PREMIER.

CRUISER. Will endeavour immediately.

28th March, 1885.

F. D. BELL.

No. 5.

The AGENT-GENERAL to the PREMIER.

CRUISER. Hope arrange Admiralty.

8th April, 1885.

F. D. BELL.

No. 6.

The AGENT-GENERAL to the MINISTER of DEFENCE.

SIR,—

7, Westminster Chambers, London, S.W., 9th April, 1885.

No. 3.

I received in due course your telegram of the 28th ultimo, directing me to negotiate for a first-class cruiser, of the "Esmeralda" type, to be stationed in New Zealand waters.

I have accordingly had an interview with Admiral Sir Cooper Key, First Naval Lord of the Admiralty, and the matter is now under consideration. The first explanations which I have been able to give have been well received, and I have some hope of succeeding in carrying your object. Your telegram leads me to think that you must have been in communication with Rear-Admiral Tryon upon the plan of naval defence for Australasia devised (before he left England) in concert between the Admiralty and the Colonial Office. I have been made acquainted with the proposals of Sir Cooper Key, but am not allowed to refer to them in any way whatever at present.

I am to see Sir Cooper Key shortly again about the cruiser. In the meantime I transmit herewith copies of the formal letters which I addressed to the Colonial Office and Admiralty.

Nos. 3, 4, & 5.

Copies of the telegrams that have passed between us are also annexed.

I have, &c.,

The Hon. the Minister of Defence, Wellington.

F. D. BELL.

No. 7.

The PREMIER, New Zealand, to the PREMIER, New South Wales.

WE have offered to pay interest on construction of one or two ironclads, "Esmeralda's" class, and two-thirds maintenance, but Imperial Government has not yet replied. I will be glad to learn your views.

15th April, 1885.

ROBERT STOUT.

No. 8.

The PREMIER, New South Wales, to the PREMIER, New Zealand.

My views are, that separate colonial navies, or even a combined colonial navy, which seems to be Victoria's ideal, or fragmentary Imperial navies designed for defence of individual colonies, which seems to be indicated by your offer, never can be very efficient; for in event of war the enemy has to be looked for on the high seas, where she will be trying to cripple our commerce, rather than be

waited for in ports, which she will only attack if she finds her path over the seas unmolested. It seems essential, therefore, that the entire sea-going naval force be placed under one control; and thus, while vulnerable points be carefully watched, the main fleet be directed towards the enemy's rendezvous or cruising-ground. The best way of attaining this would be by the colonies unitedly inviting Imperial Government to double, or even, if necessary, treble Australian squadron as promptly as possible, the colonies defraying the annual additional expenditure involved. Lord Derby stated, in one of his despatches, that the squadron at present cost, I think (but I am without any papers to refer to), one hundred and seventy thousand annually. Duplication of squadron would mean about sixty pounds per thousand population, being less than cost of establishing anything like an efficient local navy. We would also have the advantage of periodical changes of officers, skilled in every new development of warlike inventions and practices. Each colony would have its own harbour defences, torpedo-launches, and gunboats to protect the same; but unity of action by the fleet, would, I think, be best secured by the plan suggested.

16th April, 1885.

ALEX. STUART.

No. 9.

The PREMIER, New Zealand, to the PREMIER, New South Wales.

THANKS for telegram. I shall submit same to Cabinet, and afterwards reply. I think there is a good deal to be said for your suggestions.

16th April, 1885.

ROBERT STOUT.

No. 10.

The AGENT-GENERAL to the MINISTER of DEFENCE.

SIR,— 7, Westminster Chambers, London, S.W., 22nd April, 1885.

Since writing to you on the 9th instant, No. 412, respecting the armed cruiser which you No. 6. desired to obtain for the colony, I have had a further conversation with the First Naval Lord of the Admiralty, under whose consideration the matter still is.

From what Sir Cooper Key said, however, I gathered that Her Majesty's Government think your proposal (to pay two-thirds of the interest on the cost of such a ship) is insufficient; but he is to see me again on the subject shortly.

In the meantime you will, no doubt, have heard that the Admiralty are taking up a number of ships to be armed as cruisers. The "Kaikoura" and "Coptic" have been engaged, and I hear it is likely the "Arawa" will be taken up too.

The Hon. the Minister of Defence, Wellington.

I have, &c.,

F. D. BELL.

Enclosure 1.

The AGENT-GENERAL, New Zealand, to the UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for the COLONIES.

SIR,— 7, Westminster Chambers, London, S.W., 7th April, 1885.

In a recent debate in the House of Lords on the question of the naval defences in the colonies the Earl of Derby stated that Rear-Admiral Tryon had taken out with him a plan, which had been devised in concert between the Colonial Office and the Admiralty, for the naval defence of Australasia; and the Earl of Northbrooke invited any proposals to be made to the Admiralty on the subject by the Colonial Governments.

I have now received a telegram from my Government directing me to bring the following No. 3. matter under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government in connection with the naval defence of New Zealand:

Having regard especially to the number of harbours in the colony, my Government are very desirous that an armed cruiser of the first-class, of a type similar to the "Esmeralda," should be specially stationed in New Zealand waters. It might be perhaps necessary that such a vessel should be specially built, as she ought to possess the most approved armaments.

My Government would propose that the ship should be put into commission by the Admiralty, and form part of Her Majesty's squadron under Rear-Admiral Tryon, but that her disposition in New Zealand waters should be controlled by the Governor with the advice of his Ministers, as it would be especially desirable for her to be available for coast surveys and for the training of the colonial forces on shore. With regard to the cost of the vessel, my Government propose that the colony should pay annually $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on her original cost, and also pay for all repairs while stationed in New Zealand waters; further, that the colony should pay two-thirds of the total expense of the crew and maintenance of the ship.

As this proposal necessarily involves a vote of the colonial revenue, it is necessary for it to be made subject to the approval of the New Zealand Legislature. The next session will, however, be held in June, so that no long delay would take place in obtaining that approval.

In the event of Her Majesty's Government being willing to entertain the proposal, I should be ready at any moment to discuss any details with the Admiralty, and to communicate by telegraph with my Government upon any points where further explanation may be required.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.

I have, &c.,

F. D. BELL.

Enclosure 2.

The AGENT-GENERAL, New Zealand, to the SECRETARY to the ADMIRALTY.

SIR,—

7, Westminster Chambers, London, S.W., 7th April, 1885.

I transmit to you herewith, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copy of a letter which I have sent in to the Colonial Office, containing a proposition respecting an armed cruiser, which the New Zealand Government would wish to have stationed in that colony.

The Secretary to the Admiralty.

I have, &c.,

F. D. BELL.

No. 11.

The PREMIER to the AGENT-GENERAL.

REPRESENT Colonial Office and Admiralty greatly aggrieved Admiral's refusal send any vessels New Zealand. Alleges has other use for them. We are spending large sums defence to support naval action, and certainly counted on not being virtually omitted from naval protection. During last five years only fourteen visits English men-of-war, whilst eighteen visits foreign men-of-war same period, of which eleven German. See telegram Governor to Secretary Colonies.

24th April, 1885.

ROBERT STOUT.

No. 12.

The PREMIER, New Zealand, to the PREMIER, New South Wales.

No. 8.

CABINET considered your suggestion. We cannot without consulting Parliament come to any decision that would bind the colony. Would you put your suggestion into formal shape, so that we can submit to Parliament. At present we do not know Imperial views. We may add that we believe no proposal would be satisfactory to our Parliament which did not provide for the presence of one or more of the men-of-war constantly or frequently on our coast. During the past five years we have only had fourteen visits from English men-of-war, whilst we have had a larger number from foreign war-vessels.

3rd May, 1885.

ROBERT STOUT.

No. 13.

The AGENT-GENERAL to the PREMIER.

NAVY. Will see Colonial Office.

25th April, 1885.

F. D. BELL.

No. 14.

The AGENT-GENERAL to the PREMIER.

NAVAL Defence. Instruct whether shall further represent.

1st May, 1885.

F. D. BELL.

No. 15.

The PREMIER to the AGENT-GENERAL.

NAVAL Defence. Continue represent.

2nd May, 1885.

ROBERT STOUT.

No. 16.

The ACTING COLONIAL SECRETARY, Sydney, to the PREMIER, New Zealand.

I HAVE received a letter from the Admiral Commander-in-Chief of this station, in which he points out that one of the most effectual means of defence would be a united determination on the part of all the Australian Colonies to resist all concessions to an enemy, and refuse, under any circumstances, all supplies of coal, as demands might and probably would be made in places comparatively unprotected. He suggests that there should be an united indemnification of such places from loss by injuries inflicted upon them in consequence of their refusal to obey requisitions; that owners and agents of coal-laden vessels should agree to order their destruction rather than permit their falling into the hands of an enemy; all losses to be made good by the united Governments. His letter, my reply, and a minute which I have based upon it, expressing our entire agreement with his suggestion, and our preparedness to bear our proportionate share of any such expenditure, are too long to forward you by telegram; I shall send them by mail. Meanwhile, I should like to know how you view the proposal. The very fact of our agreement to stand by each other against any concessions would, it is conceived, be a heavy discouragement to an enemy operating so far from his base under such hopeless circumstances.

6th May, 1885.

WILLIAM BEDE DALLEY.

No. 17.

The ACTING COLONIAL SECRETARY, Sydney, to the COLONIAL SECRETARY, New Zealand.

SIR,—

Colonial Secretary's Office, Sydney, 6th May, 1885.

