ME. FITZGERALD ON NEW ZEALAND AFFAIRS.

Timaru Herald, Volume IV, Issue 94, 2 March 1866, Page 5

ME. FITZGERALD ON NEW ZEALAND AFFAIRS.

The following letter is extracted from the Times of Nov. 20 :— Sir, —I beg to enclose a letter just received from Mr. FitzGerald, who had just resigned the Ministry of Native affairs m New Zealand, together with the Weld Ministry, and to place it at your disposal if you think fit to publish it. Your obedient servant, C. B. Addeulev. Hams, Dec. 18. "Wellington, Oct. 13. "My dear Adderley, — The letters 1 have formerly written to you have attracted sufficient attention to excuse my again addressing yon on the position of New Zealand affairs. I believe that m the history of our colonial empire no position has been so complicated and so difficult of solution, nor has any problem been presented to a colony involving questions of such magnitude or such interest. Our present position is this. The war which resulted m the conquest of the Waikato tribes is at an end. Their land is confiscated to the Crown. The few natives who remained loyal, and such of the hostile natives as are willing to come m aud accept Crown grants, are being settled down on portions of the confiscated territory ; the remainder is being allotted to military aud other settlers, who' have been introduced under promises of land, and some part will remain for sale, to recoup, if possible, the colonial treasury for the ruinous cost of the war. The latter part will be very small, notwithstanding the expectatious raised and the promises made by the Ministers of the day. Taken as a whole, the i>olicy of 1863 is an enormous failure, and the future expense of maintaining our position m the Waikato, completing the settlement, and paying compensation will more than absorb all the profits of the scheme. The practical result is that we have paid three millions of money, and have acquired a territory of about 1,200,000 acres — that is (allowing for some expenditure out of the loan on other objects) about £2 au acre for the land. The price we used to pay for land by peaceable purchase was about an average of, I believe, Gs. It varied from pence to shillings, the highest amounting to ss. or Cs. an acre. " It may be said that we have gained other objects by our expenditure, such as the establishment of peace and the extension of law. Whether that will be the result remains still to be seen. At present the Queen's writ goes no further than it did before the late war, except over the English m the land out of which we have expelled the natives. It is by no means certain that the natives will acquiesce m. the confiscations, and that we may not again have to fight for what we presume to have acquired. In my opinion the future policy pursued towards the natives will mainly determine this question, so that the expenditure of the three millions has not as yet secured us peace or law, and only an incohate and disputable title to some land. "At Taranaki and down the shores of the Cook's Straits towards Wanganui we have also confiscated a large territory j but the country is still infested by bands of marauders, who murder our messengers of peace and shoot down our soldiers if they move out of the roach of the guns m our redoubts. That countiy is ourd only m name, and, unless the natives come m and submit, must be fought for again. Indeed, while I write, the war is about to begin, to avenge the murder of our messengers of peace. ' ' The principal evil which has come upon us is the degradation of the British name and the loss of its jirestige under the military rule of General Cameron. If we take the numbers of the natives, j their anns, their material of war, it must be admitted that no campaign has ever been fought so little credible to the British arms. Ido not say this simply by way of dectracting from the reputation of our commanders, but I ask you m

England to take a sober and sensible view of the ' facts. When we look at the magnitude of the country conquered, — a mere county, — the numbers of the troops and the material of war employed, — at the time the conquest occupied, the cost, and the loss of life, — I will defy any one to produce any instance of a similar campaign m which anything like such miserable results were achieved m proportion to the means ex- ! pended. Above all. the feeling which General Cameron has by his tactics instilled iuto the native mind that it takes five or six English soldiers to fight one Maori — a feeling universal among the whole race — has done more to impede our power of reducieg them to order than many years of courageous action will be able to overcome. It should be universally known m England that the British army has hardly ever met more than COO or 700 Maoris at a time. At the Gate pah, for example, where we suffered defeat, the numbers were about 2,000 on our side, with 17 guns ; on theirs certainly at the outside not more than 300 or 400 (they assert only 150). The moral influence of these proceedings has been the most serious impediment to all future action. But worse than all was the obsinate refusal of the General to take the Wereroa pah with 2,000 men, really the principal thing to be done m the Wangauui campaign, while Sir G. Grey took it with 400 or 500 colonial militia and friendly natives. You will hear of course that the pah was deserted, and only one old woman found m it. That is true, but it is also true that it was defended by as large a force as when Cameron refused to take it. Sir G. Grey disposed his forces so as to command it, and the position was evacuated. It was simply a matter of genei'alship, which the Governor used and the General did not attempt. ' Able strategy obtained an almost impreguable position, without the loss of a man, where the absence of military skill had sacrificed so many valuable lives against positions incomparably easier to assault.

