THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS THURSDAY, JANUARY 24, 1929. A CHANNEL TUNNEL.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20162, 24 January 1929, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS THURSDAY, JANUARY 24, 1929. A CHANNEL TUNNEL.

When the scheme for a tunnel under the English Channel, joining England with France, was urged on the Labour Government in 1921, it was described as "making one of its periodical reappearances as a topic of public debate." That is what it is doing now. A statement made to the House of Commons by Mr. Baldwin indicates complete willingness in the Government to have the question examined. Governments have been willing to do that since, in 1572, Lord Granville, Foreign Minister in Mr. Gladstone's Government, wrote to the British Ambassador in Paris asking him to inform tlie French Government that the British Government saw "no objection iu principle to the proposed tunnci between England and France." Despite that willingness to approve the principle, each Government in turn has recoiled before the practical issues of the project. The atmosphere of favourable consideration thrown round the idea by Mr. Baldwin gives no guarantee that tho Government is likely to be a vigorous partner in any action that may be taken to give it effect. This is election year, and Mr. Baldwin is not likely to appear to throw cold water on a project that, it is promised, would relieve unemployment, stimulate industry, encourage international amity, and do all this without threatening the peace or security of Great Britain in the least. So much is claimed by the tunnel advocates. No party leader can be trenchant in reply to such a case when an election lies in the near future. There may be a tendency at this distance to imagine the British Prime Minister as above party and beyond party considerations He is not, any more than any other leader where party exists. It is not wise, therefore, to build too much on what Mr. Baldwin said.

A passing reference by the Prime Minister to' the last "periodical reappearance," already mentioned, encourages consideration of what happened then. It is instructive, in view of the present developments. Mr. Ramsay Mac Donald, as head of the Labour Government, was approached by a Parliamentary deputation advocating the work. The feeling shown was summed up by one of the leaders of the movement when he wrote: "The support and hearty goodwill of the Government is alone required, and it is difficult to see why it should now be withheld." Mr. Mac Donald referred the whole question to a special meeting of the Imperial Defence Committee. The action he took to raise the question above party controversy —which Mr. Baldwin proposes to use as a precedent —was to invite ex-Prime Ministers, formerly members of the committee, to sit with it and collaborate in the decision reached. Lord Balfour, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Baldwin accepted the invitation, and shared the deliberations. The decision, as subsequently conveyed to the House of Commons, was adverse to the scheme, causing it to disappear for the time from practical politics. • The members of the committee, said Mr. Mac Donald, were, at the outset, all predisposed to regard the proposal favourably. As a result of what they heard they changed their opinions entirely. Representatives of the three arms of the service and the Imperial General Staff showed that the strategic objections to the tunnel were not dead. It was not merely a repetition of views formed before the submarine and the aeroplane appeared that the General Staff offered, for the views were based on a series of memoranda drawn up in 1920. The combined finding on the defence side, as summed up by the then Prime Minister, was that "all that has happened in the last five years in the way of naval, military and air development has tended, without exception, to render the channel tunnel a more dangerous experiment."

The wannest advocates of the tunnel urge that the economic advantages it would bring fur outweigh its strategic dangers. This view was not sustained in 1924 by the Imperial Defence Committee. The value of the work for the relief of unemployment lias been emphasised heavily in its recent discussion. A special point has been made of the distress in the mining areas, and the suitability of the tunnel work for the employment of miners. At first sight the construction of a tunnel 36 miles in length—24 miles being under the sea —at a cost of some £.30,000,000, would appear a very hopeful medium for (he relief of unemployment. At the outset it must be remembered the plans provide for simultaneous construction from each end, one-half with British capital and one-half with French. According to Mr. Mac Donald's review it was estimated 2.j00 men would find employment on the English side, and an equal number on the French side of the Channel. There would, of course, be consequential employment elsewhere. The full estimate of employment in connection with the scheme was for an over-all figure of 12.000 workers in Great Britain and 12,000 in France. It would be natural for Mr. Mac Donald to welcome any thing that could be made out of the employment side of the scheme, but this was the best he could do on the figures then supplied to him. It is difficult to see how conditions could have changed since 1021 sufficiently to cause the reversal of so completely adverse a verdict. The only possible conclusion is that Mr. Baldwin's apparently favourable view needs to be taken with reservations, and that the French rejoicings at what they read into his statement are premature.