I have the honour to submit for your consideration a matter which seems to be one upon

which a prompt and unanimous determination on the part of all the Australian Colonies is extremely desirable. The attention of this Government has been directed to the necessity of endeavouring, in the presence of impending war and possible injury to some portion or portions of Australasia, to provide for united effort—in the first place, in averting or diminishing disaster; and, in the second, in dividing as far as possible the losses which it may entail. In a seaboard of such a length as that which, in order to give complete and universal security, would have to be guarded by a much larger force in numbers and power than any which either the Imperial or Colonial Governments can furnish, it is impossible to guarantee, by any expenditure of means or by any exercise of vigilance, absolute freedom from injury; but the power to inflict serious disaster may be most effectually weakened by a united determination to resist, under any circumstances, any concessions which may be demanded by an enemy, and by an absolute denial of all coal and supplies. It has been pointed out by the Admiral Commander-in-Chief of this station, in an admirable paper which, in the form of a letter addressed to me, is appended to this circular communication, that these demands are likely to be made in places that have no defensive works, and the inhabitants of which might be consequently exposed to the severest injury. As heroic resistance under such circumstances would be the most effectual service that could be rendered to the entire group of colonies, it is submitted that it ought to be undertaken under the amplest united guarantee of all the colonies that the places so resisting should be reimbursed to the full extent of all sacrifices made and all injuries sustained under such circumstances. The general defence would be most effectively served by such an arrangement; and all considerations of justice, and a right appreciation of our common liabilities and perils, and our duty in sharing them and mutually helping and supporting each other, tend to establish the necessity of such an undertaking. With the view of bringing about an immediate arrangement, this Government undertakes, if the Governments of the other Australian Colonies concur in the course proposed, to pay its full proportionate share of all injuries inflicted upon any portion of any one or more of the Australian Colonies which may be occasioned by the resistance of such places to the requisitions of an enemy, by refusal to furnish supplies, by the destruction of coals and vessels carrying them, so as to prevent their falling into the hands of an enemy, and by participating in the expense which may be involved in providing for the widows and orphans of those defenders of the colonies whose lives may be lost in sustaining such resistance. The Government of this country has diminished as far as is in its power the possibility of the cruisers of an enemy obtaining coal at any of the mines upon this coast; but no kind of provision can control the situation effectually unless on the basis of a common guaranteed indemnification against loss by those prepared for an immediate sacrifice in the interests of the entire colonies. It has been pointed out that an enemy could easily seize vessels coal-laden between ports and bring them into safe and unprotected harbours, of which there are several on this coast both north and south of Sydney, and there coal with impunity. No more certain and effectual prevention of this could be adopted than a general order on the part of all owners and agents of vessels coal-laden to destroy them rather than permit an enemy to seize their coal, with the conviction that the entire cost of the sacrifice would be borne by the colonies; and nothing would more thoroughly operate as a deterrent to the invasion of these shores than the knowledge of the existence of such a universal agreement to resist all organizations and to share all perils. The whole question is so broadly and fully treated in the letter attached to this paper that it is unnecessary to state the case submitted at greater length. I now anxiously invite your early consideration of this proposal for united action; and, on the part of this Government, shall be prepared to co-operate with you to the fullest extent, accepting any modifications which may be suggested, provided that the object which it is proposed to attain shall be substantially effected. A copy of this letter has been addressed to all the Australian Governments.

I have, &c.,

The Hon. the Colonial Secretary, New Zealand.

WILLIAM BEDE DALLEY.

Enclosure 1.

MY DEAR MR. DALLEY,—

H.M.S. "Nelson," Sydney, 4th May, 1885.

The great centres of wealth, of trade and commerce—Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide—are 1,400 miles apart. They all are more or less protected by defensive forces and works. Nor must we forget Hobart and Tasmania, with its attachments to us.

It can be shown—

1. That while possibly one of these great centres may be attacked, all cannot be attacked at the same time.
2. That the maintenance of a foreign fleet far from its own shores and dépôts is a most costly and difficult task.
3. That it is the habit of some foreign nations to make war support war, by relying largely on requisitions made on the inhabitants of the country with which they are at war.
4. That a squadron consisting of a few cruisers might expect to sustain themselves by their captures and by requisitions made on places not provided with regular defensive works, unless measures are taken beforehand to defeat them in their object.
5. That there are many such places on our long seaboard of 7,500 miles.
6. That the defence of such places is in the hands of local corps and riflemen.
7. That such corps can offer a certain and effectual defence, and possibly will capture the boats sent from any ordinary naval force or squadron.
8. That history is replete with instances when a few resolute men have resisted successfully very considerable bodies of men landed from ships, particularly when rifle-pits and trenches have been made, and the position studied beforehand.
9. That an enemy has before now attempted to obtain supplies and a compliance with his demands by a threatened attack.

10. That a resistance may cause a destruction of property, and a stern refusal to yield may cause an enemy to endeavour to frighten the inhabitants into yielding, and into supplying his needs.

11. That, even if he does fire his guns, only temporary inconvenience to the inhabitants should befall them.

12. That the slightest concession to demands will be sure to be followed by increased demands, and a lot far worse than paragraph 11.

13. Remembering that, if all supplies are refused, either by force or by the destruction of coal and other stores necessary for the maintenance of his ships, his power to molest other places and other colonies is limited.

14. That, if he expends his ammunition on one place he has all the less for the next place.

15. That, if the system of absolutely securing the denial of all coal and supplies to an enemy is attained, he cannot fail to be greatly hindered.

16. That demands are likely to be made on places that have no defensive works. It is at such places we may rely on the brave hearts of our men and on the courage of our women, which has never failed in the hour of need. They would in their defence suffer (to their honour) in their property and persons for the public weal as much as for the public good.

17. That it is most advisable to bring this home to all.

Therefore, with a view to give force to that great existing national unity which goes so far to command success, I venture to suggest to you whether it would not only be proper, but wise and reasonable, for every colony to agree that, in every case, whether a house, a village, or a town suffers from an enemy because his demands are bravely refused, the loss incurred will be made good out of the general revenue of these colonies.

With the view only to propose a system, the sum required might be contributed by each colony according to its population.

The squadron under my command, I trust, may be able to do much; but the sea is wide, the coming nights long and dark, and the ships cannot be everywhere; but the proposal, if assented to, would very greatly assist the navy in the performance of the task allotted to it, and I shall be proud, for one, to be permitted to share in the cost of the proposal, whether the contribution is based on income or as otherwise decided.

I have, &c.,

G. TRYON.

Enclosure 2.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL,—

Colonial Secretary's Office, Sydney, 4th May, 1885.

I thank you on behalf of the Government and people of this colony for this latest proof of your sympathy with our efforts to organize an effective defence of this country, and for the valuable advice which, on this as on all matters in connection therewith, you have so generously furnished to the Government. I shall take the earliest opportunity of inviting the attention of the Governments of all the Australian Colonies to this important subject, with the view of securing that unanimity of heroic action which you have so ably counselled. This I shall endeavour to accomplish by a circular communication to the heads of the Governments of all the colonies, to which I propose to attach the letter that you have done me the honour to address to me. By a careful perusal of your letter I feel sure that the course of action proposed will commend itself to the patriotism and sagacity of the Australian Governments, and that the object which you desire to attain will be effectually accomplished.

I have, &c.,

WILLIAM BEDE DALLEY.

No. 18.

The AGENT-GENERAL to the PREMIER.

ARMED cruiser question deferred until Admiralty submit proposal immediately themselves naval defence.

18th May, 1885.

F. D. BELL.

No. 19.

The AGENT-GENERAL to the MINISTER of DEFENCE.

SIR,—

22nd May, 1885.

I find I have not yet forwarded to you a letter I sent in to the Colonial Office on the 6th instant, respecting naval defence; and I therefore transmit a copy of the same herewith.

I have, &c.,

The Hon. the Minister of Defence, Wellington.

F. D. BELL.

Enclosure.

The AGENT-GENERAL, New Zealand, to the UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for the COLONIES.

SIR,—

7, Westminster Chambers, 6th May, 1885.

I trust the Earl of Derby will allow me to bring again under his consideration the question of naval defence in New Zealand, submitted to his Lordship in the telegrams from Governor Sir William Drummond Jervois, dated the 22nd and 23rd ultimo, to which his Lordship replied on the 25th.

The New Zealand Government are very sensible of the difficulty there must always be in fettering the discretion of a Commander-in-Chief by particular instructions as to the disposition of

the ships under his command; nor would they wish to be thought unmindful of the great anxieties weighing upon Her Majesty's Government in regard to the protection of British interests in so many seas. On the other hand, Lord Derby knows how sincere has been the desire of the New Zealand Ministers to do whatever lay in their power to support the naval authorities, and to do their part towards the defence of the coasts and harbours of the colony. In addition to the four torpedo-boats built more than eighteen months ago, large orders have now been given for torpedoes and heavy guns, involving an expenditure of more than £170,000, while steps are being taken to carry out in part the plans of Governor Sir W. Jervois relating to batteries; and I have recently, as you are aware, submitted a proposal to Lord Derby that New Zealand should pay interest on the cost of an armed cruiser to be stationed there, and should contribute two-thirds of the cost of her maintenance; on which proposal I hope soon to hear the decision of the Admiralty.

Under these circumstances, my Government direct me to state that they could not but feel aggrieved at what they understood to be the refusal of Admiral Tryon to station any of Her Majesty's ships in New Zealand, as they certainly had counted on the colony not being virtually left without naval protection at a very critical time. During the last five years there have been only fourteen visits of Her Majesty's ships to New Zealand, while there have been eighteen visits of foreign men-of-war, of which eleven were German; and my Government feel sure that it is only necessary to bring this under the notice of Lord Derby in order to show an adequate ground for a respectful request for the reconsideration of the case.

I have, &c.,

The Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.

F. D. BELL.

No. 20.

The PREMIER, New Zealand, to the COLONIAL SECRETARY, Sydney.