" But General Cameron not only acted on the fatal principal I have alluded to, but publicly announced it. de writes to the Governor m one of the published letters that Col. Warre talked !

— 'how easy it is to talk,' he somewhat insultingly adds— of marching down from Taranakj with 500 nien to meet him ; and adds that 200 natives, such as he met at Nukumara, would stop Warre anywhere. If the Commander of the Forces acquaints the world that 200 Maoris can lick 500 British troops, I put it to you m England what is the result likely to be ? On the other hand, where we have used our own colonial forces, we have m every instance fought with greatly inferior numbers. Col. Fraser at Waiukn, with a greatly inferior force, took the rifle pits at the point of the bayonet, and at once restored the name of an Englishman all through the East Coast. This action is spoken of everywhere among the natives. The same thing is spoken of everywhere among the natives. The same thing is going on at Opotiki under Major Brassey, where a small force of 300 or 400 militia and natives have made a sharp, short, and decisive campaign to avenge the murders of Volkner and Fulloon. "Now, this is the real secret of the feeling which has grown up and is growing m New Zealand, that Imperial troops are of no use to us at all. It might have been otherwise under a Napier or an Edwards. But I tell you the sinple facts as they are. The mere fact of the low estimation m which we are held, owing to General Cameron's management of the war, will for many years require the colony to maintain many more men, and, of course, very much more money than would have been necessaiy had he fought with common sense. "There is another fact which should be known. The terrible Hauhau superstition has spread all along the East Coast from the East Cape to Hawke's Bay. There are not very many English settlers m that district, but there are some, and some of the friendly natives. At the North of this district we have Eraser's force, not more than 100 to 150 men strong. But Mr. McLean, who is now the Superintendent of Hawke's Bay, brought his powerful influence to bear, and by arming the friendly natives and supplying them with the munitions of war, we are conquering the country with comparatively small cost, and without a soldier. We have nearly 1000 natives fighting for us on that coast. You will remember m my former letter I pointed out to you that m the commencement of the Waikato campaign the fatal blunder made was that we failed by common sagacity and a wise diplomacy to separate our wavering friends from our real enemies. We put them all into one boat, and ended by punishing those who were most inclined to be friendly, and letting the real oulprits escape scot free. On the east coast Mr. M'Lean, acting as the agent and representative of Mr. .Weld's Gevemment, pursued the opposite course. He secured the active alliance of all the friendly, confirmed the wavering, armed the most trusty of our allies, and has defeated and is defeating the Hauhaus everywhere. Without this there is no doubt they would have descended on Hawke's Bay, and that beautiful province would have become auotlier Taranaki. " You will, probably, ask me what are the prospects for the future. I think peace will shortly be restored through the whole of the east coast. Thi north is at peace, and with common prudence and justice will remain so. In the Thames district the natives are unsettled. Kereopa, the murderer and cannibal — called by the natives, Kereopa ' cat-eyes ' — is trying to get a footing there. But I think the recent affair at Opotiki and the loss of the Waikato will make them think twice before they break out. The whole centre of the island is inhabited by the Ngatiamaniapoto, Taupo, and Urewera tribes — all hostile, not fighting against us, but ready to do so. Rewi is at their head, watching us with irreconcilable suspicion. I think it quite possible he may attack Waikato, or fall on the north of Taranaki. But he may and probably will think better of it. We are completely shut out from all that country, and have hardly any communication with it at all. " At Taranaki matters will be settled if Rewi does not commence a new war. But lam satisfied that from Taranaki to Wanganui the Taranaki and Ngatiruanui hordes must be destroyed. j They have always been cruel and treacherous, and the last two horrid murders, m which they invited men to bring the proclamation of peace to them and then murdered them, seals their doom. They are few m number, thauk God. ' " I now turn to political matters. Mr. Weld's

