THE WHITE BOOK

Sun (Christchurch), Volume I, Issue 242, 16 November 1914, Page 2

THE WHITE BOOK

LIST OF OFFICIALS

BENCKENDORFF, COUNT— , 1 Russian Ambassador in Great Britain. BERCHTOLD, COUNT— .* | ..-••... /•.,_, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. BERTIE, SIB F.— V : . ~/ . British-MiJifsteti. Paris. .-,,...■ '■'BIISNVEOT-MARTiNv^^-'''' Acting French Minister, for Foreign Affairs BOSOHKOVITCHi M-^r'V : ' . .'.,-■,.-;■• Servian' Minister in London. BUOHANANj SIR &<-- :^ British Ambassador, St. Petersburgh. BUNSEN, SIR M.. . British Ambassador, Vienna. CAMBON, M.— ..... ..;,•, , /'•*. French Ambassador in London. CRACKANTHORPE, D. E. >M.— Charged' Affaires, Belgrade. GOSCHEN, SIR E.— f ,V British Ambassador at Berlin. .

(From the '' Parliamentary Debates,'' House of Commons, Monday, August 3, 1914.)

GREAT BRITAIN ' ANU EtTROPEAN

crisis developed into war between France and Germany, we would- give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any Foreign Power unless it Was subsequently to receive the . whole-hearted support of ''■ public opinion "here - ; if the occasion ; arose. ' J • in Ihy

STATEMENT BY SIR EDWARD

GREY,

The Secretary of State /or Foreign Affairs (Sir Edward Grey).—-Last week I stated that we were working for peace not, only ,for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. ■ To-day events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. ,„ Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon each other. ' * Before 1 proceed to* state the position of his Majesty's Government, I wouM like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the House what our attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the' House may know exactly under what obligations the Government r is, or the House can be said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. First of J all let me say, verf shortly, that we have consistently worked with , a single mind, with all the" earnestness in our power, to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that, point. We have always done it. JDuring these last years, as far as Ms Majesty's Government- are concerned, we 1 would have iio difficulty in proVing';thSt we have done so. ' Throughout the Balkan' crisis, by general admission, w# i %ork ; dd* for peace. The co-operation af the Great Powers of Europe was successful in working for peace in the-Balkan crisis* It is true that some of the Powers had; great difficulty in adjusting their points of .view.; It. took much.., t^ : and and discussion .before ,they could Bettle their differences,, but peace was secured, because peace wasNtheir mam 1 wtire' Viffitfg to 'give ' time and trouble rather' than accentuate differencerapidly. • • ■' -V . ;In the present crisis, it has noi-,been possible to secure the peace, of- Europe,; because there has been .little time, and there has been a disposition—at any rate in some quarters on .which, I,will not dwell—to force things .r;apidly to issue, at any rate, to ; the; great nskot peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy' of'peace, as far as the Great Powers "generally jfre concerned;' is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, and to comment on it, arid to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which Powers were most in favour of peace, which were most disposed to risk or endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now, from the point of view of British interests, British honour, and British obligations, free from all passion as to why peace has not been preserved. We shall publish Papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last week when we were working for peace; and when those Papers are published, I have no doubt that to, every human being they will make it clear how strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts for peace were, and that they will enable people to form their own judgment as to what forces were at work which operated against peace. I come first, now r to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House —and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once—that if any crisis such as this arose,.we should come before' the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that, because we had entered into' that engagement,*" there was an obligation of honour upon the country. I'will deal with that point to cleajr i the ground first. ■'■ There has been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and ' w*at came to be called . the '' Triple EnTOntV*- for some years past. The Triple Entente was not an Alliance — it was a Diplomatic group. The House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis, also a Balkan crisis, originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister* M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because: his visit was. planned before the, crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, £ did not consider that public opinion In this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic support. More was never asked from us, more was* never given, and more was never promised. In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support —up till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic support. Now I must make the question of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis in 1906. That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it came at a time of very great difficulty to his Majesty's Government when a General Election ! was in progress; and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I —spending three days a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office-—was asked the question whether if that

