of this settlement as of the Rangitikei District. I have now one hundred and fifty men there, Military Settlers, and will push on another hundred men to-day in the "Sandfly." The Friendly Natives have also taken possession of, and now occupy the Pa of the Fanatics at Ohoutahi, only ten miles distant also taken possession of, and now occupy the ra of the ranatics at Onoutani, only ten miles distant from Pipiriki. Captain Spain is now making every preparation to supply you with surf-boats, and I fear that if within the next two or three days we can take Pipiriki, I must once again have the "Gundagai" for three days after her next trip to you. If there is any difficulty upon account of her being in the pay of the Commissariat, we must pay her expenses again from Colonial Funds, but Pipiriki is a point of such importance, that if we can get possession of it I must not lose the chance. All the roads from the interior to the Wereroa Pa and Ngatiruanui country pass through that place, it is in fact the main key of the river Wanganui and if we get it we gain entire command of the river it is in fact the main key of the river Wanganui, and if we get it, we gain entire command of the river, and the people in the Wereroa Pa will be embarrassed by having their communication with the interior cut off. In getting Parikino, we have got the second most important position in the Wanganui, and if we can get Pipiriki, we shall be quite safe for the future in this river, and the Rangitikei District will be much safer than it has hitherto been.

The consequence of our taking possession of the Pa at Ohoutahi has been, that about twenty

men of the leading Fanatics of that part of the river have come in.

You mention the "Sturt." The Government state, that the moment I notified to them your wish that the "Sturt" should be here, they had her repairs commenced, but that she was found to be in a bad state, so that her repairs would take some time in completing, but that these are being executed as rapidly as possible, and that directly they are finished she shall come here.

Is not this miserable weather? I have not yet got the English Mail. Lieut.-General Sir D. A. Cameron, K.C.B.

I have, &c., G. GREY.

## No. 59.

Lieut.-General Sir D. A. CAMERON to His Excellency the Governor.

My DEAR SIR GEORGE,—

The "Ahuriri" has gone to Taranaki without any instructions from me to the officer commanding at that station (Colonel Muloch) about the 200 military settlers. On receipt of your letter on the subject I caused a letter to be written immediately to Colonel Muloch and forwarded by orderly to the camp on the Patea, but it had not reached when the "Ahuriri" arrived off the river. The "Ahuriri" signalled to ask whether there were any orders, and the officer commanding the camp at the Patea, not knowing that she was to wait for despatches for me, answered that there were none, and the steamer proceeded on her voyage to Taranaki. The master of the "Ahuriri" ought to have been told to wait for my despatches, instead of asking whether there were any orders for him. I do not know whether you or Major Atkinson forwarded any instructions about the military settlers to the officer commanding the Colonial Forces, by the "Ahuriri," but as it is doubtful whether Colonel Muloch will allow them to leave his command without orders from me, it is possible that the "Ahuriri" may have I have, &c., made the trip for nothing.

His Excellency Sir George Grey, K.C.B.

D. A. CAMERON, Lieut.-General.

## No. 60.

Lieut.-General Sir D. A. CAMERON to His Excellency the GOVERNOR.

MY DEAR SIR GEORGE,— Camp near Manawapou, 30th March, 1865.

I have received your letter of the 22nd instant, in answer to mine of the 17th. You have misunderstood me if you imagine that I intended to complain of a want of definiteness in the instructions you gave me before I left Auckland, which, on the contrary, are the only definite instructions I have received from you since the war began; but unfortunately they were drawn out without any

knowledge of the nature of the country, the strength and position of the rebels, &c., and they were consequently liable to be found either inapplicable to the real state of affairs, or at all events much more difficult to carry out than could have been anticipated at the time they were framed. I beg to protest against being held in any manner responsible for those instructions. When Mr. Weld took office, he came to me frequently, with your sanction, for information on various subjects, which I willingly gave him; but I distinctly told him that I would not be responsible for any measures that might be adopted, in regard to which I considered it your business to instruct me. I only requested if I was to be instructed to occupy territory, its extent might either not be defined at all, or if defined, might be as limited as possible, as I had only a small force at my disposal for such a purpose; and I confess that when you showed me your instructions, it appeared to me that the amount of land you proposed to take from the natives (the block between the Waitotara and the Patea) was moderate enough, though I felt by no means certain that my force would be sufficient to take possession of and occupy it, in addition to the Waitotara block. As to the idea of the instructions embodying my views, I was always of opinion that it was unadvisable for us to re-commence hostilities, and remembering what you used to say when the last Ministers were in office, as to the inexpediency of entering upon any further aggressive operations, the necessity of consolidating what we had got, &c., I was astonished at your employing the troops in aggressive operations in this part of the country.

In regard to the Wereroa Pa, you appeared perfectly satisfied, when I saw you at the Patea, with the reasons I gave you for not having attacked it, and for having moved on to the Patea, and you seemed very anxious that I should advance at once towards Taranaki. There was not a word from you then about "preventing wrong impressions on the native mind," or about the important objects to be gained by the capture of the pa. As to preventing wrong impressions on the native mind, I believe the natives are far too shrewd to misunderstand our reasons for not attacking them in a position where