Cabinet has just resigned. This will be received with great regret m England. His policy was clear, distinct, and bold. He had a fair majority m the House, but he had the insuperable difficulty of having to ask the House to impose additional and heavy taxes on the colony to enable it to meet its engagements, and to rely on itself for self-defence. Even m this he would have been successful but for two causes — first, that the House must be dissolved immediately after this session, as it 3 five years of life has expired, and waverer3 shied going to the hustings with the charge of having increased the taxation ; secondly, he is very ill, and has been unable for some time to attend the House at aIL At the same time Mr. Fitzherbert, the Treasurer, was also laid up, and unable to defend his financial measures when most needed. The Ministry lias fallen from the lukewarmness of its own supporters, not from the increase of the strength of the Opposition. Mr. Stafford is trying to form a Ministry. Whether he will succeed, or whether he will try to reverse the policy of self-defence, so repeatedly asserted during this and the late session, remains to be seen. You will probably hear by the next mail. The latter task I regard as hopeless. I earnestly hope the English Government will be moved neither by tears nor prayers to flinch one jot from enforcing that policy of self-defence which I regard as not only the duty, but the glory and privilege of this colony, and which more than anything else will, like the manful fulfilment of all duties, lay firm and deep the foundations of future greatness by eliciting all the strength and endurance of our race. Ido hope that England will be firm on this point, and that she will be equally resolute m not permitting the colony to be cut up into two, a jiroposal which simply means that she shall again incur the heavy cost of governing the native race, and the thankless and impossible task of doing so m such a manner as to satisfy the European population. The resignation of Mr. Weld's Cabinet relieves me from the office of Minister for Native Affairs, which I occupied on the resignation of Mr. Mantell, at the commencement of the Session. I venture to thiuk that during the two months I have held that office the colony has asserted some of the most important principles which lay down fixed bases for the guidance of our future policy. A Bill for enabling the Governor to appoint a commission of natives and Europeans, to inquire how the natives may best be represented m the General Assembly, shows how widely the feeling of the colony has changed since 18(52, when, amid general laughter, J first proposed the adoption of this principle. A Bill of still greater importance has declared that all Maoris are British subjects, entitled to all the privileges and protection of British law ; and, as a great practical result, it enables a Maori to bring an action m the Supreme Court m resx^ect to native lands. The monstrous doctrine that the Maoris were coinpelled'to obey the law, and could be tried and executed by our Courts for crime, while at the same time we refused them the assistance of our courts to defend their property, is now, thank God, for ever expunged from the jurisprudence of the colony. We have then constructed an elaborate machinery for trying cases of native title to land by a native Lands' Court, and enabled the Supreme Court to use this machinery by sending down cases to it for triaL We have also passed a Police Bill, declaring that if any tribe protects a murderer, the lands of that tribe shall be taken to pay for a police force m that district — a measure which will at once punish the lawlessness of the worst tribes, and provide funds for maintaing order. These are measures which I believe go to the root of the whole question. The individualization of titles by the Native Lands' Court by consent of the owners, a work which has begun and will go steadily on ; the total abandonment of land purchasing by the Government, and allowing the natives to sell to the Europeans, which was asserted by Mr. Bell's Act of 1562, but only now practically brought into operation all over the colony ; the giving the native his remedy, even against the Crown, m the courts of law ; the organization of a native police, paid for by the district m which it is required, — these are measures which I am very glad to have had some share m during the short time I have been m office, and which, if faithfully carried into action, will, I believe, change the whole features of the Maori question.