opinion, if r war t was forced upon, France, then on the question of Morocco — : a qu^stibri been ' tKcsubject of ■ agreement between this country and France,- an agireenient exceed[popular oh if out of that, agreement war was -forced :on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied ."to the material ; support of France. I gave no promise, .but....1 expressed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember, almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise, and I used. no threats,; but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time —and I think very reasonably—"lf you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish to give it, when the time comes, unless some "conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts.". There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorised those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose. . As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in prospect. I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. I could not be summoned. An answer had to be gj,ven. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I remember, Lord Hal-, dane, who was, then Secretary of State for War, and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the niost I could I do, and they authorised that on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis aroso. The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on—l think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance —but later on it was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet. The Agadir crisis came —another Morocco crisis—and throughout that I took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the freedom of either Government; and on November 22, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Government: —

My Dear Ambassador,- —From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not

DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDING THE WAR

HOW ENGLAND WORKED FOR PEACE

The White Book which we propose to reprint in this and succeeding issues of THE SUN contains the official report of Sir Edward Grey's speech in the House of Commons justifying British intervention in the war, together with the diplomatic correspondence and negotiations arising out of the crisis which developed in Europe on the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand- and his wife. The narrative is of extraordinary interest, and is essential to a proper understanding of Britain's attitude.

GREY, SIR EDWARD— British Minister for Foreign Affairs, London. LIOHNOJVSKX, PRINCE—- "."'" German Ambassador in London. MENSDORFF, COUNTr—r ... ..... Austrian Ambassador in London. NICOL&QN, Sl£ A.— Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, London. RUMBQLD, SIR H^—j Second in Charge, British Embassy, Berlin. RODD, SIR R.— ■■»-.. British Ambassador, Rome. SAZONOF, M.— Minister for Foreign Affairs, St, Petersburgh. SCHEBEKO, M.— Russian Ambassador at Vienna. VILLIERS, SIR F.— British Minister at Brussels. VIVIANI, M.— Prime Minister of France.

to be, regarded as an eugagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The ] disposition, for instance, of the I French and British fleets respectively i at the present moment is not based ; upon an engagement to co-operate ;■ iii war. -v . ~,; .-;■.■. •' .You have, however, pointed out that;"if either Government had grave reasons to expect an unprovoked at- ';- tacjk' fey a third Power, it might,become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. : I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. Lord Charles Beresford: What is the date of that?

Sir E. Grey: November 22, 1912. That is the starting point for the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime Minister .'and . I said-to the House'of-Commons" was perfectly justified,.and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what bur .line should be, whether we should intervene or whethter we should abstain; the Government* remained perfectly i ree;: and, a fortiori, the House of Commons, remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think if, was due to prove our good fai'th to the Blouse of Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, arid say what I think is obvious froni the letter I have just read, thatwe. do not- construe" anything which has; •previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with.other Powers in this matter,as.restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or •.restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be.

Well, Sir, I will go further, and I- will say fthis: The. situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question; In the Morocco question it was primarily a diswhich concerned France—a dispute which concerned Prance and France primarily—a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France, out of ah agreement subsisting between us and France, and /published to the whole world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically in that question.

The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement with France; it has not originated with anything, which jn-im-arily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Servia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence—no Government and no country has less dcsir"e to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Servia than the Government and the country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that Alliance. So far.l have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation. I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. [An Hon. Member: "And with Germany!"] I remember well the feeling in the House—and my own feeling—for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France the . warm and cordial feeling , resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away. I remember saying, I think, that it seemed, to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friendship entails obligation—it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations—how far that entails an obligation, let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. rThe House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own.feeling in the matter.

The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the Northern and Western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. .The French fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries lias given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us. The French, coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Medit-

erranean,- and lias for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing! I believe that would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these circumstances actually did arise,.-it would be. a feeling which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land.