I HAVE to apologize for the delay in answering Mr. Dalley's telegram of the 6th instant. We are favourably disposed to your proposal, but we think the condition of resistance should not be included. We may be sure that whenever resistance is feasible or expedient it will be displayed in all the colonies, and in every part to the full extent courage and patriotism would justify. We think it would be better the colonies should agree to joint liability for all damages caused by the enemy, on the basis of a population contribution. Will you consider this modification, and state also how you would propose the assent of the several Parliaments should be given.

23rd May, 1885.

ROBERT STOUT.

No. 21.

MEMORANDUM for His Excellency the GOVERNOR.

MINISTERS have the honour to represent to His Excellency that, as an immediate prospect of war seems at an end, now is a convenient time for considering dispassionately the subject of the future naval defence of the colony.

His Excellency is aware that during the time that war seemed imminent they felt it their duty to strongly recommend to the Admiral commanding on the station the claim of the colony to the presence of at least one ship of war on the coast. The Admiral, however, although he assured His Excellency that the defence of New Zealand was regarded by him as of the utmost importance, stated that he was unable to comply with their request. Bearing in mind the infrequency of visits of Her Majesty's ships to New Zealand during the last few years, Ministers cannot regard this state of things as satisfactory, and consider that the present affords a favourable opportunity for arriving at an understanding on the subject.

It has been publicly stated that the Admiral has made official proposals to the Governments of some of the Australian Colonies concerning the organization of a colonial navy. His not informing this colony of the nature of his proposal may possibly have arisen from a belief that New Zealand requires distinct treatment. Ministers are inclined to concur in this view. Years ago the colony was given to understand that when the fleet in this part of the world became an admiral's command a section of it, under the charge of a senior naval officer, would be assigned to New Zealand.

Ministers are strongly of opinion that such a course would at once be more satisfactory and economical, for the eastern islands of the Pacific could be dealt with advantageously and cheaply by the same section of the command; and they desire to move His Excellency to consult with the Admiral and the Admiralty on the subject. Ministers would be willing to recommend Parliament to favourably consider arrangements by which the colony would contribute equitably to the cost of its naval defence. They have already, as your Excellency is aware, proposed to arrange for one vessel, but they feel that if the colony provided for the maintenance of a vessel of war it should be in connection with a section of the fleet on the station told off to specially attend to New Zealand and the Islands.

Ministers rely that His Excellency will exonerate them from any desire to evade the responsibilities properly belonging to the colony as a part of the Empire. They do not consider that, unless in very grave emergency, they should act without the approbation of Parliament. His Excellency is aware that it was their intention, when Parliament met, to recommend to its approval their offering a force of one thousand well-trained men to the Imperial Government in the event of war with Russia for service in any part of the world. They are of opinion that such a proposal would have been considered by the Parliament of this colony with enthusiastic loyalty. Ministers refer to this intention as showing that during the late period of anxiety they did not take a narrow view of the responsibilities of the colony to the Empire, whilst attending to the immediate and urgent requirements of the colony's own defence.

Wellington, 25th May, 1885.

ROBERT STOUT,

No. 22.

The PREMIER to the AGENT-GENERAL.

Re naval defences.—Represent to Admiralty that the Government considers New Zealand, being so distant from Australia, requires distinct treatment, and should be centre whence a section of Imperial fleet should visit Pacific Islands.

26th May, 1885.

ROBERT STOUT.

No. 23.

MEMORANDUM by the PREMIER of NEW SOUTH WALES.

Naval Defence of the Colonies.

Colonial Secretary's Office, Sydney, 3rd June, 1885.

IF there is one lesson more than another which recent events have taught us, it is that we should be in a better state of preparation with regard to the defence of the whole of the Australasian Colonies, and have some recognized principles as to how far they are to be dependent upon themselves, and how far the work is to be left in the hands of the Imperial Government.

Nos. 7, 8, 9,
and 12.

When I was lately in New Zealand I had some communication with the Premier of that colony upon this subject, copy of which is appended hereto; and since my return I have had the advantage of perusing the able minute by Admiral Tryon, and of conferring with that distinguished officer upon the subject.

I entirely concur in the views set forth by him that each colony should undertake its own harbour defence, obtaining from England such officers as may be deemed necessary, either to superintend the works or to give practical instruction to volunteers or others to whom the work may be intrusted. This local defence would include torpedo-boats, and, where necessary, one or more gun-boats or floating batteries for their protection.

With regard to the sea-going defence, the more I think of it the more I feel convinced that the wisest and most efficient policy would be to leave it entirely in the hands and under the sole control of the Imperial Government.

The objections arising from the risk of a dual control are so great as to impair the efficiency of any squadron. The admiral on whose shoulders the direct responsibility would rest might deem it absolutely essential that at a particular juncture the whole force should be at his disposal; and, although the local authorities would probably be much influenced by the admiral's expressed desire, yet if they were in any way to run counter to it by declining to permit certain vessels to go out of their own jurisdiction, disastrous consequences might ensue which it would be difficult to remedy.

It appears to me, therefore, that the wisest course for these colonies to pursue is to come to some definite understanding with the Imperial Government as to the extent of the Imperial naval force which ought to be maintained in these waters, even in time of peace, or to what extent it should be increased in time of war, and offer that, in whatever degree such force shall, in its annual expenditure, exceed the force heretofore maintained, such additional expense shall be defrayed by the colonies in proportion to their population; such payment being, of course, made directly to the Imperial Exchequer, thus maintaining the force under the direct payment of the Imperial authorities.

If this course be adopted it would be a matter for consideration whether the sum stated by Lord Derby be taken as the basis of the expenditure, or whether some deduction should be made therefrom by reason of the inclusion therein of the cost of the small fleet service chiefly maintained for the purpose of regulating and controlling the Island traffic connected with the labour question. I merely mention this as an item to be considered; but I believe that the principle involved in the main question will be held to be of much more importance than the mere saving which may be effected by the exclusion of the cost of those vessels. When, in my telegram to the Premier of New Zealand, I spoke of doubling or trebling the present squadron, I did not mean that there should be an addition made to these small vessels, nor that the number of each class of other ships was necessarily to be doubled or trebled, but rather that the additional expenditure to be borne by the colonies should be expended in sending to the Australian station additional vessels of the most approved class and construction.

The only point which I would urge in addition is, that the colonies thus contributing should be allowed a certain number of nominations for cadetships in the Imperial navy—not with the view of their being necessarily employed in the vessels of the Australian squadron, but rather with the view of letting the colonies feel that the navy is essentially an Imperial navy, by a gradual infiltration into its ranks of officers of colonial extraction, who had complied with the requisite tests imposed upon applicants from the Mother-country.

Personally I would hope that such an arrangement might be carried on for all time; but, as the relations between the Mother-country and the colonies, especially in the question of federation, may undergo gradual changes in the course of years, it would be prudent to place a limit upon any arrangement now made, with the view of bringing it under periodical review. This limit, however, should not be less than ten years, which I am glad to see is the shortest period suggested in Rear-Admiral Tryon's memorandum of the 27th March.

In estimating the additional cost which is to be borne by the colonies, I feel confident that the colonies would wish that there should be taken into consideration the present values of deferred payments, pensions, or retiring allowances which the Imperial Government may be liable for to the officers and crews of such vessels at any deferred period, even although they may not have to pay them during the time of service of such vessels on the Australian station.

I notice that the New Zealand Premier considers that some provision should be made for more frequent visits of ships of Her Majesty's navy than has hitherto been the case. Although it may

be difficult to lay down any precise times for such visits or their duration, yet the suggestion is one that is well worthy of consideration by the Imperial authorities, not only with regard to New Zealand, but other places; for it would be an unwise policy to allow a feeling to grow up in any of the colonies that they were less worthy of receiving visits from ships of Her Majesty's navy than from those of other nations.

I would urge specially for the consideration of the colonies that the advantage of having an increase to the Imperial squadron, in its fullest sense, instead of having in any degree a colonial navy would be, that we would have the benefit of officers and men specially trained for the work, with an experience gathered in all parts of the world, and of every improvement which naval science and skill can command, both in ships and in other armament.

Whatever decision is arrived at as to the amount of contribution to be paid by the various colonies should be embodied in statutes, and not left subject to annual votes.

ALEX. STUART.

No. 24.

The COLONIAL SECRETARY, Queensland, to the PREMIER, New Zealand.

SIR,—

Colonial Secretary's Office, Brisbane, 2nd June, 1885.

I have the honour to enclose herewith a memorandum upon the subject of united action on the part of the Australasian Colonies for the purpose of naval defence, to which I beg to invite your careful consideration.

The importance of the subject and the desirableness of an interchange of opinion upon it will, I am sure, commend themselves to you, and I take leave to suggest that it would conduce to an earlier mutual understanding if you would forward to the Governments of the other colonies copies of any observations you may think fit to make on the subject.

I have, &c.,

The Hon. the Premier of New Zealand, Wellington.

S. W. GRIFFITH.

Enclosure.

MEMORANDUM.

Colonial Secretary's Office, Brisbane, 1st June, 1885.

RECENT events have impressed upon the Governments of all the Australasian Colonies the importance of making adequate provision for naval as well as land defence, and have, I think, indicated with tolerable clearness the defects inherent in the systems at present adopted. Each of the colonies has made such preparations as it could for defending its coasts—some have provided gun-boats, torpedo-boats, and other floating defences, and all have done their best with regard to their land defences; but so far as regards dealing with a hostile squadron in Australian waters, we have at present to rely entirely upon such ships as the Imperial Government are able to detach for this station. And it is manifest that the ships at present on the station are insufficient both in number and quality to afford such offensive and defensive force as a community of over three million persons, with wealth far beyond that possessed by a similar number in most other parts of the world, ought to have at its command.

