THE WHITE BOOK

Sun (Christchurch), Volume I, Issue 247, 21 November 1914, Page 4

THE WHITE BOOK

DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDING THE WAR

HOW ENGLAND WORKED FOR PEACE

The White Book, which we are reprinting in this and succeeding -issues of THE SUN, contains the official report of Si* Edward Grey's speech in the House of Commons justifying British intervention in the "war, together with the diplomatic correspondence and negotiations arising out of the crisis which developed in Europe on the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand and his wife. The narrative is of extraordinary interest, and is essential to a proper understanding of Britain's attitude.

...'.' /, .No. ,43. . jS Sir E. Gosehen to Sir Edward Grey. •—'(Eeefcived July 27.) (Telegraphic.) ■ Berlin, July 27, 1914. Your telegram of July 26* Secretary of State says that conference yon suggest would' practically amount to a court of arbitration, aud eou'id not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate \ for the maintenance flf peace. I said I was sure-that yov" idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that; J-eprc-sentatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means of avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was notp ractieable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was no intention on the ( part of M. de Sazonof tot vi«ws, with. Count Berehtold. He thought that this m%hod of procedure might .lead to a satiffactory result, and that it would be be-,, fore doing anything else, tq await outcome! of exchange of views. bet"v#sen the,* Austrian and Russian Governments. . In the course''of a short Conversation .Secretary of State,said that,as. Austria was only partially but that ( if Russia mobilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him tvhat he meant by "mobilising against Germany.! '\ He said that if Russia only mobilised iii Soutji, Germany would nofe#JT*pMiise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would haye; to do so too, and 'Russian .system of mobilisation wifcso it might be 'difficult 'exactly to«lbeate; her mobilisation. Germany would, therefore, have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise. IA ' Finally, Secretary of State |aid that; 'news ,from .St. Petersburg has caused Jbim to take more hopeful viejy of she general situation. '■££'■■' ;% .....•-.. - ' ?See No. 36. S»L ■ §*■ '".'" v\, >' —• ■ :: W< \t- - No., 44. :| ' |f.. *: • Sin G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey} —j{ReceiVed July 27). (Telegraphic.) ■ - ■ St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914. < Auhtriau Ambassador tried, ; iu a long conversation which • he had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable'features of the recent action taken by the Aus-tro-Huugarian Government. Minister :for Foreign Affairs pointed out that* although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultimatum had been tsq.,drafted that it ■.could not possibly be accepted as aw hole by the Servian Go.vernwent. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some eases, others not only could not possibly be*put into immediate exectitiony •.seemg that fjiey entailed revision of existing Servian laws^ .but jprjp, mpreoveTf with Servia's dignity" "as an independent Btate. It would be useless for Russia to offer her gOod offices at Belgrade, in view 'of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In • order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. The Austrian Ambassador Undertook to communicate liis Excellency's remarks to his Government. On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that J had i correctly defined the attitude, of his Majesty's 'Government in my conversation with him, which I reported in ray telegram of the 24tli instant.* I added that you could snot promise to do anything morep that his Excellency wras mistaken If; he believed that the cause of peace could be by your telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if they supported Austria by' force of arms. Their attitude woxild merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert Avar by 'approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preseve peace. His Excellency must, not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances, I trusted that the Russian i Government would defer mobilisation ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued. In reply, the Minister of Foreign Af-. fairs told me that until the issue of the Imperial Ukase no effective steps towards mobilisation could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred too long. * See No. 6.

