

# FURTHER PAPERS

ON THE SUBJECT OF

## COLONIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN NATIVE AFFAIRS.

*(Return to an Order of the House of Representatives, dated 30th November, 1863.)*

That there be laid upon the table of this House copies of the Minute, dated 27th May, 1863, signed by Mr. Bell; the Minute of His Excellency the Governor commenting on it, referred to in the Despatch of His Grace the Duke of Newcastle, of the 26th September, 1863, and any other Memoranda, Minutes, or Correspondence (if any) relating to the same subjects as the above Minutes.

*(Mr. Fitzherbert.)*



## FURTHER PAPERS

RELATIVE TO

# COLONIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN NATIVE AFFAIRS.

No. 1.

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE GOVERNOR.

Adverting to the subject of the Duke of Newcastle's Despatch of 26th February, Ministers conceive that the position of the Governor in relation to them under the Resolutions of the House may be inferred from the following considerations :—

The House had manifested in several previous Sessions a desire to bring the Native Secretary's department under the control of Responsible Ministers. This desire the House had expressed in resolutions and other proceedings in former Sessions, and entertained it as strongly during the last Session.

At the same time the House was decidedly of opinion that, in the then circumstances of the Colony, Sir George Grey having been specially appointed to deal with the Native difficulties and carry out a policy of pacification, which policy had already been partially brought into operation, the direction of this or any other Native policy should be left with his Excellency.

The second resolution therefore stated that Ministers should undertake the administration of Native affairs, reserving to his Excellency the decision in all matters of Native policy.

In practice the result of the resolutions has been virtually to place a large control over the administration of Native affairs in the hands of the Governor.

The Native Minister has conducted his department in all its details solely with a view to carrying out his Excellency's plans, and directing all its proceedings towards that object.

The difference between the conduct of business in the Native and in other departments is this: in the other departments, whatever the importance of the matter in hand, it is merely referred to the Governor, and then only as matter of form, unless the Governor is by law or by the Queen's instructions required to take personal action in the matter. In the Native Office, every matter of importance is submitted to the Governor, and is the subject of personal or written communication between the Governor and the Ministers. In like manner with respect to legislation—while the laws which were passed last Session on Colonial subjects were as usual introduced and passed solely on the responsibility of Ministers; when the Native Lands Bill was brought in, and subsequently in its stages through both Houses, Ministers were bound to submit it for the Governor's approval or acceptance before the third reading.

But the really important practical part of the Native business is in the personal communications which take place between the Native chiefs and the Governor. It is in these that the most important declarations on both sides have been made; and it is to these that the Natives themselves look for their guidance, and not to the opinion of the Native Minister of the day, even if he has the advantage of an acquaintance with the Native language. Nor while Sir George Grey is in the country could this be otherwise under any Native Minister whatever. While, on the other hand, if complete Ministerial responsibility be established on Native affairs, it would be impossible that such personal communications should take place without the constant risk of cross purposes between the Governor and the Minister.

It appears to Ministers that the Duke of Newcastle has not kept this practical and necessary consequence of Sir George Grey's mission sufficiently before him in the Despatch under consideration.

If Sir George Grey were to abandon the exercise of this by far the most important portion of the practical administration of Native affairs, his usefulness and power over the Native mind would be incalculably diminished, and his appointment rendered comparatively nugatory. On the other hand, if it is to be continued, as the good of the Colony imperatively requires, the whole responsibility for the guidance of Native affairs cannot be placed in the Minister.

The fact seems to be that the responsibility in question must be shared between the Ministers and the Governor.

The Governor is responsible only to the Imperial Government for his policy, and the Ministers are responsible to the Assembly, under the resolutions, for faithfully endeavouring to carry it out. No one can deny that many difficulties and anomalies must occur in such a system. It is one which it is only possible to work where confidence exists between the Governor and Ministers.

ALFRED DOMETT.

Taranaki,  
May 14, 1863.

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No. 2.

MEMORANDUM BY THE GOVERNOR.

In reply to the Minute the Governor has received from Ministers, dated the 14th instant, he would begin by observing he has derived great advantages from the ability and zeal with which they have discharged the duties of their respective offices, and he is especially obliged to the Native Minister for the industry he has exhibited, and the desire he has always shewn to give effect to the Governor's views on the subject of Native affairs. Ministers will therefore see that when the Governor says the present system of conducting Native affairs works badly, it is of the system that he complains, and not of the mode in which it is carried out by those gentlemen to whom he so fully acknowledges his obligations.

When the Governor arrived in this country, he found the Native Secretary's department, and all the officers belonging to it, wherever they might be, under his control, and considerable sums of money were at his disposal for Native purposes.

He took also £27,000 per annum from funds which would be annually payable by the Colony to Great Britain in aid of Military expenditure, and with the consent of Her Majesty's Government (subsequently obtained), devoted that amount also to Native purposes. The Governor thus at that time possessed real power in Native affairs, and with it necessarily followed responsibility. He could then decide on Native matters and promptly administer Native affairs in whatever part of the Colony he might be. The officers of the Native department looked to him as their immediate head, and obeyed him as such. If the administration of Native affairs was not everywhere prompt and vigorous, he was to blame; and he could instantly, as he thought proper, modify all his plans and proceedings in detail, suiting them to the various exigencies which necessarily arise in a country circumstanced as this is.