I use the word "community" because, although for many purposes the several colonies are and are likely to remain separate, yet from many points of view we are one, and certainly to this extent—that the effect of a hostile attack, or of the presence of an enemy's fleet in our waters, would indisputably be felt by all alike.

Whatever views may be entertained in the abstract as to the duty of the Mother-country to maintain a naval force on the Australian Station sufficiently strong to destroy any hostile squadron that could reasonably be expected to attack us, and to protect the merchant shipping in Australian waters, there is, I think, every reason to suppose that until the colonies take the matter to some extent in their own hands, that degree of security will not be attained which we should like to feel, and which, with our geographical position and wealth, we are alike entitled to expect and bound to insist upon. No nation of a population and importance equal to that of Australasia has secured or can hope to be able to secure immunity from attack without some substantial sacrifice of money for defence purposes, which may be regarded as expended by way of insurance. And, while I maintain that it is in accordance both with the duty of the Imperial Government and with the interests of the Empire of which Australasia is an integral part that the Admiralty should maintain a powerful detachment of the Imperial navy in the Australian seas, I submit that it is our duty, and should be our pride, as self-governing countries to establish and maintain side by side with it an auxiliary squadron specially adapted for the peculiar duties required on this station. The question of expense I do not propose to deal with; but assume that if the desirableness of the end in view be admitted, the same spirit which has lately been displayed in the several colonies, and most notably in New South Wales, would willingly inspire the Legislatures to make all reasonable provision necessary for the purpose.

How, then, can the work be done? It cannot be done satisfactorily by the colonies individually. Supposing, for example, that each of the larger colonies maintained at its own expense, and as its own property, a fast and powerful cruiser under the orders of the admiral commanding the station, the sense of individual proprietorship would be so strong that, in the event of war, a feeling would arise not altogether rational, I admit, but I think too strong to be neglected, that that ship should be specially available for the defence of the colony which owned it. Yet it is manifest that the best course to be adopted for the defence of any one colony might be to concentrate all available force at a distance from it. The decision of such questions must be left to some independent, competent, and trusted authority, who would naturally be the admiral commanding the station,

Another grave objection to separate action would be the greater difficulty of securing a constant succession of officers and men. This is, I suppose, admitted by every one to be an object of the greatest practical importance from many points of view, upon which it is unnecessary to enlarge. In the case of united action this difficulty would be diminished, and might be entirely overcome by satisfactory arrangements which could not be so readily made in the case of separate action.

If, then, individual action would not satisfactorily secure the desired result, the other alternative is combined action on the part of all the colonies. I can see no difficulty in the conclusion of an agreement for this purpose amongst the Australasian Colonies if the several Governments apply themselves to the matter with a desire to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, and I think that the suggestions contained in Admiral Tryon's confidential memorandum of the 27th March, addressed to Sir Henry Loch, the Governor of Victoria, form an admirable basis for such an agreement.

I therefore submit the following proposals for consideration :—

1. That a fleet of six fast cruisers be raised and maintained at the joint expense of the Australasian Colonies in proportion to their population. If New Zealand declines to join, the number to be reduced to four.

2. The ships to be built at the joint expense of the colonies in the same proportions, the type and armament being agreed to by the Admiralty and the Colonial Governments.

3. The ships to be employed solely for the defence of the Australasian coasts and protection of British interests in Australasian waters, unless with the joint consent of all the Australasian Governments.

4. The ships to be commissioned and re-commissioned in all respects as other ships in Her Majesty's navy, of which they would form an integral part, to fly the white ensign (with a distinguishing badge or flag to be devised for the purpose), and to be under the command of the admiral commanding the Australian Station.

5. A sufficient number of sea-going torpedo-boats to be provided on the same conditions.

6. A due regard to be paid to the admission of Australian boys as cadets on the ships of the Australian fleet. This should be the subject of express stipulation with the Imperial Government.

7. An Australian arsenal and dockyard to be established and maintained at the like joint expense. Having regard to the natural advantages of the Harbour of Port Jackson and its nearness to the best supplies of coal, I suggest that the arsenal should be established in that harbour.

8. A Permanent Appropriation Act to be passed in each colony providing the necessary funds to give effect to these proposals—the Act to be in force for ten years, except by the mutual consent of all the Governments, or of all but two, and, in that case, until after one year's notice to the dissenting Governments.

9. A Commission consisting of three members, each being a member of a Government of one of the colonies, to be appointed to represent the several colonies and supervise the expenditure in conjunction with the admiral.

10. In time of profound and assured peace one or more of the ships to be put out of commission or employed on other services to be agreed to.

In these proposals I have, as will be observed, followed to a large extent Admiral Tryon's suggestions, and I have taken this opportunity and adopted this mode of bringing the matter under notice, because it seems evident that no satisfactory action can be taken until some concrete proposal, open to assent or dissent and to discussion, is put forward, and because it appears to me of urgent importance that the opinions of the several colonies should be known on the subject as soon as possible, so that if by any unhappy mischance common action should be found impracticable the colonies may, nevertheless, individually adopt the best measures that are open to them for the protection as well of the general interests of Australasia as of their own.

It may perhaps be expedient to hold a conference of representatives of the several Governments to discuss the subject before a scheme is definitely adopted.

S. W. GRIFFITH.

No. 25.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR OF VICTORIA AND HIS EXCELLENCY REAR-ADMIRAL TRYON, C.B., COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, RELATIVE TO THE DEFENCES OF THE AUSTRALIAN COLONIES.

His Excellency the GOVERNOR to the PREMIER.

Memorandum for the Hon. the Premier.

Government House, Melbourne, 30th March, 1885.

THE Governor begs to transmit to the Hon. the Premier a copy of a correspondence which has taken place between Rear-Admiral Tryon, C.B., and himself with reference to the defences of these colonies and the protection of the commercial interests of the Empire in Australasian waters.

HENRY B. LOCH.

Enclosures.

The GOVERNOR to Rear-Admiral TRYON, C.B.

Government House, Melbourne, 21st March, 1885.

SIR,—

At the conference which was held at Government House on Wednesday, the 18th instant, at which your Excellency was good enough to be present, the questions relating to the defences of the Port Phillip Heads and other approaches to Melbourne were discussed and considered; but there was an important question connected with the defence of this and the other Australian Colonies upon which I purposely did not touch, leaving it for separate consideration and discussion

by itself. I refer to the assistance which this colony and the trade of this colony may expect to receive from the Imperial navy in the event of war occurring between England and one of the Great European Powers.

The area included within your Excellency's command is very extensive, and the numerical strength of your squadron is not large for the duties which, under such an eventuality as war, they would be called upon to perform, while the requirements of the more distant parts of your command might further reduce the strength of the squadron in the immediate vicinity of Australia, and, moreover, the first line of defence may lead to the concentration of your squadron at some distance from the shores of these colonies. Under these circumstances, I should be extremely obliged for your Excellency's views upon the general question, that I may submit the same to my Ministers for consideration. The principal points to which I would venture to draw your Excellency's attention are—(1) the importance of having a certain number of vessels which could not be withdrawn from Australian waters; (2) that these vessels shall be the best of their several classes; (3) that the officers and men shall be acquainted with and well-drilled in the knowledge of the most modern gunnery and torpedo practice; (4) That during war, while placed under the command of the senior naval officer on the station, their first duty shall be the protection of the Australian Colonies.

Your Excellency will also, perhaps, favour me with your views with respect to the number of vessels that, in your opinion, would suffice for this special service.

In seeking for your Excellency's advice on this important subject, I trust it may not be understood as intended to lessen in any way the Imperial responsibility for the external defence of these colonies or for the protection of the commercial trade of the Empire in Australasian waters, in connection with which Imperial and colonial interests are both so closely and largely concerned; but that anything done in the direction I have indicated should be in addition to, and not in exchange for, any protection now provided for these purposes by Her Majesty's squadron in these seas.

I have, &c.,

His Excellency Rear-Admiral Tryon, C.B., &c.,
Commander-in-Chief, Australia.

HENRY B. LOCH.

Rear-Admiral TRYON, C.B., to the GOVERNOR, Victoria.

SIR,—

H.M.S. "Nelson," at Melbourne, 27th March, 1885.

In reply to your Excellency's letter, received on the 24th instant, a copy of which I attach, I beg to forward a reply in the form of a memorandum.

I have, &c.,

G. TRYON,
Rear-Admiral and Commander-in-Chief.

His Excellency Sir Henry Loch, K.C.B., &c.,
Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Victoria.

MEMORANDUM.

CONSIDERATIONS of defence naturally involve an estimate of what they are to be prepared against.

History is apt to repeat itself: squadrons and fleets have escaped the most vigilant admirals, and the most skilful strategists failed in days of old so to order our fleets as to prevent this. Since those days the composition of the navies of the world has greatly altered, and at this time it is far easier for an admiral to avoid notice and conceal destination.

It is possible that an attack may be delivered by a small squadron of ironclads of a type that does not entitle them to a place in the first rank: they would be very formidable if employed to attack our colonies. And still more possibly a hostile squadron might contain vessels of the fast partially-armoured class that are now much in fashion, and the construction of them is on the increase. It is well to consider what such a squadron could do, supposing it had arrived off our coast, having avoided detection, the admiral in command, deceived by false reports, gone to New Zealand, with the telegraphs cut.

If there is a determination to resist, such a squadron, even should it force a channel or the line of defence, unless it is accompanied by a considerable land force, cannot do much against a large population if there is a resolute determination to resist at all costs.