■'■ ~. ■' it/) . No. 46. ;' ' '■: Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Gbschen. v -■ ■ i (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. German Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburg to localise the war and to keep up the peace of Europe. . . I have replied that the Servian reply went further than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian Note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised coneilitary influence at Belgrade,; and it was ;• really at Vienna that moderating .influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing, and marched, into Servia, it meant that she was.-determined to crush Servia at all costs,, being reckless of . the conse-r quences that might be involved. Serivian' reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion arid pause. I said German Government should xxrge this at Vienna. I recalled what,' German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation:,if' the war could not be localised, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia,, it Would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute,'---Germany could nd#afford to see Austria, crushed. .Just asv other issues ■ might be raised that wbiMd supersede the dispute between Austria and Servia, and would bring other Powers in,, and the war -wpuld be the biggest ever known; but as tong as Germany would work to keep the pe&ce : I would keep closely in touch. Prcpßated that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged. 'A' X. K"' - -■'■- "'. " No. 47. 'Sir'Edward-Grey to Sir G. Buchanan. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 27, 1014. See my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Gosehem* - ' | I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any | event we stand aside. His Excellency deplored the offcet that such an impression must produce. This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to. the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for mahteuvre leave. But I. explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised. We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia will take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory. I pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear more Servian than the Russians in our dealings with the German and Austrian Governments. *See No. 37. No. 48. - Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen. Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. Sir, —Count Mensdorff told me by instruction to-day that the Servian Government liad not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. Seryia showed that she did not. in-

tend to abandon liev subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very, reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe .measures to enforce a fundamental change of the .attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Servia. As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many years endeavoured to find a way to .get on with their turbulent neighbour, though; this had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of Servia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to everyone what appalling consequences the Servian propaganda had already produced, and- what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees for the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and for the security of peace and order on .the south-eastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defence. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Servia from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as she had been for the last 10 years. The high sense of justice 0-' the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their posi-

No. 45. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey. (Beceived July' 27.) .(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914. Since my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported •in. my telegram of to-day,*" I understand that his Excellency has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna, a.-'.d St. Petersburg. *■ Sec NT-o. 44.

LIST OP OFFICIALS BENCKBNDORFF, COUNT— Russian Ambassador in Great Britain. BERCHTOLD, COUNT— s Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. BERTIE, SIR F.— British Minister, Paris. BIENVENU-MARTIN, M.— Acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs. BOSCHKOVITCH, M.— Servian Minister in London. BUCHANAN, SIB G.— Ambassador, St. Petersburg!!. BUNSEN, SIR M. fle— British Ambassador, Vienna. CAMBON, HL French Ambassador in London. ORACKANTHORPE, D. B. M.— Chargt d'Affaires, Belgrade. GOSCHEN, SIR E - British Ambassador at Berlin. GREY, SIR. EDWARD— British Minister for Foreign Affairs, London. LICHNOWSKY, PRINCE— . German Ambassador In London. MENSDORFF, COUNT— Austrian Ambassador in London. NICOLSON, SIR A.— Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, , London. RUMBOLD, -SIR H.— Second In Charge, British Embassy, Berlin. RODD, SIR R British Ambassador, Rome. SAZONOF, M.— Minister for Foreign Affair*, St. Petersburgh. SCHEBEKO, M.— , Russian Ambassador at Vienna. VILLIERS, SIR F.— British Minister at Brussels. VIVIANI, M.— Prime Minister of France. CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE EUROPEAN CRISIS.

tion with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on /our assistance in localising the fight, if necessary. Count Mensdorff added 'on his own account that, as long as Servia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures, because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Servia had doubled her territory and .population without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self-defence and self-preservation on Austria's * part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs against Servian territory.

I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Government"" upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substaiice of the conversation, that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning about that reply. . Count Mensdorff that, on paper, the Servian reply miglrfc seem to be satisfactory; but the Servians had refused the one co-operation of Austrian officials and police—which would be a real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive, campaign against Austria.

I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, even after the Servian reply* they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia aud at the saine time satisfy Russia, well and good, bxit if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government. I fear-: ed that it would b# expected in St. Petersburg that the Servian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when Russia found'that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should' not think of calling lip reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but:,' owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that ; .was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative. —I am, etc., E. GREY. No. 49. Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Rodd. Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. Sir, —The Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicholson to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference of four to be held in London. . _ - \ : As regards the question of asking .Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Servia to I suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, the Marquis : di San Guiiiano would recommend the i suggestion warmly to the German Go- | vernment, and would inquire what proI cedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna. —I am, etc., ! E. GREY. (To be continued on Monday.)

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