The Governor was, however, informed, as Ministers now state, that the General Assembly had, in several previous Sessions, manifested a very strong desire to bring the Native Secretary's department under the control of Responsible Ministers, and had expressed this desire in resolutions and other proceedings.

Anxious to meet this reasonable desire of the House, the Governor gave up to his Ministers, at their urgent request, the entire control of the Native department, and the power of appropriating the sum of money placed at his disposal for Native purposes, including £27,000 payable for military objects to Great Britain. The equivalent Ministers gave as their part of the bargain was that they would assume the entire responsibility of Native affairs.

When the General Assembly met, the Governor with regret found that instead of meeting the wishes of the Legislature, he had displeased them. They said in fact that this agreement between the Governor and his Responsible Advisers had been concluded without their consent having been previously obtained; that they repudiated it, and threw upon the Governor the responsibility for Native affairs.

The Governor felt that as the Assembly repudiated the agreement, and threw back the responsibility upon him, the power of which he had divested himself must as of right be restored to him; and that it never could be said that whilst they repudiated their part of the contract, they held him to his.

The Native department has, however, in fact, remained entirely under the control of Ministers. The officers of that department have not recognised the Governor as their head; they have not taken their orders from him; the moneys for Native purposes have never been expended until the assent of Ministers had been previously obtained; and he has consequently never been able to act in Native matters with that vigour and promptitude which he believes to be essential to a successful administration of affairs. If these difficulties have arisen when he has had the advantage of having as his assistant so able and industrious a Native Minister as Mr. Bell, what must have been the result if a gentleman less able and less acquainted with Native affairs had held that office?

The Governor is of opinion that the General Assembly did not intend to place him in this position in regard to Native affairs, which he has continued to the present time to hold. He observes that in their resolutions they state that Ministers should undertake the administration of Native affairs, not as a matter of right, but only if the Governor requested them to do so; and he further observes that in the Act appropriating funds for Native purposes, the whole of those funds are for such purposes placed at the absolute disposal of the Governor, Ministers or the Executive Council not being even incidentally alluded to in the Act.

Feeling so strongly as he does the great evils which result to both races of Her Majesty's subjects from the present system, in which all power rests really in the hands of his Ministers,

whilst responsibility rests upon himself, and that there can consequently be no rapidity of decision or vigour of action in Native affairs in this most important crisis of the history of the Colony, the Governor begs Ministers to accede to the advice of Her Majesty Government by acting on the principle that the administration of Native affairs should remain as it now is, with them, and that the Governor will be generally bound to give effect to the policy which they recommend for his adoption, and for which they will be responsible.

The Governor believes that the General Assembly will, under the present circumstances of the Colony, entirely approve of Ministers doing this; for it would be found inconvenient at the present crisis to dislocate the existing machinery for the management of Native affairs, and to bring back the actual administration of them under the Governor.

The plan that the Governor recommends involves no change. It simply gives the Ministers, who have now all the real power, the means of using that power vigorously and promptly, whilst their rapidity of decision and action must necessarily be quickened by the sense of the great responsibility that will rest upon them. The Governor will continue, whenever asked to do so, to give them his advice to the best of his ability, and to afford them every support in his power in the discharge of their duties.

G. GREY.

Taranaki, May 16th, 1863.

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### No. 3.

#### MINUTE FOR HIS EXCELLENCY.

The Governor's Minute of the 16th instant recapitulates the following circumstances:—

That, when His Excellency arrived in the country he found the Native Department entirely under his control.

That, at the urgent request of his then Ministers, he gave up the control of this Department to them.

That they, as an equivalent, undertook to assume the entire responsibility of Native Affairs.

That the Assembly, when it met, objected to this arrangement, and proposed to place the responsibility in question upon the Governor.

That the Governor then felt that if the responsibility were thrown back upon him, the power (*i.e.* the control of the Native Department,) should also be restored to him; for the Assembly could not mean, while they rejected the Ministerial part of the contract, to hold the Governor to his part of it.

This was shewn by the wording of the second resolution, which says, that Ministers should undertake the administration of Native Affairs only if His Excellency requested them to do so, and not as a matter of right.

Ministers admit that this statement of facts, and this view of the arrangement, is perfectly correct and just.

His Excellency goes on to say, that the Native Department has, however, in fact, remained entirely under the control of his Responsible Advisers.

Ministers beg leave to observe that, on coming into office, they found the Native Department under their control, as described by His Excellency. This was tacitly allowed to continue as a Departmental arrangement. But, if Ministers had understood at that time that such an arrangement would be viewed by the Governor as being an unfair limitation of his own authority, so long as responsibility was placed upon him, it obviously would have been their duty to have requested the Assembly to reconsider the position of His Excellency and his Advisers.