It could effect a certain amount of harm by bombardment; but to such towns as Melbourne and Sydney the injury would not be very great, even if the fleet expended all its ammunition. The more lasting effect would be the destruction of trade, and with it the recuperative power of the country, for years. If, in lieu of resistance, there was hesitation, followed by a decision to yield—a condition I hardly can contemplate—trade and commerce will be equally destroyed; and if there is one thing more certain than another, it is that demands, if yielded to, would have a more disastrous effect on the welfare of the country than ever could be produced by the heaviest bombardment.

History is replete with instances of the successful resistances that can be improvised by large towns against even a very considerable force.

The destruction of trade and commerce, and, with it, the infliction of long and lasting injury, could be also effected by an enemy who sent fast cruisers off our ports to capture our vessels.

To render an attack from the first-named futile, and, if possible, to render the task so improbable of success that no one would contemplate the undertaking, a local defence is called into existence; but, while it is not very costly to protect our homes with the aid of local forces, they do not, and they could not, help to drive off cruisers such as could prey upon us. We must, therefore, provide the means whereby they may be captured, if possible; if not, at all events, driven off our own coasts.

It seems to me that, if our local defences are in a satisfactory condition, a heavy squadron would have no mission in these waters. The cost would be great, the maintenance difficult, and in time it would be overtaken.

From the above it appears that two forces are required, each with its special mission, but each aiding the other. The duty of the first is to defy attack, and to welcome the coming friend and to afford him a safe harbour; the latter to chase and capture the enemy on the wide sea, or, if driven home by superior force, to join in the defence. It appears to me that the local defence forces—I include in this term the naval and military force, the forts, mines, and torpedoes, in fact everything—at Melbourne are designed to comply with one condition—viz., to furnish local defence.

Each harbour has special conditions attached to it. Some may be defended by forts and mines only; in some cases torpedo-boats must be added, and in other cases, such as occur at Port Phillip, where there is a wide entrance to an inland sea, a defence is created by covering the entrance with gun-fire, the channels by mines; the forts and mines aided by a flotilla and by torpedo-boats, so that, if a vessel should, perchance, burst through all, and, though shattered, still be able to punish an undefended town, she would be tackled by a naval force.

Although it probably will not be questioned that a regularly-trained force is a more perfect force in itself than any militia or volunteer force, still there is a reasoning to which weight must be attached in favour of leaving by far the greater portion of local defence in the hands of local corps.

Local corps can be formed on a system which withdraws those who join them but little from those occupations which increase the wealth of the country. Local corps are subject to the keenest local criticism—to a criticism that is perfectly well understood by them, but which would probably ruin a more regular force. The system of local corps tends to identify the population with the defence. It is less likely to languish. It gives experience to many in the supply and in the use of warlike stores. It does not continuously separate the men from their wives and families. It habituates the people to feel that possibly some day they may be required to make personal sacrifices. It gives a sense of security. It tends to allay panic. It accustoms the Government of the country to study the questions involved, and the responsibility that belongs to it on this subject is kept perpetually before their eyes.

Under such a system, more men are trained to arms than under a system based on a permanent long-service force.

The essential to do justice to a local corps is a nucleus of trained men and experts.

But, if we are to have efficient vessels to capture cruisers, they must have thoroughly efficient crews, trained and inured to the sea, and well practised in their vessels. This is a totally different thing to the other.

To keep the crews of such ships efficient, they must be changed from time to time. There are no means of drafting them from ship to ship out here at this time, or of sending them to undergo a course of training in the new methods or new implements for war, or to keep them acquainted with what they have to meet.

I see no way, in 1885, of securing efficiency save by making such vessels *bonâ fide* men-of-war, on the same footing in every respect as all Her Majesty's ships in commission.

I do not understand that your Excellency desires me to draw up a scheme for consideration that does not also pay some regard to the financial aspect of the case, but rather to formulate a scheme which, if adopted, would, in my opinion, give a substantial addition to our naval forces in these waters, and be specially suited for the service required of them.

If the reasoning contained in what I have already written is accepted as right, and assuming that the local defence is satisfactory, it follows that what are wanted in the first place are cruiser-catchers.

In Parliament in London, lately, it was announced that ten additional vessels of what are termed "Scout" class should be added to the navy. These vessels, admirably adapted for the service for which they are designed, would, in my opinion, not have sufficient gun-power, but a design might be got out giving them 6-inch breech-loading guns in lieu of 5-inch. These guns, at moderate ranges, penetrate ordinary ironclads.

The legend of the ship should run thus: 16½ knots, 1,600 miles full speed, 7,000 miles half speed (10 knots), six 6-in. B.L. guns on sponsons as in "Scout" class. This enables two guns to be fired ahead, two astern, or three on either broadside, with shields to protect the crews against machine-guns. A light hog-back fore-castle and poop. This seems to be advantageous, as the seas that run at the entrances of these harbours are often heavy and the "rip" inconvenient; besides, they would give cover for machine-guns, of which there should be an ample supply. Also two electric lights; four fixed torpedo-tubes each side. Quite a light rig, with fore-and-aft sails—in fact, as a whole, a "Scout" enlarged to carry the guns named.

Six such vessels would be a substantial and material additional protection to our trade and commerce; and, besides being cruiser-catchers, are well adapted to join in the defence of any port. Moreover, even if far more powerful vessels appeared in these waters, they would have their mission, which would not be confined to defensive operations. They would be a most welcome addition to Her Majesty's squadron that is usually employed on this station.

I may here point out that, if all the colonies concurred in any arrangement for their protection, economy and efficiency would be greatly increased. For instance, if, instead of each colony ordering its own vessels, or each colony ordering guns or rifles, without concert, an agreement could be come to on such subjects, stores would be interchangeable, and in time of need one would be able to aid the other. If there is no agreement on such points, after action, on refitting, we should have to send to each colony for stores belonging to her ships.

It must be remembered that these colonies cannot be attacked simultaneously, though they might be consecutively if the enemy was successful in his first efforts.

Should it be decided by the colonies to move on the following lines—viz., to create a force suited to these waters and to the special requirements of their case, with the view to increase the Australian squadron—to bring the matter within range for decision I put forward a series of propositions on my own responsibility, but with an earnest feeling that some such force is much required; and, while I personally recommend for consideration each proposition, I quite recognize that it is necessary to convince those responsible for recommending expenditure, as well as the colonists at large, and it is not possible within the limits of such a paper as this to enter fully into all the details involved. It may be recalled that in the reign of Henry IV. the country was much perplexed about the navy, then in its infancy. Matters had not gone well with it either as to expenditure or as to the force produced. It was decided to intrust it to merchants—viz., to provide a navy by contract. The system did not last long, for reasons I need not enter into, but the precedent conveys an idea.

Should it be decided that the highest interests would be best served if the colonies defrayed the expense while the Admiralty supplied men and maintained the vessels, it being clearly understood that the vessels so provided were to be a force, both as to *personnel* and *matériel*, additional to the fleet of the Empire as voted by the Parliament in London, then the following are some of the points that would present themselves for decision:—

(i.) The arrangement to last, say, for ten years, but to terminate only after three years' notice.

(ii.) The Admiralty to furnish the ships, which would be built either by contract or in the dockyards. The ships to be equipped, manned, and despatched as are all other of Her Majesty's ships, the sole reserve being a limitation as to their employment.

(iii.) The class of ship, the design, and estimate to be approved by the Colonial Government and by the Admiralty.

(iv.) The armaments to be approved by the Colonial Government.

(v.) Repairs to be effected, as far as they can be, within the colony.

(vi.) Repairs to be effected in the same manner and with the same authority as is the practice with Her Majesty's ships.

(vii.) The Admiralty to recommission the ships from time to time precisely as Her Majesty's ships on the station. Officers and crews are not to be kept too long on the station.

(viii.) The officers and men to be on the same footing in every respect as the officers and men in Her Majesty's ships. In fact, the ships to be in every sense Her Majesty's ships in commission, and placed under the Commander-in-Chief on the Australian Station.

(ix.) At no time will these vessels be removed without the waters of Australasia without the sanction of the Governments of the colonies.

(x.) During a time of peace the officers and others of such ships as are not in active commission could be well employed to instruct the reserve forces and Volunteers. A special arrangement on this subject would be necessary.

(xi.) Nothing in the above regulations prevents any colony possessing itself of other vessels for other purposes. Such vessels will fly, as now, the colonial flag, and this applies to all vessels the property of colonial Governments when they are not placed under the naval Commander-in-Chief. When under the Commander-in-Chief they would fly the white ensign, and be like other ships of the squadron.

(xii.) The entire cost of *matériel*, of maintenance, and of *personnel*, including the ultimate liability of Her Majesty's Government on account of deferred pay for officers and men for the periods they serve in such ships, to be borne by the colony.

That there is a distinct call for every endeavour that can tend to protect our commerce cannot be questioned. More sea-going tonnage enters one port within these colonies annually than entered the Thames at the time when Her Majesty came to the throne within the same period.

There is no colony that does not possess statistics that clearly demonstrate how small a percentage would be called for out of the profits of that trade to afford a reasonable amount of protection; and a first step in this direction would be taken if we provided ourselves with cruiser-catchers, and to the cruisers I should desire to add torpedo-boats capable of going from port to port. They would be especially valuable to cover a long stretch of one coast. The possession of such boats, kept always at the end of a telegraph wire, would effectually prevent an enemy anchoring near our shores.

I recommend the adoption of a dropping arrangement, which could be fitted in a few hours to local small steamboats, such as we have on board H.M.S. "Nelson," for Whitehead torpedoes. It is inexpensive in construction and maintenance, and enables us to largely supplement more regular torpedo-boats for harbour defence, in a ready and effectual way. There should be torpedo-stations on shore, a small pier where the boats could rest in safety, and two air-compressing engines in different positions within the heads, and two skilled hands at each station.

