REFUGE OF INFANTRY.

Sun (Christchurch), Volume I, Issue 169, 22 August 1914, Page 14

REFUGE OF INFANTRY.

FIELD ENTRENCHMENTS. A POWERFUL FACTOR. Rifle bullets and shrapnel assail the soldier for the greater part of the time lie is in the field during the active process of ~an engagement. It is the duty of artillery, broadly speaking, to utter the first loud words of battle, and the argument is continued with the rifle. Cavalry and the bayonets are the concluding remarks. While, then, these long preliminaries and discussion in lead and iron are in progress, where is the soldier's refuge? asks a contribute! to the Wellington '' Evening Post.'' It has often been said that a man never knows till he has been in action what a trifling shelter will hide him. Ir the midst of an apparently level plain a good officer will find cover for his troops behind natural, but scarcely visible obstacles; and seemingly minute undulations cover even mounted soldiers. But while these indefinable slopes will hide troops from view, they will not protect them from the terrible scourge of a searching fire, and they will further keep the hidden men from being themselves on the offensive. Entrenchments are the cover of the active soldier.

We will hear enough of entrenchments before this war is over to make it worth while to know what they are. They are of various kinds, with various objects. They may le so placed and constructed in a special position, to be virtually a temporary fort, a place which is designed to be specially attacked, and which is therefore specially prepared for defence. Such an entrenchment will be elaborate, - difficult to manoeuvre over even if no one were in

it. It will have been carefully and ingeniously designed; its trenches will be deep, and buttressed with timber work, and overhead cover will be provided. Ii will be a field fortification. And the troops in it will be in effect a fixed unit, like the men in a fort.

On the other hand, entrenchments may be a system of ditchings thrown up in the extreme of haste, or even of little holes dug at .speed, just to afford desperate men a trifle of shelter against a hail of bullets; and in between these extremes there may be all grades of work. The Havoc of Artillery. It is recognised that the greater power and efficiency of modern artillery and rifles compared with tfhose of fifty years ago makes the modern battle-field far more deadly than before. One can picture a host of men flayed by hostile lead digging furiously with little spades for a small protection from which they may reply with a similar hail. Before one can understand either the need or the nature of trenches in the open field it is necessary to realise what troops have to face, and what they must do. Shrapnel, which after the exchange of a preliminary fire of rifles, is the first compliment the enemy will pay. to any notable force, is an abominable and deadly thing. The modern artillerist can drop a shell anywhere within, an area measuring a few chains long and a few yards wide. But after he has found his range, he does not do'that. He sets the fuse of his shell so that it bursts before it reaches the ground, anil steel sj)linters and hundreds of small round bullets fly on in a hail which searches every square yard of ground withi'n an area which it is within his hands to define. If the ground is difficult he can burst the shells earlier, and the missiles, descending more steeply, will search it with the most certain effect. There is nothing delicate about shrapnel. Its fragments and its round balls do not travel at high velocities or make tiny wounds. " They punch hard. With modern quick-firing guns of deadly accuracy and great range, it is necessary to avoid, if possible, the devastating effects of shrapnel. The fire of infantry, too, is a very heavy scourge, which takes a great toll of fighting men if the/ have no shelter,

and it. may be terribly rapid and very hard to stop. Here, again, the desirability of trenches; from the defensive point of view, one may say," entrenchments must be made. Tliey are recognised by the authorities as indispensable for troops halted under fire. It is not long since trenches were called "funkholes," or since officers at least were expected to walk about in full view whether their men were hidden or not; but Napoleon knew the value of the defensive line. Those who proscribed* the use of trenches, he said, deprived themselves gratuitously of a power and an auxiliary which were never injurious, nearly always useful, and often indispensable. The Value of Trenches.

So far it .may have appeared that trenches are to be regarded only as cover, to provide an escape from hostile fire. But they play a most important part otherwise in defence, and when jyoperlv used, they are powerful also in attack." The Balkan w,v showed that troops cannot remain halted for any time exposed to the immensely destructive effects of modern artillery fire; but it showed also that it is extremely difficult to carry out an attack upon ff well entrenched position. An attack depends largely upon the success of the attackers' artillery and rifle fire in weakening the ranks of the defence; and if the fire fails to do that, then the defence, having an advantageous position from which to lire, speedily becomes relatively more powerful and able to become in turn attackers. But entrenchments have serious disadvantages. The Frencli recognise one of the chief by referring to forces entrenched as "fixed troops," and to others as "mobile troops. " The more efficient the shelter given by entrenchments, the harder it fs for any troops but the most trustworthy and seasoned to leave them for the greater perils of the open ground. In this way, entrenched troops suffer not only the loss of mobility, but in Joss of "morale," and the value .of morale is extremely high. The essential point to overcome these disadvantages is to be sure that the trenches are made subservient to the troops, not the troops to the trenches. To entrench a position which is easily defended is not the ideal; the position must be fixed to get the best effect from the troops,, and the trenches made accordingly. That entrenchment is not necessarily opposed to the spirit of the offensive is shown by the great use the essentially aggressive Japanese made of the practice when attacking the Russians, to defend themselves against counter-attack. What they gained they • determined to hold, and they made their feet firm by entrenching so that, they were the harder to drive back. The modern battle is no matter of hours; it- stretches over days; and the grip of the ground may well be established by night. Such night work by the .Japanese was a common occurrence during the war; and the men were practised in time of peace in the use of light entrenching tools in a prone position. As to actual methods of entrenching, they depend upon the circumstances and upon the Views of the officers directing the operations. If the position requires it and there is time, they may be elaborate; if done in the heat of battle, the shelters may be but trifling hollows. It is a less lengthy business for troops to entrench themselves than might be supposed. A man is able to dig himself into cover in average ground in about half an hour; and with so many workers properly formed trenches can be quickly cut.