But they understood that His Excellency did not view the administration of affairs by Ministers in this light, because His Excellency, in his first Despatch on these resolutions, in informing the Duke of Newcastle that he had consented to act in their spirit, until His Grace's decision should be received, remarked that, whatever might be in theory the nature of the relations existing between himself and his Advisers, the practical result would be the same. At the same time, Ministers do not deny His Excellency's clear right under the resolutions to have resumed the Departmental administration at any time, if he found that Her Majesty's service required it.

Ministers now learn that the experience of this system, since the meeting of the Assembly, even under conditions to which His Excellency is pleased to refer in terms which Ministers must gratefully acknowledge, has satisfied the Governor that it works badly, and prevents him from acting with vigour and promptitude in the execution of his policy.

They can only, therefore, express their readiness to concur in any arrangement whatever, as to the conduct of the Native Department, until the next Session, which will remedy the evils so necessary to be removed at the present crisis.

But with respect to the acceptance by them of the position in which the Duke of Newcastle wishes to place them, Ministers must with great respect observe that they consider the resolutions of the House of Assembly as absolutely precluding them from adopting the course recommended by the Governor. If, during a time of peace, the Assembly was unwilling to take the direction of Native Affairs out of the hands of Sir George Grey, His Excellency's present Advisers

cannot believe they would consent to its being done at a moment when war seems imminent, notwithstanding every effort of the Governor to avert it.

ALFRED DOMETT.

18th May, 1863.

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No. 4.

MINUTE BY THE GOVERNOR.

The Governor acknowledges the receipt of the Ministerial Minute of the 18th instant, to which he has given his best consideration.

The Governor cannot admit that he thinks that the resolutions of the Assembly preclude Ministers from adopting the course in regard to Native affairs which the Governor has requested them to follow.

As Ministers observe, those resolutions were adopted by the Assembly in a time of peace. They cannot therefore be regarded as binding any one in so great a crisis as the present. Men must rise equal to the emergency which has taken place, and not shrink from the responsibility which it necessarily brings on all. Moreover, the Assembly, when it passed the resolutions had not then before it the positive declaration of the Home Government that in the case of the relations which had existed between New Zealand and itself it recognised the following obligation, viz., "the obligation of the stronger to assist the weaker, an obligation of generosity and wisdom as irresistible practically as it is one of technical justice, and unquestionably heightened in proportion to the amount of control exercised by the power which gives assistance over the affairs of the community which receives it. This species of obligation the British Government has ever been ready to acknowledge and fulfil."

The Governor feels sure that the General Assembly will treat with great generosity all who now assume responsibility to save the Colony from the perils which threaten it.

Ministers must allow some latitude of expression to the Governor at the present moment, when life, property, wives and children—all that men hold dear—are in imminent peril over a large extent of country. He had hoped, when he wrote to Ministers on the 16th instant, that they, being his Responsible Advisers, would have recommended for his consideration some arrangement for the conduct of affairs at the present emergency. As however Ministers have thrown upon him the responsibility of recommending such an arrangement, he will, especially as he believes that not a moment should be lost in coming to a decision upon this subject, do so to the best of his ability.

The Governor, then, believes it is impossible, without incurring the risk of very great dangers, to separate at this time from the administration of Native Affairs the control of the Militia and Volunteers—of the local forces of every kind, of the funds voted for public purposes, of the Post Office, in fact, of nearly every Government establishment in the country. At the present instant, which he believes to be one of as great public peril as he has ever known, the Governor thinks that whoever is to govern the country should be armed with every power which the State confers on those who rule it. Indeed, in such a crisis those powers ought to be increased. In no other way can he see a hope of successfully meeting the dangers which threaten the Colony.

The Ministry can in a moment assume these powers; they virtually have them now. They are the constitutional depositories of them, and the Colonial Secretary is the person upon whom properly the chief direction of them and the chief responsibility should rest.

If Ministers will not assume what the Governor believes to be their duty, and exercise these powers, and take that responsibility which goes hand in hand with power, then the Governor thinks they should, under present circumstances, relinquish them to him until the Assembly meets.

The Governor thinks that Ministers will excuse him from pressing this advice upon them; but his doing so at this critical time is a necessity of the position of responsibility in which the General Assembly and Ministers have against his will placed him.

Yours, &c.,

G. GREY.

New Plymouth, Taranaki,  
May 20th, 1863.

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NOTE BY THE COLONIAL SECRETARY.

No immediate reply was sent to the foregoing Minute, as far as the question of assumption of responsibility is concerned; the Ministers who were then at Taranaki being desirous of personally consulting their colleagues in Auckland, in order to ascertain whether some temporary arrangement might not be come to with the Governor, to subsist until the General Assembly could meet and decide upon the whole question. Such an arrangement was made, and is described in the Minute of Ministers, dated 24th June, and of the Governor, dated 6th July, 1863.

But in order that His Excellency in the meantime might not be without the opinion of the Ministry as to what was proper to be done in the present emergency (to which the question of the responsibility for doing it was quite secondary and subordinate), the Colonial Secretary prepared the following Minute for Ministers, which was shewn to His Excellency when written.

