BRITAIN'S ARMY

Evening Post, Volume CXXVI, Issue 127, 25 November 1938, Page 18

BRITAIN'S ARMY

A MOTORISED FORCE

RAPIDLY MOVING COLUMNS

RECENT, EXERCISES

Anyone who saw something of the Army exercises this year can hardly fall to have been impressed, writes a military correspondent of the "Manchester Guardian." There is nothing new in the adaptation of the internal combustion engine to military purposes; it was put to a dozen uses in the last war. What is new is that at last, after years of experiment and anxious searching of heart, the whole organisation of our Army has been recast on the basis of the internal combustion engine. Many foreign armies have their mobile armoured formations; but their infantry divisions still contain a high proportion of horsed transport, hampering their rate of movement. The British Regular Army alone constitutes the homogeneous fighting force of which military reformers have dreamed. The details of the new war establishments are necessarily not for publication. Perhaps the most useful thing at this stage is to give some general impressions of the new model at work. THEIR MANY VEHICLES. One has a vivid recollection of a brigade group on the march—an infan- '• try brigade of three battalions, a machine-gun company, a regiment of field artillery, an anti-tank battery, and a field company of sappers—made up to war establishment by drafting in men from other units to take the places that would be filled by reservists on mobilisation. The first impression was the great number of vehicles required to carry the troops and their actual fighting necessities. The next was the length of the column on the roads and the speed at which it moved. The columns of horse, foot, and guns that we knew in 1914-18 did their steady two and a half miles an hour well closed up, nose tight jammed to tail, as their predecessors had done in a hundred campaigns down the centuries. By, contrast the modern column counts on moving at a steady fifteen miles an hour, including halts, which means a speed of anything up to thirty miles an hour whilst moving on the road. The ever-present air menace decrees that there must be no bunching, which in any case would block the roads and impede movement. To ensure an even flow of traffic vehicles must be spaced out at intervals of a hundred yards or even more. A DIFFICULT PROBLEM. The control of such a column on the march presents a very difficult problem—a regiment of field artillery alone with the vehicles spaced out at the normal intervals occupies ten miles of road space. The number of men available for traffic control duties is limited, and a great weight of responsibility rests on the shoulders of the young N.C.O. or soldier in charge of a vehicle. It is not too much to say that in the modern Army every man must be able to read a map, and read it quickly and accurately, as well as drive a vehicle. . One could feel nothing but admiration for the way in which these young soldiers, many of them only just out of the depots, rose to the occasion. The ■Standard of driving was high, there were very few mechanical breakdowns, and when the column was halted every vehicle was at pains to obtain what cover it could from the air. : At such times it was possible to be in the middle of the area in which the troops were moving and to be almost unaware Of their presence. Another noticeable thing was the almost complete absence of noise made by an army moving on rubber tyres. The tramp of feet and rattle of gun wheels that used to advertise the movement of -troops for miles, particularly by night, were gone. The training of the drivers included moving by night without jights, and they had attained a very high standard of proficiency in this art. CLOTHING AND KITCHENS. One, was struck by the care and forethought that had been lavished on many minor details of equipment. Various patterns of new clothing were on trial; apart from the gas-resisting properties of a waterproofed cotton material, one wondered whether any of them was preferable to the old service dre§s as far as the infantry were concerned, though cotton overalls worn over service dress seemed a 'sensible kit for an artilleryman or a motoivdriver. A company of sappers was equipped with power tools and a new pattern of steel-girder bridging material and completed the various jobs that fell to its lot with extraordinary dispatch; many existing bridges will require strengthening to bear the weight of a modern army. Last, but by no m^ans least, the old field kitchen has gone, and its place is taken in every unit by a most ingenious device. Food is cooked on a petrol range and taken up to the troops in insulated containers capable of keeping it hot for as long as three days. The constant cold food that added so much to the discomfort of the soldier on active service and which in the long run was the cause of a not inconsiderable number of hospital cases, is a thing of the past. An interesting point is that it has been found impracticable to disti-ibute from tanker lorries the petrol which supplies the motive power of the Army today, and the can in normal commercial use is too costly. Use is made of a sealed white-metal container like the Indian kerosene-oil tin. MECHANISED FORCES. The mobile divison —tanks and cavalry—is a mechanised force, that is to say, it fights as well as marches on wheels, or rather on tracks. Moving at the pace it does, the problem of controlling it and issuing orders is one of great difficulty. It is even doubtful whether in all circumstances it would prove possible to draw up and distribute written orders. Can wireless or radio-telephony always be relied on, particularly at night? Very much depends on. the instinctive cooperation and team work of the various, units. Besides the immenselyincreased demands on the initiative and intelligence of the private soldier, the task of the regimental officer and, in particular, that of the lieutenantcolonel commanding a regiment or battalion is out of all proportion greater than ever before. Obviously the human factor is all-important.

The infantry division is motorised and not mechanised. That is to say, it marches on wheels and tracks, and, except for the infantry "carriers" and such tanks as may be allotted to it for the attack, it fights on its feet. The infantry reach-their positions of assembly by road, disembark, leaving their vehicles under cover, and go into action much as their fathers did before them. But not quite. The accepted doctrine today for a daylight attack when anything more than the very slightest resistance is expected is that the infantry are "put on to" the position by tanks specially allotted for the purpose. These, together with infantry "carriers," with their Bren guns and the supporting artillery, combine the two essential elements of fire and movement without which no attack can hope to succeed. Once on the position, the fighting vehicles rally back to the rear under cover, leaving the infantry, with their titty-two Bren guna for each battalion

and the machine-guns and anti-tank guns allotted to them, to organise the defence and deal with the impending counter-attack. Owing to the greatlyincreased range of the new 25-pounder gun-howitzer the supporting artillery will have moved forward their observation parties, but not necessarily changed their gun positions.

In the actual attack the infantry appeared very thin on the ground, a welcome change from the masses of men that used to offer such targets to the enemy machine-guns. It is noteworthy that in the new model the infantry section, the brick from which every military organisation must be built up, consists of seven men. Its counterpart in the German Army Comprises thirteen and in the French Army twelve men. In each case the section has one light automatic, so that there is little difference as regards fire-power. The difference is made up by the greater number of riflemen in the foreign sections. Thus, as Mr. Hore-Belisha promised in his speech last March, we have made use of machine-power and firepower in order to economise manpower. For the small and highlytrained long-service army of an industrial nation this seems an eminently sensible decision. This judgment is confirmed by the obvious keenness with which all ranks have adopted and are adapting themselves to the new organisation. What the Army needs at the moment is to be left to get on with its job of training for war without any more far-reaching changes. But our adoption of the new model raises a number of questions of wider importance.