SAFETY ON HIGHWAYS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20249, 8 May 1929, Page 12

SAFETY ON HIGHWAYS.

THE DUTY OF MOTORISTS.

NEGLIGENT DRIVING DEFINED

ORDINARY REASONABLE CARE

CHARGES IN SUPREME COURT.

What constitutes reckless and negligent driving of a motor vehicle was carefully explained by Mr. Justice Kennedy to the grand jury at tho opening of tho quarterly criminal sessions of tho Supremo Court yesterday. Four charges of causing death by negligent driving have been set down for hearing. " What is negligently driving a motorcar?" asked His Honor. "It is driving a motor-car without taking that caro which an ordinary caroful motorist would use when driving his motor-car upon a highway. The standard of care is tho standard which tho ordinary man, reasonably careful of his fellows, would use when driving a car. Tho motorist is not bound at his peril to use every conceivable caro. He must exercise the degree of care which an ordinary careful, reasonable man would under the circumstances use.

" Ho docs not fail in his duty if he fails to exercise that care which tho overcautious, the unduly fussy man would exercise. Neither does it follow that because there has been a death tho survivor is noccssarily a reckless and negligent driver. You will havo to consider then the circumstances of each case, and you will be careful to apply, as far as you can, tho proper standard. You will not make the standard too low, and you will bo careful not, simply because there has been an accident, to make the standard too high. You must try to apply the standard of the ordinary reasonable man." Features of Tour Cases. His Honor proceeded to outline the features of tho four negligent driving charges which the grand jury was called on to consider. The first case was that of a taxi-driver, driving from Wiri carrying a number of Europeans and Maoris on his car. Two Maoris were seated on tho running board, and when tho car was rounding a corner they were both thrown off, one of them meeting his death. There was a suggestion that the driver was travelling too fast. Tho question for the jury was whether in tho circumstances tho driver recklessly or negligently disregarded the safety of tho Maoris he was carrying.

The second case was against the driver of a motor-cycle, whose pillion rider was killed. They collided violently with a motor-car turning at a street intersection, and tho pillion rider was thrown to the ground. The question was whether the inotor-cyclist could and ought to have seen the car. Was he going at too great a speed ? Tho third case was one in which a child was killed by being run over by a motor-van. There seemed to bo no suggestion of excessive speed against tho motor driver, and the question for the jury was whether the driver had kept a proper look-out. Alteration of the Law. The last case was one in which a child was killed by a motor-car. The jury might find that tho child was struck by the under part or support of the running board. There was a special feature of the case which at first sight might unduly prejudice tho minds of the jury. That was that tho driver did not stop immediately after the injury. What subsequently followed did not concern them except so far as it might throw light upon what preceded the child being run down. Tho jury would have to consider whether tho driver was going too fast.

There was some suggestion, also, that the brakes were not in order. Tho jury would notice that the child, who was running across the street at the time, was struck by the front of tho car, and the motorist's suggestion might bo that ho had passed the child without injury. The jury might, after hearing merely one witness, find a true bill, but it would be careful not to find a no bill without having heard all the witnesses whoso names were endorsed on tho bills.

His Honor explained that these charges of negligent or reckless driving causing death, formerly came before tho Court as charges of manslaughter, but the law had been altered since 1924. A statutory offence of less gravity than the old charge of manslaughter had been created, which permitted accused persons to be proceeded against on a charge the maximum penally for which was small when viewed in relation to the. old charge of manslaughter. Tho grand jury returned truo bills in every caso except that of Olliver Godfrey, charged with negligently riding a motorcycle and causing death. PALMER STON NORTH CASE. COMMENT BY THE JUDGE. GRAND JURY RETURNS NO BILL. [BY TELEGRAPH.—PRESS ASSOCIATION.] PALMERSTON NORTH, Tuesday. ' In addressing tho grand jury in the Supremo Court to-day, Mr. Justice Ostler devoted some time to commenting on a charge against a young man named O'Donnell of recklessly driving a car and thereby causing the death of his brother. His Honor, "after traversing the facts, said: "No man should be put on a criminal charge of negligence unless it is of a gross character. It is quite wrong for a man to stand his trial because a human life has been lost through his inaccuracy. Gross neglect means something more, than an error of judgment." Referring to tho evidence,. His Honor said that although the fact that accused's car continued over the bank might bo regarded as corroborative evidence of excessive speed, tho actual impact assisted. Two speeds, added togcthor, if sufficient to tear off tho bumper of a car, might be quite sufficient to upset tho steering gear of a light car. Tho question was whether tho other party could accurately observe and record accused's speed. If that were considered impossible—and that seemed to bo tho only ovidenco of negligence—accused should not have to stand his trial. If the version given by the other party were thought reliabto as indicating excessive speed, then a true bill should be returned. The grand jury returned no bill against O'Donnell;