The Native Minister, however, differing in opinion as to the advisability of immediately calling out the Militia, on the grounds stated in his Minute following the next, and the other Ministers being in Auckland, it was impossible to convey to His Excellency at that moment any expression of the opinion of Ministers as a body.

A. DOMETT.

## No. 5.

### MEMORANDUM FOR MINISTERS.

As it appears incumbent on Ministers, whatever the decision upon the theoretical question of responsibility, to offer advice to the Governor as to the measures to be taken in the present crisis, and as the Governor in his Minute of the 20th instant, expresses a desire for it, the Colonial Secretary submits to Ministers the following sketch of the measures which in his opinion should be adopted.

The first consideration is whether it is necessary to provide against a general insurrection of the Natives.

So much diversity of feeling exists among the various tribes, and members of every tribe, that it is scarcely possible that a combination including all of them could be found capable of united, vigorous, and simultaneous action. It is more probable that some will either remain neutral or give but a lukewarm support to the movement. Some few will even oppose it. But the very natural sympathy with their own countrymen which these Natives will probably feel in any conflict between them and the Europeans; the contagious excitement to which they will be exposed wherever war is raging; in some the desire of revenge when their own people are unsuccessful; in others, the fear of it should their own people triumph; all these feelings expose the Natives most favourable to us to the risk of being drawn into the ranks of those who are opposed to us. It appears then to be the wisest course to be prepared for a general insurrection. If the worst contingency is calculated on and provided for, every other contingency will be clear gain to us. And in circumstances such as the present, preparation is undoubtedly the best prevention. Wherever the Natives see us well prepared for them, there we may believe they will feel least inclination or temptation to attack us. The different settlements then should at once be placed in the best state of defence possible.

There are three sources to which we may look for defence, viz.: Her Majesty's Troops, the friendly Natives, and the Colonial Militia and Volunteers.

1. With respect to the disposal and distribution of the Troops, this is a purely Military question, the decision of which rests exclusively with the Governor and the Officer commanding them as the Duke of Newcastle especially points out in his Despatch of 26th February. Ministers will therefore no doubt hesitate to volunteer any very positive opinion on the subject. Perhaps, however, they may concur in a general remark to the effect that the paramount object to be kept immediately in view, should be, the defence of the different settlements, rather than any offensive operations against the enemy; that, accordingly, the troops should be so placed as to afford the greatest security attainable to each settlement; and if any surplus power then remain available, it might be employed in dealing the foe as heavy a blow as could be given. But this is not likely to happen at present.

If this be a proper principle to act upon, it must soon become a question, whether it is desirable to retain our present hold on the Tataraimaka block, at the expense of the number of troops required to hold it, and the different posts necessary to keep up our communication with it. And this, while the land itself to be held at such a cost, is altogether unavailable for the settlers, as none of them can venture upon it. The moral effect of withdrawing the troops at this moment would no doubt be very bad, as it would be a great encouragement to the Natives in other parts of the Island. But if the preservation of the other settlements require it even this last consideration must be set aside. This contingency may arise whenever an insurrection breaks out in Waikato, which would probably be followed by similar outbreaks in the Southern settlements and Hawke's Bay. It would then become necessary to set as many troops as possible free from all other duties than the defence of the settlements until reinforcements arrive. The Tataraimaka block might easily be resumed at any time, and so much of the enemy's territory confiscated as would enable us to plant settlements that would be a guarantee for the future peace and security of that part of the country.

2. The best mode of dealing with the "friendly Natives" is a question upon which the Native Minister is best qualified to give an opinion. The Colonial Secretary, for his part, believes that many of them may be safely relied on, especially those who have proved their fidelity to us, or which is nearly as satisfactory, their hostility to our foes, in past wars. Natives who have been generally considered as our friends, and who have a blood-feud or a land-feud of long standing with our enemies, may probably be relied on with much security, especially if they happen also to be the weaker of the two parties. Such is the case with the people of Mahau and Te Teira at Taranaki, of William Nero at Raglan, Hapuku at Hawke's Bay, and probably others in different parts of the country, whom the Native Minister can point out. Natives affected by motives like these might be safely entrusted with arms. It is perfectly true that persons acquainted with some even of these Natives may be found who entertain suspicions of them, and can cite circumstances enough

to give colour to their suspicions. But we cannot look for any very hearty or zealous support from the Natives of our cause *for its own sake*. With the imperfect sympathy, which is the best we can expect from them in any cause but their own for the conflict, it is not surprising that such circumstances should occasionally occur. Undoubtedly it sometimes happens that while a native chief and the majority of his tribe are well inclined to us, and intend to be faithful, there may be some malcontents among his followers, too few to influence the whole of the tribe, but too independent to restrain the expression of their feelings, or perhaps to abstain altogether from acts of a dubious character, even amounting to occasional collision or tampering with the enemy. It has been accordingly proposed sometimes, as the safest course, to reject the assistance of the friendly Natives altogether, to expel them from our towns, shut them out beyond our lines, and treat them and our open foes with the same rigour, distrust, and enmity. This seems to the Colonial Secretary neither just nor expedient. Some men who have freely and generously exposed their lives in our battles, or on other occasions, to save the lives of individuals among our countrymen, would have to be classed among these enemies, and treated accordingly. Naturally this treatment would turn them and their followers into our bitterest foes, and give disaffected Natives a good handle for their taunts against all who were weak enough to put faith in us.