I have dwelt specially on the defence of our principal ports (I have previously written on the defence of Newcastle and Sydney) because I feel that, if the principal temptations to attack are removed, and the largest prizes are shielded, it would not be worth while for an enemy to detach important squadrons for the purpose of destroying less important places; and thus the whole of the colonies and every place would receive benefit, inasmuch as they would not be liable to be devastated by an overwhelming force.

Cruisers and unarmoured ships can do little against a comparatively very small defence; and it will be noticed that, while I have recommended the adoption of cruiser-catchers, I have not been unmindful of the long stretches of these shores where the efforts of the enemy would be best defeated by another class of boat.

It may not be out of place here to mention, seeing that success engenders success, that, if all united to pay the losses suffered at any spot on our shores owing to the resistance the inhabitants

made, either to the demands of an enemy or to an actual attack, it could not do otherwise than provoke that unity of action and of feeling that goes so far to assure success.

I am aware that this report may be held not to go so far as is contemplated in your Excellency's letter to which it is a reply; but I need hardly do more than mention to your Excellency that a navy cannot be created in a day, and that it is hardly the time to consider what force would be sufficient to give security against this or that force; that a great deal can be done if all pull together to meet present emergency; and the foundation of a force might well be laid that would grow with the growth of our colonies.

Proposed Sea-going Colonial Fleet.—If all joined, including New Zealand: Six cruiser-catchers, eight torpedo-boats, sea-going, say, of 150 tons. The above to be furnished, manned, and maintained by the Admiralty at the cost of the colonies. A portion of this force only to remain in commission during a time of peace.

Local Defences.—To be officered and manned by local forces—viz., harbour-defence vessels and Whitehead torpedo-boats, small class generally speaking; batteries and mines, to be intrusted to local corps.

That local corps should have a good nucleus of highly-trained men is an essential condition.

The Whitehead system to enter largely into the system of defence, and dropping-gear to be provided in readiness to be fitted to local boats, to supplement the regular torpedo-boats.

No. 26.

MEMORANDUM for His Excellency the GOVERNOR.

No. 21. **MINISTERS** had the honour, on the 25th May, to forward to His Excellency a memorandum relating to the naval defence of New Zealand.

No. 25. Ministers have read the correspondence between His Excellency the Governor of Victoria and His Excellency Rear-Admiral Tryon, C.B., referring to the naval defence of the Australian Colonies, which, at the request of the Admiral, was shown to them by your Excellency. It would appear that this correspondence was begun by His Excellency the Governor of Victoria drawing the attention of the Admiral to certain points relating to the naval defence of the Colony of Victoria. The points to which His Excellency especially drew attention were: (1) The importance of having a certain number of vessels which could not be withdrawn from Australian waters; (2) that these vessels should be the best of their several classes; (3) that the officers and men should be acquainted with and well drilled in the knowledge of modern gunnery and torpedo practice; (4) that during war, while placed under the command of the senior naval officer on the station, their first duty should be for the protection of the Australian Colonies.

His Excellency the Governor of Victoria also requested the Admiral's opinion on the "extent and character of the naval defence which it may be advisable to provide for the external security" of the Colony of Victoria and the other Australasian Colonies. He also asked the Admiral's views on certain questions of defences of parts of Victoria.

In the memorandum which the Admiral has furnished as a reply to the questions put to him, the question of defence may be classed under four heads: (1) A land defence, including trained men and batteries; (2) a local sea defence, including harbour-defence vessels, Whitehead torpedo-boats, batteries, mines, &c.; (3) a sea-going colonial fleet, consisting of six "cruiser-catchers" or "Scouts," and eight torpedo-boats, sea-going, say, of 150 tons; and (4) the aid from the Imperial navy.

So far as appears from the memorandum, the position that New Zealand is to occupy in the scheme of defence is only incidentally alluded to.

While there are many observations in the memorandum that are of service to New Zealand in dealing with the question of local defence, Ministers are of opinion that the exact position that New Zealand should take in providing for local naval defence is not defined, and they feel that it would be impossible, from the memorandum, to submit any proposals to Parliament to deal with the subject.

Ministers at once admit that, from an Imperial point of view, the defences of New Zealand and Australia may be considered as bound up together. They are of opinion, however, that New Zealand is so exceptionally situated, being so distant from Australia, that no system of naval defence would be complete which did not make New Zealand the head-quarters of a section of the Australasian fleet. This was pointed out in the previous memorandum of the Ministers, and they do not require to urge it further.

As to the sea-going colonial fleet, to consist of six cruiser-catchers and eight torpedo-boats, Ministers have no information as to how these are to be located, nor how worked. A torpedo-boat of 150 tons, stationed in any of the Australian ports, could be of no service to New Zealand, save, perhaps, in attacking vessels that might, if not attacked, proceed to this colony. As to the "cruiser-catchers," these, no doubt, would be of some service to New Zealand, wherever located, as they would be cruising in the Pacific on the look-out for enemy's ships.

His Excellency is aware that Ministers submitted a proposition to the Admiralty, bearing date the 28th March last, for the location of a cruiser of the "Esmeralda" type on the shores of New Zealand; but as yet they have not had the Admiralty's decision on their proposal.

That proposal fits in with the views expressed by the Admiral. Ministers foresaw the advantages, so ably described by the Admiral, of having the ship manned and under the control of the Admiralty. The ship being at the disposition, as far as concerns movements from one part of the coast to another and to the eastern Pacific Islands, of the Governor in Council during times of peace does not affect the general question; nor is there any divergence of principle, in the proposal of how payment is to be made, between Ministers' proposals and those of the Admiral,

Ministers thought it better that the colony should not purchase the vessel, but merely pay interest on the cost, as the type of suitable vessels changes so often, and the colony could not always be buying new vessels, whilst the Admiralty can find employment for vessels that are not quite up to the most modern requirements. Ministers also proposed that some portion of the annual cost of the vessel should be borne by the Imperial Government; but, again, that is a matter of detail; and substantially it may be taken that, so far as concerns New Zealand being willing to maintain a vessel under the condition of Imperial management, Ministers have already shown themselves favourable to the proposal.

But the Admiral himself designs that each colonial vessel should be an adjunct to Her Majesty's vessels on the station: their use, in fact, he specially shows, is as an adjunct. Ministers therefore hope that the Admiral will see that the distance from Australia makes the request previously referred to reasonable—that a portion of the fleet, under a senior naval officer, should have its head-quarters at New Zealand, to serve that colony and the eastern Islands. The Admiral's representations to that effect would greatly promote the scheme described in his correspondence with Sir Henry Loch.

Ministers venture to point out that it has been authoritatively stated that cruisers being able to steam at full speed only up to $16\frac{1}{2}$ knots would be of little service in attacking some of the vessels that are now constructed and afloat. This, however, is a matter on which the Admiralty are better able to express an opinion than Ministers.

What Ministers would desire would be a full statement of (1) what is requisite for the naval defence of the colony; (2) to what extent we may look for Imperial aid; (3) how and what arrangement could be made between the Imperial Government, the Australian Colonies, and New Zealand; (4) if cruisers are granted, in what manner they are generally to be located and controlled both in times of peace and war. They would feel much obliged if they could obtain further information concerning these points.

There is one point in the correspondence which has already received the attention of Ministers—namely, that referring to all the colonies uniting to pay losses sustained at any spot owing to the resistance of the inhabitants. Ministers received a communication from the Hon. W. B. Dalley, Colonial Secretary of New South Wales, on that subject, as follows: "I have received a letter from the Admiral, commander-in-chief of this station, in which he points out that one of the most effectual means of defence would be a united determination on the part of all the Australian Colonies to resist all concessions to an enemy, and refuse under any circumstances all supplies of coal. As demands might and probably would be made in places comparatively unprotected, he suggests that there should be a united indemnification of such places from loss by injuries inflicted upon them in consequence of their refusal to obey requisitions; that owners and agents of coal-laden vessels should agree to order their destruction rather than permit their falling into the hands of an enemy. All losses to be made good by the united Governments. His letter, my reply, and a minute which I have based upon it, expressing our entire agreement in his suggestion and our preparedness to bear our proportionate share of any such expenditure, are too long to forward you by telegram. I shall send them by mail. Meanwhile I should like to know how you view the proposal. The very fact of our agreement to stand by each other against any concessions would, it is conceived, be a heavy discouragement to an enemy operating so far from his base under such hopeless circumstances."

And to this a reply was sent as follows by the Premier: "I have to apologize for the delay in answering Mr. Dalley's telegram of the 6th instant. We are favourably disposed to your proposal, but we think the condition of resistance should not be included. We may be sure that whenever resistance is feasible or expedient it will be displayed in all the colonies, and in every part, to the full extent courage and patriotism would justify. We think it would be better the colonies should agree to joint liability for all damages caused by the enemy on the basis of a population contribution. Will you consider this modification, and state also how you would propose the assent of the several Parliaments should be given?"

Ministers have not had as yet any reply to this communication; but they are willing, on the lines mentioned by them in their telegram, to recommend Parliament to enter into an arrangement with the other colonies of Australasia.

In conclusion, Ministers would add that they feel obliged to the Admiral for forwarding his very able memorandum on the subject of defences for their perusal and consideration, and they hope that without delay the further information they require may be communicated to them, so that they may be able to submit some definite proposals to Parliament.

Wellington, 4th June, 1885.

ROBERT STOUT.

No. 27.

The PREMIER, New Zealand, to the COLONIAL SECRETARY, Queensland.

SIR,—

Premier's Office, Wellington, 20th June, 1885.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your circular letter of the 2nd instant, enclosing ten copies of a memorandum upon the subject of united action on the part of the Australasian Colonies for the purpose of naval defence. I will submit the memorandum for the consideration of our Parliament, which is now in session.

I have, &c.,

The Hon. the Premier, Brisbane, Queensland.

