The Lyttelton Times. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1865.

Lyttelton Times, Volume XXIV, Issue 1568, 21 December 1865, Page 2

The Lyttelton Times. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1865.

The main argument used of late against any attempt to protect the interests of the Middle Island by Separation from the North has been that England will not listen to such a proposal. We had thought that any such argument was completely met by the rejoinder that, if our own interests are really in peril, we had better try to get John Bull's consent, and not be deterred from righting ourselves through fear of a refusal. At the worst, John Bull can only say No, and he may say Yes. But Btill those who are bent on keeping the disposition of Northern affairs in their own hands Btick to their argument. They put it thus. In order to obtain the consent of the Imperial Government to Separation, you will have to show that the Northern Island will be no burden upon England afterwards. But you say that the North is a millstone round the neck of the Middle Island now; if you withdraw your support, that burden must fall upon England, in default of any other resource. It is impossible on your own showing to make a proposal which shall not involve danger to England; England will take no risk; therefore you will not obtain her consent ; and what you cannot hope to do it is not worth while to attempt. We demur to every one of these propositions. We believe that a satisfactory proposal, involvingnorisk, can be made to England. We believe that England would, if necessary, undertake and could easily perform what is impracticable to the colony itself. We believe, therefore, that her consent can be obtained. And even if success was far more unlikely than it is, we believe it would be well worth our while to try, for the sake of making the condition of the colony thoroughly well known to the Imperial Government, and forcing upon its attention the consequences ot its somewhat ungenerous policy of late yeara.

This one point must be clearly kept in remembrance, that what may be difficult for the colony may be very easy for England. Help that would be only generous on her part would surpass the result of our most strenuous efforts, carried to the very pitch of imprudence. England would not be injured, for instance, by foregoing all claim for her troops in the colony, though the colony would be utterly unable to pay the claim of £240,000 a year for six regiments. We hare no right to say that what is impossible for New Zealand is impossible for Great Britain also. But this is practically what the anti-separa-tionists are now saying. Again, as to the assumed unwillingness of the Imperial Government and Parliament to do anything for the North Island, that is merely a matter of opinion. They have not been properly asked, and they have not been asked often enough. Mr. Eeader "Wood asked once personally, and Mr. Weld a second time by letter. Mr. Cardwell declined, as we know, to do anything, but Mr. Cardwell is not the British public; he will not be Secretary of State for ever. All depends on making out a case, and urging it. In proper hands, at the proper time, the case of New Zealand would awaken the sympathy of England from end to end. They have dealt harshly with us for a few years. That is enough; the reaction is sure to follow, and an access of generosity will have its turn. What Mr. Weld has not Bcrupled to do on behalf of the whole colony, the North may surely do for itself, and with the greater chance of success, because Parliament could no longer entertain the belief that the North has in the Middle Island a resource equal, to all its needs.

Another point we must recollect is that English opinion of our way of managing our own affairs is not a cafe guide for us. English opinion is most fickle, .and often most unfair, because it is not sufficiently informed. Our statesmen have no right to administer the affairs of our country in a special manner, so as to catch the applause of the morning papers and the Government at home. If they do, they are sure to err. Let us instance the Stamp Duty question. If that new tax was not necessary, but was proposed by the late Government for the sake of proving to the people of England that we are ready to submit to any burden, in order to give effect to the Self-reliance policy, then the motive was an unsound one, and the step a mistake. It assumed a claptrap character. Again, we can fancy a leading English statesman, who had heard of the Self-reliance policy itself, expressing his thorough approval of it; and we can imagine that great weight would be attached to that opinion by the authors of the policy, who would proceed the more confidently with all their plana. But this would be a blunder ; the English statesman not only is ignorant of the details and obstacles on the spot, but he has a direct interest in urging a plan which relieves his country from responsibility whether the plan succeeds or not. His opinion is not a safe guide for us; we should do much better to think for ourselves. By taking our own line we shall best inform the English statesman, and when

he comes to oonsider any proposal which it may he necessary for ub to make, he will he lean ready to think that he knows our affairs better than ire do ourselves. Now we come to the sort of proposal which we have said can be made to the Imperial Government without encountering a stem refusal. Let us imagine that a session of the Assembly has passed over, and that by a maiority of rotes of the North Island, and a similar majority of the Southern members, Separation has been determined on, I and a Government placed in office to give effect to it. They seek the sanction of the Home Government, which asks, first, the grounds of the application. The South declares that the Native difficulty is too heavy a burden and too great a risk ; it has done what it could and can do no more. The j North says that it cannot endure the j i management of Native affairs by the South ; what it wants is the power to look after its own concerns. The British Government replies that, if the burden and risk are too great for the ; united colony, they must be far too heavy for one of the Islands. The North rejoins that that is not so; it would not, were it standing alone, incur such heavy liabilities; that it alone is interested in Native affairs, and therefore would like to carry on the administration of those affairs so as to suit those interests which it could do by simply defending itself and ceasing all aggressive war. And then both North and South would unite in saying that a Northern Government is intolerable to the South, and that a Southern Government is intolerable to the North; and therefore that continued union of the two produces misgovernment to one or the other. If the British Government were to ask why the self-defence and no aggreasion plan cannot be adopted by the joint Government, the South would say that the Northern men could not be got to carry it out; and the North would answer that it would do so for itself, but not at the command of the South; that it has the confiscated lands, which, if it was independent, it could turn to account in finding means for the war; but which can not be utilised by the united Colonial Government, within whose sphere the practical colonization of the country does not lie. As for the past debts of the colony, it is possible that the Imperial Government might sanction the allocation of a certain share to each of the islands ; but it is more likely that the joint and several liability which now exists between them would continue. The allocation, in that case, would be made by consent, 'either temporarily or permanently, and the British Government would have nothing to do with it, except to see that the Act of Separation should not impair the rights of the public creditor. Our liability for the past would then be just as it is at present; and we should gain exactly that which we want—an immunity from risk for the future.