There are other Natives again, like Waata Kututai and Wiremu Te Wheoro, whose advocacy of the Government has been so open, active, and continued, that it has become a matter of pride with them to carry their point against their opponents, even though it necessitated the taking up arms against them.

It seems better that men like these should be regarded as friends and trusted in as allies, than by neglect or ingratitude turned into foes. At the same time, English Officers acquainted with them, their language, and habits of thought and action, should be placed permanently beside or over them, who would thus easily come to a knowledge of their opinions and intentions from day to day, and be able to give timely notice if any symptoms of disaffection appeared amongst them.

If this mode of treatment merely secured their neutrality, it would be sufficient to justify its adoption, to say nothing of the advantage of depriving our enemies of the strong ground against us an opposite course would supply.

The Native Minister has already sent in a plan for the organization of the friendly tribes at Taranaki into several companies, with the names of Native and European officers, and suggestions as to their pay and location respectively, in order to render them auxiliary to the defence of the settlement, or to the operations of the troops in that Province.

With respect to one tribe, and that the most important of those who are considered friendly to us—the Ngapuhi,—the Colonial Secretary has one remark to make. The propriety of bringing a body of them down to Taranaki, to act in concert with us against the tribe of that name, and the Ngatiruanui, has frequently been discussed of late. The measure, no doubt, has much to recommend it; and if the Ngapuhi were promised, as they reasonably and fairly ought to be, that any land they might conquer should belong to them; or, if they were inclined to sell it, be bought by us of them, no doubt the proffered reward would greatly increase their already existing inclination to become our effective allies. But, as it is probable that hostilities may before long break out in Waikato, it appears to the Colonial Secretary that it would be better to hold in reserve the employment of these powerful allies until that occasion arises. Their jealousy of the usurpation of a sort of sovereignty over the other tribes by the Waikato in setting up their king, is a feeling probably easy to be worked upon, and one which may fairly be taken advantage of. And if the insurgents in Waikato were once suppressed, the Ngatiruanui and Taranaki and our Southern opponents would either fall along with them, or be easily dealt with.

3. The third means of defence is the Militia, including the Volunteers. The Colonial Secretary recommends that a proper proportion of the Militia be immediately called out into active service, in all the settlements of the Northern Island. This has already been done in Taranaki, and five hundred men are employed in the occupation of blockhouses, and in nightly patrols and pickets about the town. Should it be found necessary eventually to withdraw the troops from Tataraimaka, and contract the lines of defence around New Plymouth, the number of Militia kept on permanent pay might be reduced.

It is not advisable to call out less than 500 men at Hawke's Bay, 500 at Whanganui, 1,000 at Wellington, and 1,500 at Auckland.

Most of the towns of New Zealand (excepting Auckland) are built in such a manner that if the object had been to make their defence impossible, human ingenuity could scarcely have devised a better mode of doing so than the plan of building actually adopted. Houses, generally of weatherboards, are built as wide apart, and scattered over as great an extent of open land, as is compatible with their being considered a collection of dwellings (in other words, a town or village,) at all. The mode of defence adopted at New Plymouth (a town of this sort) is the erection of blockhouses, on commanding sites, around the central portion of the town, in which the buildings are least dispersed. Within the line of defence so constructed Natives probably would not be very ready to venture, as their retreat might be cut off in many directions. But if they were determined, and made a rush, they might obviously commit much havoc before they could be arrested. Against such a contingency, it is possible that a number of soldiers and Militia, sufficient to patrol different parts of the town at once, and at all hours, might be found an adequate security. It is suggested, however, that certain of the houses in various parts of the town, and in the best positions to command the streets, and the open spaces between them, should be rendered ball-proof, and pierced with loop-holes, and be used as stations for Militia and Volunteers, who might thus cover with their fire almost every space or open ground by which an enemy might enter.



The defence of the out-settlers in the various Provinces is also a very difficult matter. To make this defence absolutely complete seems impossible with the present military resources of the Colony. Isolated sheep stations, many miles apart, or agricultural farms scattered over narrow and secluded valleys, with ranges of mountains and tracts of forest land intervening, spreading over millions of acres in the aggregate, cannot possibly be brought within continuous lines of defence. Every preparation should be in readiness to bring in the women and children from these districts to the capital towns at a moment's notice; and it would be advisable to have the means of removing them, or some of them, from the towns themselves to the other Island should it appear that the towns had become unduly crowded and liable to attack. The most defensible houses ought then to be taken in the different districts as centres, in which the male inhabitants might congregate at night. These houses might be rendered shot-proof and loop-holed, as above suggested with regard to town houses, and supplied with sufficient quantities of ammunition. If the Natives of the district were only in small numbers, or moved about in small parties of marauders, such houses would perhaps be sufficient for the protection of the inhabitants. But wherever they could gather in large masses, the settlers would have to be concentrated in fewer centres near the principal towns, and in regularly built blockhouses capable of standing a siege. If this could not be done, they would have to abandon their dwellings and their districts and assemble in the towns, and take part in the defence of the latter.