"But the step which, you will bear most questioned m some quarters is the proclamation of peace. It will be said that the natives won't accept it, and that it was absurd to say the war was at an end, while, m fact, it was still going on. The fact, however, is that the greatest part of the hostile tribes are m constant fear that we are going to attack them ; and, therefore the question whether they will attack us is reduced to a consideration of strategy. They are suspicious and sulk}'. It is to them — the great bulk of the people, to the waverer?, Jto the peaceful element of the war party, to those like Thompson, who long for peace, but must help their people if it is war — to all these the announcement of peace would, it was hoped, be most grateful, qnieting their fears, restoring their conh'dence. By the more violent it may be rejected. But it will do this — it will tend more than anything else to separate ' the sheep from the goats,' and divide the peace and war party into two. This proclamation is, I know, doing its work.

" But the little experience I have had m office has taught me that even legislation is of less importance m this matter than the work of practical administration. The present suspicious and sulky attitude of the great bulk of the native race has its origin, partly, at all events, m a multitude of petty grievances arising out of unfulfilled promises. Instead of letting them alone, and giving them what they asked for when it is^a matter of indifference, we have treated them like children and acted as if we knew much better what was good for them than they do themselves. Their conclusion has been that m all this manipulation we were looking to our own object and interests, and not to theirs ; and I cannot tell them that this is* altogether a mistake. One most remarkable instance of this is seen m the hatred to the missionaries, — an entirely new feature m Maori sentiment, but one painfully evident. They accuse the missionaries of stealing their land, while they pretend to teach them religion, and point to the large estates formerly acquired by the missionaries. Unjust as these charges are, with some exceptions, they are deeply felt. As one chief expressed it, ' While you were teaching us to look up to Heaven, you are pulling the land from under

our feet.' Again, they look on the missionaries as having deserted them m this, as they view it, unjust and aggressive war, and as having sided with their oppressors. One point m particular is pointed to. Bishop Selwyn accompanied the the army through the Waikato, and endured all the misery of a campaign m order to tender his services to the wounded and dying of both sides. But the natives believe that he was actually m command of a part of the army, and was showing General Cameron his way abont the country. W. Thompson, m a petition to the Assembly, speakes of ' the army of Bishop Selwyn and the General.' Formerly the missionaries were the link between the two races. Now this link ia absolutely dissolved, and m this new-born hatred of the missionaries lies one of the causes of

Hauhauism.

' ' These are some of the difficulties surrounding this great question. One word about Sir G. Grey and I have done. I cannot recall my opinion that he made a great mistake m all his conduct prior to the Waikato war. I cannot believe that that war, any more than the Waitara war, was necessary ; but m his dispute with the Whitaker Cabinet he was clearly m the right, and m his differences with General Cameron more distinctly so. It is monstrous to accuse the Governor of violating the confidence of a private correspondence, when that correspondence included all the public busines of bis station. Not on c word published has any relation whatever to private matters ; and if the Governor and General chose to conduct the public business of the country m letters beginning ' My dear General' and ' My dear Sir George,' instead of ' Sir,' it is ridiculous to say that the correspondence thereby became private; The only wrong committed would have been m the spreading the sham veil of private correspondence over the official records of public acts. In all his conduct towards Mr. Weld's Government Sir G. Grey has been most loyal, and though, as is evident, he is personally opposed to the removal of the troops, he has acquiesced m Mr. Weld's policy, and m other respects hasheartily seconded a noble attempt to awaken the colony to a true sense of its duties. And m permitting the ministry for native affairs to be placed m my hands his Excellency has shown that no private or personal feeling interferes with his administration. As I have written so strongly on the points on which I have thought he was wrong, I am glad to pay this tribute to his personal kindness to an opponent. " Believe me, my dear Adderley, Yours very truly, " James Edwakd FitzGerald. " Mr. C. B. Adderley, M.P."