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British, interests, and it is on that that 1 am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment, what is France, to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves s her Northern and Western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the to do as it pleases in a war i which is a war of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that \ the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in .the presence of a European conflagration; can'anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it? Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying, '' No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this conflict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the eonse j quenees—which are already tremendous lin what has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace —in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war —let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defence of vital British interests, we should go to war; and let us assume — which is quite 1 possible—that Italy, who is I now neutral—[Hon. Members: "Hear;! hear!"] —because, as I understand, she Considers that this war is an aggressive! war, and the Triple Alliance being a de-1 fehsive alliance her obligation did not arise—let us assume that consequences which are not yet foreseen, arid which — perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests —make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to fight, what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at sojne critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because bur trade routes in the Mediterranean might''be vital to this„eountry? Nobody can say that, in the course of the next few Weeks, there is any particular trade route the keeping open of which may not Tje vital to this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination, of other fleets in the Mediterranean.; It would be the very moment wheii we. could not detach more ships to the Mediterrahv can, and wo might have> exposed—this country■•frohi our negative attitude at the; present moment to most'; appalling riisk.: I say that from the-poiflj;.of view ofBritish interests - . We/ feel strongly that." France was entitled to know—and to kiiQW at once! —-whether or not in the event'of* attack .upon, her unprotected' Northern-and Wester*!?-< Coasts, *she could (iepehd upon,; British support. ~ lii. that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I ga-ve to the French Ambassador the fol-. lowing, statement: — I am authorised to give an assiir>;a%g|!2fchat if the German Fleet comes. :M|p|l!ie Channel or through the North; undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, . : vt&'igHtish Fleet will give all ' teclion in its powey. This /^ssuraiiije is, of course, subject t!o the ; policy of his Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be.taken as bindiiig his Majesty's Government to tak£ any! action until the above, contingency: of . action by the German fleet takes

place. . ,'-. :, I read that to,the House, not as a declaration of war on orir part, not as entailing immediate- aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should '.that contingency; arise. Things move" very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh news' comes in, and I cannot give this in any very formal way; but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but if is far too narrow an engagement for us, And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration —becoming more serious every hour — there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium. I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position in regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the Treaty of 1839, but this is a Treaty with a history, a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium arose, and various things were said. Amongst other things, Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to Belgium that, confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the treaty in existence —that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would be respected by the other belligerent Powers. That is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacredness of these treaty rights. What was our own attitude? The people who laid down the attitude of the British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords, and Mr Gladstone in the House of Comnions. Lord Granville, on August 8, 1870, used these words. He said: —

This country was bound either morally or internationally or that its interests were concerned in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium, though this course might have had some conveniences, though it might have "been easy to adhere to it, though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a course which her Majesty's Government thought it impossible to adopt in the name of the country with any due regard to the country's honour or to the country 's interests. ' Mr Gladstone. spoke as follows two days later:- —, • There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that treaty; but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine Of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of the guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises.

The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom 1 have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is of necessity an important Haet, and a weighty element in the case to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of Which we must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power whatever. The treaty is an old treaty—lß.39 and that was the view taken of it in 1870. It is one of those treaties which are founded, not only on consideration for Belgium, which benefits under the treaty, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honour and interests are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations and of the importance of those obligations than was taken by Mr Gladstone's Government in 1870. , :

. I will read to the House what, took place last week on this, subject.. When mobilisation was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most impVrtant element in our policy—a most important subject for the House of Commons. : I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from,the French Government this reply:-^-

The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of- some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the'necessity, in order to assure the defence of her security, to act otherwise'. This

' -assurance has been, given .several times.vTjThe- President of the-•Republic spoke.oi it to the.King of ;the Belgians, and the Wrench Minister at Brussels has spontah£6usly renewed the assurance : '"td; the BelgTatf Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day.".. •' ;■■■','

. From Government thq r<3ply was:— '""'"'".

The, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ■ could not possibly give aii answer before consulting the Emperor and

the Imperial Chancellor. Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said ii important to have an answer soon, said lie hoped the answer would not be too'long delayed. The. German Minister »for Foreign Affairs then" gave Edward 'Gosehen to understand 'that he rather ;doubted whether they could aiiswer at, ; as any reply they might in the event of; war, to .haYe.iW.undesirable effect of disclosing., part of their plan oif-eainpaignV;-! telegraphed at the same time to;' Brussels to the Belgian Governthe, following reply from' Sir Francis; Villi^rs: — "";'*; j. :The> : .Mimffees :,?of Foreign Affairs communication,J will, to the utmost ' of expeeis /and; ctefeiresiother Powers to bb-> .:': "'/ to//add'tKat^iie v relations between Bel-