In any of the three cases supposed the Colonial Secretary believes that it is most desirable that the settlers of the out districts should be formed into Mounted Corps, which could easily be done, as most of them have or could readily provide themselves with horses. They should be armed with rifled carbines or common rifles and revolvers if possible. Detachments of these Mounted Corps might sally out daily, visit the different farms and stations and patrol the whole country, and make the incursions of marauding Natives and the destruction of houses and property a much more difficult and dangerous task for these roving banditti.

There are rifles enough in the Colony for the above purpose: rifle carbines and revolvers have lately been sent for from England.

The selection of the houses to be used as above suggested, and the sites for blockhouses, must of course be left to the persons best acquainted with the respective localities concerned. The officers commanding the troops, and those commanding Militia and Volunteers, might in each Province form a Board for this purpose, in conjunction with the respective Superintendents.

All the above suggestions are obvious enough. But as his Excellency considers it is incumbent on Ministers to give him advice on the general question of defences, it is proposed that they should now be formally made.

But these merely defensive measures would do very little if anything towards putting an end to the war, or bringing the Natives to a conviction that their interest lies in remaining at peace. It would require active aggressive operations by the military for this. But all authorities have hitherto declared that a much larger number of troops than are in the Colony at present would be required to secure for such operations much chance of success.

A most important matter remains for consideration,—the providing funds to defray the cost of these measures.

The Militia at Taranaki, in number 500, cost at present about £36,500 a year. If the number above recommended were called out in the other Provinces, and similarly paid, the expense (of 4,000 men, including those at Taranaki,) would be about £290,000 a year. With the other measures recommended, £350,000 at least would be required, if the supposed state of things were to last a year.

If it be said that the pay of the Militia at Taranaki is too high (2s. 6d. per day, and rations), it need only be answered, that the ordinary wages of labour of the simplest kind, such as working on roads, is eight shillings a day at the present moment at Nelson and Canterbury. At Otago, there are the richest goldfields in the world in full operation, and at Nelson prospects of other fields as rich. With all these inducements to the most numerous class of the population to cross a strait of 20 miles, and get quit of the onerous duties of militiamen, there is much more fear that the pay will have to be increased, in order to keep any sufficient number of men in the Militia at all, than hope that it will be found possible to reduce it.

The House of Representatives have not voted one penny to meet the expenses attending a state of war. £9,000, to keep up the head-quarters and staff of the different Militia and Volunteer Battalions, on peace establishment throughout the Colony, is the only sum strictly applicable to the maintenance of these forces.

But, of the proposed loan of £500,000, £200,000 is appropriated by the Loan Act to the reinstatement of the settlement and inhabitants of Taranaki. By an arrangement lately made, in conjunction with the Legislature of that Province, £80,000 of the whole £200,000 is to be devoted purely to purposes of reinstatement. As the mere preservation of the settlement is a necessary preliminary to its reinstatement, it appears reasonable in the present emergency to employ this sum on the former object.

The portion of the loan (£100,000) appropriated by the Act to the "formation of roads and other public works connected therewith," was avowedly so appropriated with the view of rendering the country more available for military operations, the ulterior object being, of course, either directly to quell insurrection within the limits of the country so to be rendered accessible, or indirectly to prevent it by letting the Natives see the Government had power so to quell it. It may admit of question then, whether it would not be carrying into effect the spirit, although not the letter of the Act, to employ the sum in question in quelling or preventing insurrection by the

means suggested above. The special reason for particularizing the object of expenditure, viz.,—the making of roads, was that the money might contribute towards the permanent establishment of peace and security. But if it be spent in aid of any plan for bringing the Natives once for all to a conviction that they must obey the laws, and cannot disturb the general peace with impunity, would not this main object the Assembly had in view, viz.,—a permanent settlement, be even more satisfactorily attained than by the construction of a few more miles of macadamized road into the interior of the country?

If this appropriation of the £100,000 be allowable, and if, as is probable, a surplus of £20,000 or £30,000 may be calculated upon, out of the £200,000, of the Loan to be applied to the liquidation of the Colony's debts to the Imperial Government, on account of the last war, there would be a sum of about £200,000 at the disposal of the Government to meet the present emergency. This sum would enable the measures above suggested to be carried on for the next six months.

If this cannot be done, one of two alternatives remains. The Governor can, if he pleases, exercise the power recognised in the late Despatches of drawing upon the Commissariat in cases of great emergency. Or, he can call the General Assembly and apply to them for the means wherewith to rescue the Colony from a position of imminent danger. But the delay, and the great and possible fatal interruption to the execution of any measures by the Governor requiring his personal attention, which would be interposed by the sitting of the Assembly at the present moment, seem to put the last step almost out of the question, even though the necessity of calling it at the earliest possible date be acknowledged.

ALFRED DOMETT.

23rd May, 1863.

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### No. 6.