ROBERT STOUT.

No. 28.

Rear-Admiral TRYON to Governor Sir W. F. D. JERVOIS, G.C.M.G., C.B.

SIR,—

H.M.S. "Nelson," at Sydney, 24th June, 1885.

I have to thank your Excellency for your letters of the 4th June, and for the two

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enclosures, both by the Premier of New Zealand, in which I observe that it is suggested you should consult with me in the subject-matter of those memoranda. I can only say I shall be too happy to assist you in any way in my power.

2. It is not necessary for me to write on the memoranda: it will probably be all you wish if I touch on these generally; and it may be also as well to correct one or two points on which there is a misconception.

3. I read that "it has been publicly stated that the Admiral has made official proposals to the Governments of some of the Australian Colonies concerning the organization of a colonial navy." This is a mistake. Long ago, before I left England, a proposal to increase the squadron at the cost of the colonies was made by eminent men within them.

4. If I had made an official proposal you may be quite sure I should have sent it to New Zealand.

5. It has been my object to seek to know the wishes of the colonies, and to learn what is by them considered practicable, and it was my duty to assist in this matter so far as I was able.

6. The inference drawn—viz., that I might be of opinion that New Zealand required "distinct treatment," if it is meant that it stands by itself, such is not in accord with my opinion; but probably that was hardly meant.

7. I also read that "the position that New Zealand is to occupy is only incidentally alluded to." This refers to my correspondence with Sir Henry Loch. It has, perhaps, escaped observation that the questions put to me, to which I replied, only referred to Australian waters and Australian Colonies. I purposely added New Zealand, so as to make it clear that I had not omitted to consider whether it ought, as I think it ought, to be included in a general scheme for the increase of the squadron.

8. In my opinion neither the condition or position of New Zealand separate her from the other colonies; and it appears to me that, if all the colonies in these seas would unite for this one common object, that it would be the least costly and most effective plan to adopt, and also the most practicable in 1885, whatever may be the case hereafter.

9. I cannot say who will concur, but I can speak of the great advantage that would be obtained compared to what would be the case if the same number of vessels as I have indicated were possessed and divided among all the colonies and localized.

10. Where the squadron should be placed depends on a variety of circumstances. Where the ships can be best placed is always a subject of much consideration in a time of war. It may be far the wisest plan to employ them in positions far removed from those in whose interest they are acting. Much depends on the enemy, whose movements we should seek to restrict. New Zealand would not regret to hear that a hostile squadron, destined for these waters, was destroyed far from her shores.

11. Have those who have pressed your Excellency to ask for one ship—a request that is but a small one, and in itself so moderate, compared to the great object in view—considered what can one ship do on that long line of coast? It was in the interest of New Zealand I gave the answer I did; but I could not tell them what I intended to do.

12. If you had one ship or two acting alone in New Zealand, is the case much altered? Are you prepared now at this time to propose separate stores and appliances and a separate establishment, and to pay for them? As years roll on it may be different, but at this moment I think New Zealand has many calls (but of this your Excellency is the best judge) on her purse, and would gain greatly by a moderate measure in which others joined. What is the main object, and how is it best secured? What is most likely to cultivate success? are questions that have to be answered.

13. All that I have written or said is based on the idea that the colonies desire to increase the squadron over and above the force usually maintained on this station.

14. Attention may well, for a moment, be drawn to what is being done at Home. Three millions were voted last December in excess of estimate (see *Times*, 3rd December, 1884), the greater part of which is devoted to the increase of our sea-going fleet, such as could be sent to reinforce our squadron in these waters, if it is necessary to do so. Increased protection is being given to ports in the line of trade and commerce. This will serve to aid our vessels and to impede those opposed to us. The population of England is about thirty-six millions; the naval estimates for this year are £12,600,000; the army estimates last year were about sixteen millions: the burden on the taxpayer is not light.

15. The strength of the fleet out here has of late years been considerably increased in force. The Admiralty invites co-operation, observing, as to the main fleet of our country, that, while there is no difference of opinion as to the necessity for making the action of our navy felt in the most distant parts of the ocean, the question remains, How is this best effected? It cannot be better done than by destroying an enemy before he has time to act against us. This cannot be done if our fleet is unduly scattered over the world; and it is certainly wise to take precautions lest, as in days gone by, notwithstanding every effort made to prevent it, a hostile force should escape, and appear off a distant shore.

16. With reference to the main fleet of the country, the strategy of the day is averse to its being scattered in small, weak squadrons, or its strength frittered away by placing single ships here and there all over the world.

17. Allusion has been made in the memoranda to the class of vessel proposed, especially to the torpedo-boats. The geographical conditions of the colonies differ and the maritime features vary; therefore, to embrace all the colonies in one scheme, these points must be considered (New Zealand would not regret to hear that an enemy destined for her shores was torpedoed in the Torres Straits); and these are subjects which the Admiralty would not fail to consider.

18. Your Excellency will not fail to observe that I separate entirely from present consideration vessels specially constructed for harbour-defence for such places as require them, and such torpedo-boats as are constructed for local service, from vessels constructed for general service at sea.

19. The mission a vessel is destined to perform is considered before she is built. To employ sea-going vessels for purely local defence would be to misuse their power: they may come in in a time of need as an aid; but that is the exception. What is required for local defence varies in every port: each one must be considered separately on the spot as to the defence that is necessary for it; and no one will recognize better than your Excellency that in such matters also the question of cost is intimately connected.

20. It appears to me that it would only add to delay and create difficulties if we began by considering what ships we ought to have, unless we know we are in a position to pay for them. So far as I can gather this view is shared by others also. I invite for your consideration whether the minute recently put forward by Mr. Stuart might not form the basis for a scheme for adoption. When we know the sum that will be at our disposal, the question will arise how to obtain a maximum effect from that sum. The amount of that sum would in no small degree affect not only the number but the type of ship that would be recommended.

21. Should the force on this station receive an addition, your Excellency may rely upon it New Zealand will be frequented by Her Majesty's ships, and will be visited frequently by the squadron in a time of peace. It is but reasonable that those who contribute should see the result of their contribution and feel assured of the benefit derived from it; but it seemed to me impossible to suggest that there should be a general contribution, and that one colony should stipulate as a condition for her contribution that a portion of the force created should be localized.

22. As to the past, no one can suppose that those who preceded me would not have frequently sent Her Majesty's vessels to New Zealand, but the long and wearying cruises that have been undertaken year after year of late among the Islands have fully occupied the squadron. Those cruises were undertaken because duty called the ships where civilization and barbarism have been so prominently brought into contact of late years, and wherever such is the case Her Majesty's ships have important duties to perform, not only in relation to trade and commerce, but in the interest of Her Majesty's subjects.

23. Take the case of some of the colonies of Australia. They have provided forts for the defence of the principal ports, and, where necessary, vessels suited for local defence, including torpedo-boats. New Zealand is doing much the same—viz., providing a purely local defence. In Australia I see in the papers, and I hear elsewhere opinions expressed that it is time to go further afield. I read, New Zealand inclines to the same opinion. It remains to carry out these wishes.

I have, &c.,

G. TRYON,

Rear-Admiral and Commander-in-Chief.

His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir W. F. Drummond Jervois,
R.E., G.C.M.G., C.B., &c., Governor and Commander-in-Chief, New Zealand.

No. 29.

MEMORANDUM FOR HIS EXCELLENCY.

MINISTERS have the honour to acknowledge the receipt from His Excellency of the letter addressed by Rear-Admiral Tryon, C.B., dated the 24th June, 1885, to His Excellency, dealing with two memoranda submitted by Ministers in May last.

2. The Admiral does not profess to do more than refer formally to the memoranda, and "to correct one or two points on which there is a misconception."

3. The Admiral writes that it is a mistake to suppose that he has made official proposals to some of the Australasian Colonies. Ministers may be forgiven for falling into the error. The suggestions made by the Admiral to the neighbouring Governments had all the appearance of being official; and this view was supported by statements made in England, and not contradicted, that the Admiral was authorized to negotiate with the Colonial Governments upon the question of naval defence.

4. The subject of naval defence, as it relates to this colony, divides itself into three heads: (1) The disposition of Her Majesty's navy throughout the world; (2) The disposition of the men-of-war on the Australasian station; and (3) Local defences provided by the colony.

5. With regard to (1). This is not a question with which the colonies can be supposed to deal. Ministers have no doubt that Her Majesty's Government will, in case of war, take the most efficient measures for the protection of all parts of the Empire; and they fully realize that the disposition of the navy at places far removed from New Zealand may be of immense service in its defence. Indeed, in the event of a war with Russia, a strong squadron on the Chinese station would be of incalculable benefit to this colony.

6. With regard to (2). It appears that the Admiral, so far from considering that there is anything in the conditions or position of New Zealand to separate her from the other Australasian Colonies, is of opinion that a fleet stationed off, and with its head-quarters in, Australia can efficiently deal with the defence of New Zealand, from a distance of twelve to fifteen hundred miles, without any assurance of a portion of the fleet being stationed here, or calling at any port of this colony more often than convenience may dictate.

7. Ministers venture to express the opinion that the Admiral has not thought out the question sufficiently, and is entirely mistaken as to the view which he appears, from paragraph 12 of his letter, to hold as to the inability or unwillingness of New Zealand to supply whatever may be needed for the purpose of the head-quarters of a section of the fleet. Ministers think that, if the Admiral will honour this colony with a visit, he will entertain a higher opinion of its resources, and be more alive to its real necessities in the matter of naval defence.

8. During the last five years and a half (from the 1st January, 1880, to the present time) only fourteen visits have been made to New Zealand by Her Majesty's ships, whilst those of foreign war-

vessels have been more numerous. The Admiral, whilst admitting this, states that the cruises which had to be undertaken in the Pacific Islands have so fully occupied the squadron that they have been unable to visit New Zealand more frequently.

