WAS IT WORTH £300,000,000?

Sun (Christchurch), Volume I, Issue 272, 21 December 1914, Page 6

WAS IT WORTH £300,000,000?

o WHY THERE HAS BEEN NO NAVAL BATTLE. GERMANY HAS EVACUATED THE SEAS. A valuable article, which will reassure those who are perturbed by the occasional losses of our Navy, appears in the "Fortnightly Review," by MiArchibald Hurd, entitled "No Naval Battle—Why?" This very lucid article shows what overwhelming superiority in naval force belongs to the Allies. "Our margin of safety'at sea has, indeed, increased since hostilities opened," says Mr Hurd. "Instead of the enemy wearing down our superiority, we have increased his inferiority. "When the war opened, we -were almost in the proportion of two to one against Germany; we have not lost even in the proportion of one to one, and we have passed a larger number of new ships into commission. "After nearly three months of war we are actually stronger in materiel than we were, and the chances of the German or Austro-Huhgarian fleets endeavouring to resume the use of the seas has decreased. . We.ek succeeds week, and we enjoy all the blessings of maritime eommunication,v while the enemies' fleets remain imprisoned.. Fifteen Yeare^.Exp^nditobe^

"We have every day about 4000 ships moving on the oceans, engaged in trade; we have hundreds of transports bringing to our aid the military strength of the distant portions of the Empire; ,we have maintained our postal and telegraphic communications with the uttermost parts of the earth.

" All these benefits the enemies have abandoned; they have evacuated the seas.

" The German Navy. at the outbreak of war represented the cumulative results of fifteen years of rising expenditure. The extent of the sacrifice made by the German people in response to the demands of the" Government can only be adequately appreciated if the 1 movement be studied in its financial aspect. ' _, ''lf we take full account of all the avenues of expenditure, revealed and unrevealed, it may be assumed that upon the effective German Fleet an aggregate- sum' of* not less- than £300,000,000 has been spent.. "Germany attained.the second place' among the great naval Powers, but in the meantime, owing to our unrivalled shipbuilding facilities, we had been enabled to reinforce our supremacy. Con : sequently in relation to Great Britain Germany, at the outbreak of the war, was actually weaker on the seas than she was three or four years before. What the Germans Expected.

"What were the German people led to anticipate that* their _ Fleet would achieve f, We have an official statement of Germany's, ambitions, which the new Navy Law embodied- in*the memorandum accompanying r'the. Navy Bill of 1900. 'This illuminating document was apparently prepared by Grand Admiral v.on Tirpitz, the Naval Secretary. The first paragraphs are of particular importance, in the light of recent events: — " 'A naval war for economic interests, particularly foivcommercial interests, will probably be of long duration, for the aim. of a superior opponent will bo all the more completely,.reached the longer thewar lasts.- To this must be added that a' naval war which, after, the destruction at shutting up of the German sea fighting foree,-was- confined to the blockade of the coasts and the capture of merchant ships, would cost the opponent little: indeed,, he. would, on the contrary, amply cover the expenses of the ;war;; by the simultaneous improvement of his own trade. " 'An unsuccessful naval war of the duration of even only a- year' would destroy Germany's? sea trade, -and .would; thereby bring about ; ,the most disastrous first in, her economic, and then, as an immediate consequence of that, iri her social li^ " ' Quite apart fronirthe consequences of the possible peaee conditions the'destruction of our: sea trade during ..the war could not, even .at the close of it, bo made good within measurable time, an<l. wouhj,. thus add to the. sacrifices of the war a serious economic depression,' After Fifteen Years—and Three Months

"After fifteen years ,of unparalleled .sacrifice of treasure,, and after fifteen years of pin-pricking and mail-fisting, j Germany realised in a, flash, in the early ( days of August', that she had not only: missed 'the goal which had been set,'! but had - so aroused "the nervous fears of| her neighbours that, in the cireum-! stances which came immediately into, view, she was little stronger on the sea than she had been when she! embarked' on her schemes of naval ' expansion. • '' Let us examine the facts. In 1898 the British Channel Squadron consisted of only ■'■ eight first-class battleships,, and there was the Eeserve Squadron,; manned with reduced crews arid embracing seven old first-class and three' old second-class battleships, which cruised once a year. ; This comprised tho strength of the' British Fleet in homo waters, and the Channel Squadrou spent most of its time off the coasts of Spain and Portugal, and even visited tho Mediterranean, where practically all our best ships were concentrated. Tirpitz Makes a Mistake.

'' Grand Admiral von Tirpitz was sufficiently innocent to assume that what was would always be, and hence the assumption .that 'a great naval Power will not,.as a rule, be in a position to bring all'its ' striking forces against us.' Not only did the greatest naval Power carry out the concentration which Grand Admiral von.Tirpitz had assumed that it would not carry out, but by arrangement with France it was able, soon after the opening of the war, to entrust to Vice-Admiral Boue de Lapeyrere the defence of British interests in the Mediterranean. Thus we were in a position to hold the North Sea with practically all our strength, as we do to-day, while France held the Mediterranean with all her strength, as she does to-day, and consequently the basis upon which the expansion of ' the German Fleet had been palnned was swept aw r ay before the peace was broken. , ' /'During the period that, war has been in progress not a single German battleship" has put to sea, although,; as we know,-the Grand' Fleet, under Admiral Sir John JeUieoo has, "time and again, challenged it to action. The Germans have, in fact, considered it wise to cast back to the naval policy

of 1898— * the fleet would Lave to 'withdraw into the harbour, and there wait for a favourable opportunity for male* ing a sortie.' For nearly three months it has remained inactive. During the whole of this period it has not even assumed 'importance merely as a sortie fleet.' " * The Reason Why. '<lt seems probable, however, that the German Fleet, whatever the strategical situation, will eventually be driven to justify its existence. At present it has completely failed to fulfil any single one of the hopes on which it was j based. It has not been able to protect German shipping; it has not saved from strangulation German sea trade j it has not been in a position to defend Germany 's colonies. The whole fabric represented by German welt politik has fallen in ruins, despite the £300,000,000 expenditure upon the Navy during the past fifteen years. "The reason' why- there has been; no naval battle is thus, on a cursory examination of the situation at sea,, transparent* While the armies of Germany and Austria-Hungary proceeded! to invade the territory of their neighbours, their navies evacuated the seas in face of superior fdree, I ■■' They relinquished without a struggle all the advantages which sea command confers. They had claimed, and Germany in particular had claimed, that she had as much right to use the seas as the British people. •-: "When the war opened, both the enemies abandoned this claim and withdrew their fleets into strongly-de-fended harbours. Without striking a blow the navies of Great Britain and France thus -..achieved" the object for which; they were created. If an enemy runs away, leaving his opponent with all the spoils of victory, the latter has 'certainly no ground for complaint.".