#### MEMORANDUM FOR HIS EXCELLENCY.

With respect to the maintenance of the military occupation of Tataraimaka, the Colonial Secretary concurs with the Native Minister as to the course to be adopted in either of the contingencies mentioned in the following Minute.

With respect to the defence of the Colony in the event of a general rising, the Colonial Secretary has already communicated to His Excellency his own views on the subject.

ALFRED DOMETT.

27th May, 1863.

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### No. 7.

#### MEMORANDUM BY THE NATIVE MINISTER.

MR. DOMETT,

With reference to the conversation we have just had with the Governor, I will state my own views very briefly as to what should be done.

Immediately upon the murders being committed on the 4th May, the Colonial Government sent authority to the Superintendents of Wellington and Hawke's Bay to call out the Militia for active service in case of any attack upon those settlements. They also sent orders to Auckland to have everything in readiness for calling out the Militia and Volunteers there. The Superintendent of Wellington replied, that in his opinion there was no such pressing danger there as to necessitate the immediate calling out of the Militia. At Auckland every necessary step has been taken, and from the letters received by the "Airedale" it may be stated that the number of men will not be far if any short of 5,000 there, and will be ready at any moment.

The question of calling out the Colonial Militia and Volunteers throughout the North Island, and thereby incurring an immediate and large outlay, for which no provision was made by the House, must necessarily depend upon the previous question, whether any aggressive movement is now to be made against the murderers and their abettors, or whether a merely defensive position is to be maintained. Upon this last question the Governor requires an immediate and decisive expression of opinion; and I have no hesitation whatever in stating mine.

1. If the General considers that with the force of Troops and Militia now here, he can, notwithstanding the season of the year, inflict sharp and present punishment on the Taranakis and Ngatiruanuis now in arms against us, this should be done; and the Colony ought to assist to the utmost in men and money, if the infliction of such punishment should lead to a general insurrection.

2. If the General does not think that at the commencement of Winter, in a country so broken into gullies, with the known position of the enemy's Pas, and with the force he has at his command down here, swift and decisive punishment can be inflicted, my advice is to withdraw the Troops from the Redoubts at Tataraimaka and Oakura and make no aggressive movement whatever during the Winter. I see no use in maintaining those posts; they can be re-occupied whenever they are wanted for offensive operations.

3. I look upon an aggressive movement against Waikato as out of the question. If in July, 1861, the then Governor, the General, and the Colonial Ministry were all agreed that the then

force was not sufficient for such a movement, the same opinion must surely be entertained now, when the force has been reduced by I believe nearly 1000 men.

4. My own belief is so clear that the force in the country is not and never has been sufficient for offensive operations, in a general insurrection, and that a campaigning winter must be disastrous to us, that I hope it will not be deemed impertinent in me to state that belief here. It was right and necessary to occupy Tataraimaka. When this was done the Government had just grounds for believing that its occupation would be made in peace. Now that the contingency of War has arisen, the General should be left perfectly free to choose the time, place, and circumstances when he may strike a decisive blow, and the Troops should not be called upon to do harassing escort duty and suffer the hardships of a winter in tents, merely to keep up a guerilla warfare.

Taranaki, 27th May, 1863.

F. D. BELL.

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## No. 7.

### MINUTE BY THE GOVERNOR.

The Governor thinks it his duty to offer the following remarks upon the Memorandum he received last night from his Responsible Advisers, and he feels sure that they will in the present critical state of affairs pardon him for doing so, and make allowances for the great weight of responsibility which he feels rests upon him.

With regard to the question raised as to the power, or the contrary, of the Lieut.-General to undertake some decisive operation with the force now at his disposal in this Province, the Governor would remark that on the 25th instant the Lieut.-General, by taking every effective man in the Queen's troops from the Town of New Plymouth, could not collect a force of 500 infantry. The same day the troops marched from the town, which was left to be protected by the Militia and Volunteers, hostile Natives came down to its vicinity, an alarm was raised, and the Colonial Secretary recommended that the troops should be recalled to town.

A force of 300 men is required every night for the protection of this town. The Militia and Volunteers consist collectively of about 385 effective men. A consideration of these facts will, the Governor thinks, show how totally impossible it would be, until further preparations are made, to undertake any decisive operation in the field at this point.

Ministers appear to consider that the necessity of calling out the Militia and Volunteers depends upon whether any aggressive movement is to be made, or whether a merely defensive position is to be maintained. The Governor thinks he ought candidly to state that in the present condition of the country he cannot concur in this opinion, especially in as far as Auckland is concerned. He does not think that the regular forces now there, even when augmented by reinforcements from Taranaki, are adequate for the protection of the town of Auckland and its outlying settlements, and for the maintenance of our positions on the Waikato river, for so long a time as the tribes inhabiting the banks of that river seem so bent on mischief.

Generally, upon the subject of the aggressive movement spoken of by Ministers, the Governor would observe, that if such a movement would cause a general rising, as would most probably be the case, it appears clear it never ought to be made until the settlements which might be endangered by it are put in a thorough state of defence, and this can best be done by having their Militia and Volunteers well drilled, in a thoroughly efficient state, and fit for immediate service.