gium and the neighbouring Powers were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions, but that tho Belgian Governttient believe, in the case of violation, they were in a position to defend the neutrality of their country. It now appears from the news I have received to-day—which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form—that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium: Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether if a guarantee ' were given that, after the war, Belgium! integrity would be preserved that would j content us. We replied that we could not j bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgium neutrality. Shortly before. I reached the .House I was informedthat thefollowing telegram had been received'from the King of the Belgians by our King—King George : Remembering the numerous proofs ; of your Majesty's friendship and that j of your predecessors, and the friendly! attitude,of England in 1870, and the "'■ proof .of friendship she has just given : us again, I make a supreme appeal to the Diplomatic intervention of your ; Majesty's Government to safeguard the • integrity of Belgium. Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests in the independence—and, integrity is the least part—of Belgium;' If Belgium is compelled to'submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask-but x o ne thing., Their one desire is that they should. be ; left alone and independent.; The one \t)iing they/fear is, I think, not so-iriiich that, their integrity but thas,their independence; should. : be ; :.interfered with.: If in this j war which IS befprej Europe ■the neutrality of one' of those* countries if the' troops of one>of the combatants violate; its neutrality and .no action be .taken to resent it, at the entf of tjie war, whatever the integrity,. may bey the independence will be gone. ' ; I have one further quotation from Mr Gladstone as to what he thought about the independence of found in Hansard, volume 203, page 1787. I have not- had -time to read the whole' speech and verify the' context, tot the; thing seems to me so clear that no context 'could make any difference,-ttf the meaning of it. Mr Gladstone said■;—-* We : have an interest iii : the'ifide-' pendenee of Belgium whichf is. wider than that which we may have" -in,, the the literal, operation of the guarantee, lit is found in the answer, to the..question whether under the circumstances of

the case, this country, endowed, as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that; ever stained the pages of history, and thiVsJbecome, participators in the sin. -\\ ■.-. . No, Sir, if it be the .case, that -there has been anything in the nature of- an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality," what

ever may have been offered to her in rejturu, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will follow., I ask the House from the point of view of British interests, to consider what may, be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as-a great Power, becomes subordinate to the will and powei* of one greater than herself—consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often —still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then. Denmark, then would not Mr Gladstone's words come truerthat just opposite to us thore would bo a common interest against tho unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power?

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that, whatever happened.;in the course of this war, at the :-bf it intervene with effect to and to adjust them to l6Wf. : 6fts. point of view.' If, in a crisiß-lilce tliis, - . we run away from those .tibHgatipßß ; of honour and interest as Regards,:th6 Belgian Treaty, I .(Jpubt\wh^!bh^r|; , j 'wii i 4.tever' material force vvje- the end, it would be of very much value in. face, of: the respeet-tHa.t \ye should have lost> And do whether a great Power stands .outside this war or'not,, it is going* a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength.- For ids, with # ppsrerful fleet, which we believe able tp protect our commerce,! to protect our shores, and to protect our engaged in -war we shall feu|;;Jittle more than we shall suffer J ptand' aside. ~ ' : ' : ; ' ; . : " ; '• 1 /- :' :

' We are going to suffer,! am afraid, terribly in this war,, whether, we are itf it or whether we stand aside, s trade is going\to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but' because there is„no trade at tti<To'ther"end.. Continental nations crigaged t in war—all their pppulatiorts, all their-!(mefgies, all their> wealth,' engaged in : a* 'desperate struggle—they % eahh<Jfc , f£aq3 , j£v,(m the trade with'us that carrying on in times of pVa.ae;'- are parties" to the war or%n£ther-we are not. I do not' believe fW'-a moment that, at the end of tKis3y£.r, even }& we stood and remained we, should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively ,to undo what had happened in the course of thewwarr r to prevent the whole of the west of Europe opposite to us—if -that had b.eenr the result of the war—falling under the domination of a single Power, and 1 am quite sure that our moral position would be of such as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are undisputed. (To be continued to-morrow.)