9. Ministers are distinctly of opinion that New Zealand requires the permanent location of a portion of the squadron, and that in the interests of economy this is desirable. They, of course, do not mean that the vessels so located are not to be available for the Island service, or under the uncontrolled disposition of the Admiral in time of war. But they would point out that the reason given by the Admiral for Her Majesty's ships not having visited New Zealand ports more frequently is an additional argument in favour of Auckland being looked upon as the head-quarters of the Pacific station. On a late occasion a vessel was required on a very important service at Samoa. It took her about as many weeks to reach that island from Sydney as it would have taken days had she started from Auckland.

10. The Admiral fears the evils that might arise from scattering the fleet in small, weak squadrons. Ministers would recognize the justice of this observation if the danger to be met were a large naval force. But a section of the Australasian fleet would surely be quite enough to meet one or two cruisers at a time; and it is admitted that it is unlikely that an attack would be made by more than a small squadron. If the enemy were to send a considerable force the distance which would be necessary, it would be watched and followed, and its escape would be highly improbable. Again, though ships of war acting from a port on the east of Australia might guard the Torres Straits, and prevent vessels coming from India by that route, or even intercept hostile ships passing along the south of Australia, it can hardly be said that any squadron so stationed could deal with a possible attack on New Zealand if the enemy's ships came from the northward or eastward. The Admiral can scarcely be unaware of the information which has been received of the intention of the Russians, in case war had broken out in 1877-78. The attack would have come entirely from the North Pacific, and not from the direction to which the Admiral appears to attach most importance. This information was based on official documents. In connection with this part of the subject, Ministers must point out that, in the arrangements contemplated by the Admiral, he entirely overlooks the consideration that in about five years from the present time the whole aspect of affairs will be altered by the completion of the Panama Canal. The westward approach to Australia will be of less moment, whilst Auckland will be of immeasurably more strategical importance to all Australasia.

11. With regard to (3). Ministers consider that they are doing their duty in the matter of local defences by offering to pay a certain amount for one or two cruisers of the "Esmeralda" type, and by providing shore-batteries at the chief ports. They do not, however, mean to imply by doing so that these should form the only defences of New Zealand, but regard them as aids to the Australian squadron; and consider that by these measures (which must, to a great extent, inure to the benefit of all the Australasian Colonies), and by contributing towards the expenses of New Guinea, they have given proof of the readiness of New Zealand to co-operate with the other colonies in matters that are for the benefit of all.

12. Finally, Ministers again remind the Admiral that the neglect New Zealand has met with is well known to foreign countries; and that the absence of assurance and even (judging from late events) of probability of immediate support from Her Majesty's ships would make this colony a special object of attack for foreign cruisers in case of war. The Admiral appears to forget the distance of New Zealand from Sydney, and the possibility of the cable being interrupted. Ministers regret to say so, but it is their duty to place on record their opinion that, unless Her Majesty's Government show more consideration for New Zealand than they have hitherto done, foreign Powers are virtually invited to this colony as being specially open to attack. They would once more urge that, independently of any local vessels which the colony, either with or without the assistance of the Imperial Government, may be able to furnish, the defence of New Zealand should be specially dealt with. Whether this can best be done by allocating a certain number of vessels belonging to the Australasian station to New Zealand, or by the formation of a Pacific station, with perhaps Auckland for its head-quarters, Ministers do not consider it lies within their province to say; but, if either of these plans was carried out, Ministers would be prepared to propose, should Her Majesty's Government think it more desirable, that, instead of this colony acquiring one or two ships of the "Esmeralda" type, the sum which New Zealand was to have contributed thereto should be devoted to the increase in the number of Her Majesty's ships stationed in these seas. They feel sure, however, that New Zealand will never consider herself adequately protected by an Australasian fleet that looks upon Sydney as its head-quarters, and does not provide for the direct defence of this important portion of the Queen's dominions.

Wellington, 14th August, 1885.

ROBERT STOUT.

No. 30.

The PREMIER, New Zealand, to the COLONIAL SECRETARY, New South Wales.

SIR,—

Premier's Office, Wellington, 15th August, 1885.

Not printed.

No. 23.

Nos. 21 & 26.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th June, enclosing a memorandum on the naval defence of the colonies, of date the 3rd June, 1885.

2. I enclose for your information memoranda that we have forwarded to His Excellency the Governor upon the same subject, for transmission to the Secretary of State for the Colonies and to the Admiral on the station.

3. We feel a difficulty in dealing with the question until we have the views of the Imperial Government put in something like a definite shape. We regard the question of cost as of primary importance, and we think also that, though there may be no interference with the disposition of

the vessels, yet New Zealand requires some distinct treatment from the rest of Australasia. You will observe that we have impressed this on the Admiral in the memoranda that we have submitted to His Excellency the Governor of New Zealand. We think that, if we undertake to pay part of the cost of the Australian squadron, New Zealand should be dealt with specially, at any rate in time of peace.

4. We have received a memorandum from Mr. Griffith. We incline to agree with him that the present Australian squadron is inadequate as a defence for the colonies. His suggestions are definite; but we do not like to commit ourselves even to the cost which he proposes without further information. We shall reply to his letter to-day, and will forward you a copy of our reply.

5. The whole subject requires careful negotiation and consideration by all the colonies. We are obliged to you for forwarding your memorandum.

I have, &c.,

The Hon. the Colonial Secretary, New South Wales.

ROBERT STOUT.

No. 31.

The PREMIER, New Zealand, to the PREMIER, Queensland.

SIR,—

Premier's Office, Wellington, 15th August, 1885.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd June, enclosing a memorandum of the 1st June on naval defences.

No. 24.

2. The subject has engaged our attention for some time past, and memoranda have passed between us and His Excellency the Governor for transmission to Admiral Tryon and the Secretary of State for the Colonies. We enclose you copies of these memoranda.

Nos. 21 & 26.

3. Before the receipt of your letter we had received a letter from the Premier of New South Wales, a copy of which you have, no doubt, also received. To that we have replied by letter to-day, a copy of which we enclose.

4. You will observe that we consider the questions of cost and of the disposition of the ships to be of first importance, and that these points should be well defined before a definite conclusion is come to.

5. We are favourable to recommending Parliament to undertake some portion of the cost of the naval defence of the colonies, independent of what may be termed the local naval defence.

6. We also think that the ships should be under the control of the Imperial naval authorities. We approve also of your suggestion of having a separate flag, and of the admission of Australasian boys as cadets on the ships of the Australasian fleet.

7. As to a dockyard, we believe that two, if not more, ports in New Zealand will have docks sufficient for docking almost any of the vessels that will form part of the squadron.

8. And we would urge that Auckland should be the head-quarters of a portion, at all events, of the fleet, as it is a convenient place for vessels coming from the eastern Pacific Islands. It is inadvisable, however, to go into further details until the question of cost is more nearly settled. You will observe from our memoranda that we have pressed, and still press, on the Imperial Government for definite proposals.

I have, &c.,

The Hon. the Premier, Queensland.

ROBERT STOUT.

No. 32.

Governor Sir W. F. D. JERVOIS, K.C.M.G., C.B., to the Right Hon. Colonel STANLEY.

SIR,—

Government House, Wellington, 21st August, 1885.

I have the honour to transmit herewith the following papers with reference to the naval defence of New Zealand:—

No. 1, a memorandum from my Ministers, dated the 25th May last; No. 2, a correspondence between Rear-Admiral Tryon, C.B., and His Excellency the Governor of Victoria, which was forwarded to me by the Admiral; No. 3, a memorandum from my Ministers, submitted to me after they had read that correspondence; No. 4, a letter from Rear-Admiral Tryon, dated 24th June, with reference to these two memoranda from my Ministers, which had been forwarded by me to him; No. 5, a letter from me to Rear-Admiral Tryon, dated this day, forwarding a memorandum from my Ministers on the Admiral's letter.

No. 21.

No. 25.

No. 26.

No. 28.

I have, &c.,

The Right Hon. Colonel Stanley, M.P.

WM. F. DRUMMOND JERVOIS.

Enclosure 5.

Governor Sir W. F. D. JERVOIS, G.C.M.G., C.B., to Rear-Admiral TRYON, C.B.

SIR,—

Government House, Wellington, 21st August, 1885.

I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum by my Ministers with reference to your letter of the 24th June.

No. 29.

2. You will observe that, whilst recognizing the force of many of your observations therein contained, they take exception to the view that a port on the Continent of Australia should be regarded as the sole base of operations of Her Majesty's navy in these seas.

3. They represent that, whilst naval squadrons may act efficiently from such port for the protection of the lines of commerce to the westward, they would not meet the case of an attack by hostile vessels coming from the northward or eastward. They are of opinion that it is therefore necessary that the headquarters of a section of the fleet should be in New Zealand; and they state, in paragraph 7 of the memorandum, that it is a mistake to suppose that New Zealand is unable or

unwilling to supply whatever may be needed for this purpose. It will be observed also that, in the event of such an arrangement being carried out, they are prepared to propose to Parliament, "should Her Majesty's Government think it more desirable, that, instead of this colony acquiring one or two ships of the 'Esmeralda' type, the sum which New Zealand was to have contributed thereto should be devoted to the increase in the number of Her Majesty's ships stationed in these seas."

4. My Ministers feel the more strongly that this is the most desirable arrangement when they consider how important a part of the duties of the Australasian fleet are those connected with the Pacific Islands, and that Auckland would be the most convenient port for vessels engaged on that service.

Rear-Admiral Tryon, C.B.

I have, &c.,

WM. F. DRUMMOND JERVOIS.