The Governor would submit to his Responsible Advisers that what requires to be done in the present emergency is, not to determine what should be done for the defence of the Colony in the event of a general rising taking place, but forthwith to take such active measures as may probably prevent such a rising, and may place the Colony in a thorough state of preparation for it, if such an event should unfortunately happen. By taking such a course we shall encourage our friends, dishearten our enemies, and place ourselves in a position of security.

The Governor feels that he ought to express this opinion to his Advisers, for he has incurred a great responsibility in recommending the Home Government to send large reinforcements here, and he will find it difficult to justify his having done so unless the Colony, by making corresponding efforts, shows its sense of the danger which threatens it.

The Governor, in conformity with the views of his Responsible Advisers, will recommend the Lieut.-General to withdraw the force from the Tataraimaka block whenever he thinks it expedient and convenient to do so.

G. GREY.

New Plymouth, Taranaki,  
28th May, 1863.

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## No. 9.

### MINUTE BY THE COLONIAL SECRETARY.

In his Excellency's Minute of yesterday, there occurs one passage which the Colonial Secretary feels himself bound to remark upon.

The passage alluded to is as follows :—“The same day the troops marched from town, which was left to be protected by the Militia and Volunteers, hostile Natives came down to its vicinity, and the Colonial Secretary recommended that the troops should be recalled to the town.”

This implies that the expedition, whatever it was intended for, was abandoned on the recommendation of the Colonial Secretary.

The Colonial Secretary read this statement with the greatest surprise. In justice to himself he feels bound to state, with great deference to his Excellency, that he never recommended, nor thought of recommending, “that the troops should be recalled to town.”

The only conversation the Colonial Secretary had with his Excellency was late in the evening of the day alluded to. He then learned from his Excellency that a telegraphic message had some hours before been received to the effect that the Natives who had been collected near Tukitukipapa (south of Tataraimaka), had disappeared from that locality. That his Excellency had *already* sent a mounted orderly to General Cameron with the news of the appearance of the Natives in the vicinity of the town, and had *received a reply* from the General, intimating that he would be in town early the following morning. The Colonial Secretary then expressed an opinion that it would be prudent to have a small number of troops (from 50 to 100) in the town, as a support to the Militia and Volunteers, in the case of the Natives being or coming in any force towards the North, and molesting the town while the troops were moving to the South. In this opinion his Excellency appeared entirely to concur, and sent another message to General Cameron.

The Colonial Secretary was under the impression that there being, as he understood, about 1300 infantry and cavalry in Taranaki, a small force, say of 100 men, might be left to help in the defence of the town, without materially interfering with any aggressive operations to the South against the few hundreds of Natives collected in that quarter.

With regard to what requires to be done in the present emergency, and to the calling out of the Militia, the Colonial Secretary's opinion coincides with that of his Excellency. This opinion he has expressed in the Memorandum shown to his Excellency on the 27th instant, giving some of the same reasons for it. But the Colonial Secretary cannot convey to his Excellency the conclusive opinion of Ministers as a body on this subject, until he has had an opportunity of conferring with his colleagues in Auckland. The Colonial Secretary regrets this delay, but is in no way accountable for it. On the receipt of his Excellency's Minute of the 20th instant, the Colonial Secretary requested a passage for himself and Mr. Bell to Auckland in the “Eclipse.” The “Eclipse,” it appeared, could not then be sent away, and even if she could have been spared, it seems from the result of a second application this week, that she has not sufficient accommodation for his Excellency and his necessary suite, and Ministers at the same time.

ALFRED DOMETT.

May 29th, 1863.

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## No. 10.

### MINUTE BY THE GOVERNOR.

The Governor begs to acknowledge the receipt of the Colonial Secretary's Minute of yesterday's date, explaining, firstly, that he could not admit, that the expedition, whatever it was, which led the Lieut.-General to move from the Town of New Plymouth on the 25th instant, was abandoned on the recommendation of the Colonial Secretary alone. If the Governor's Minute of the 28th instant implies that such was the case, he is very glad to have an opportunity of removing what would undoubtedly have been an erroneous impression. The Governor did not know until he received the Colonial Secretary's Minute of the 20th, the exact number of men he thought should have been recalled to the Town of New Plymouth upon the 25th instant. In the Governor's opinion, it would have been almost useless to have recalled so small a force as 100 men, to aid in the defence of a Town the outline of which is so extensive: he quite concurred, however, in the propriety, under the circumstances he has stated, of recalling a sufficient force for that purpose. The Colonial Secretary will see that the precise number does not affect the Governor's argument, which was simply this, that it could be shewn from facts which had already transpired, that the Lieut.-General had not now at his disposal a sufficient force in this Province to enable him to undertake any decisive operation here, and that the state of other parts of New Zealand render it rather necessary to reduce the force at Taranaki, than to increase it; and in trying to show this, he had no intention of asserting that the recall of the Troops the other day had been based upon the recommendation of the Colonial Secretary alone, and he is sorry that he gave him the trouble of explaining that such was not the case.

G. GREY.

Taranaki, 30th May, 1863.

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