POLICY IN CHINA

Evening Post, Volume CXXIII, Issue 30, 5 February 1937, Page 7

POLICY IN CHINA

COURSE OF BRITAIN

DOUBTS IN NANKING

Considerable speculation as to the future course .of British policy in China followed the recent arrival of Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen as Ambassador in place of Sir Alexander Cadogan, who was recalled to London last spring to take up the post of Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, writes a Shanghai correspondent to the "Christian Science Monitor."

Of course, as the new envoy pointed out in his first Press interview in Shanghai, a change of Ambassadors •soes not necessarily mean a change of policy. Fundamentally, he declared, Great Britain would aim at "peace, prosperity, and a greater purchasing power among the Chinese people." But many thoughtful British are asking themselves whether this is enough. By some it is felt that there should be less opportunism and more moral leadership.

Invited by the "Christian Science Monitor" correspondent to suggest what British policy in China ought to be, one far-sighted merchant occupying an influential.position in the British community in Shanghai made this statement:—

"British policy should be at once constructive and realistic. It should be constructive in that we should try to assist in every way China's progress towards unification and financial stability. And it should be realistic in the sense that British traders should cease to rely so absolutely upon their extra-territorial status. We have got to be prepared gradually to relinquish these privileges—not by overnight cancellation, but rather by a normal process of attrition as and when the Chinese are able to render the extraterritorial provisions of the treaties unnecessary." JAPAN'S MOVES DEPLORED. "As regards the Japanese, the question is how we can establish an understanding with them so long as their policy out here continues to be so aggressive, I feel that we should be careful not to condone any Japanese activity, such as the North China smuggling, which we feel to be wrong. And we should; not hesitate to condemn any action which is contrary to our own principles of fairness and justice." ■ ' But it would be misleading to suggest that this was a typical British business view. Most of half a dozen other British merchants interviewed felt that on the whole the safest policy would be to "stand pat" on the present treaty status lest, threatened by Japanese expansion on the one hand and Chinese aspirations on the other, British interests be squeezed out altogether. As to the question of assisting Chinese reconstruction, there was a good deal of loose talk on the subject, it was pointed out, but when you come down to it, what real guarantee was there for the British investor? Didn't it mean simply that you gave the Chinese the money and that they proceeded to spend it as they thought fit. One or two favoured friendly cooperation with Japan, though they admitted that it would be difficult to adppt this course without giving he Chinese the impression that a renewal o£ the Anglo-Japanese alliance was in the offing. From two veteran British missionaries, interviewed independently, came the suggestion of an Anglo-American demarche. "The question ought to be decided," one of them urged, "as to how much Britain is willing that Japan should get away with in China. Somehow or other Britain ought to let it be known what she is willing to stand for and what she is not." WANT JOINT ACTION. "Britain and America ought to come together and say: 'We recognise the justice of a lot of Japan's claims, but we cannot stomach the idea of a Japanese hegemony in China and would consider it an unfriendly act if any further moves were made in that direction." So much for the local British viewpoint. What do the Chinese think of British policy in the Far East? Many feel that Britain's lack of moral leadership and her tendency to compromise have done much to encourage Japanese aggression. ' "In the Far East," wrote the editor of the influential "Shun Pao," on the occasion of Sir Hughe KnatchbullHugessen's arrival in Shanghai, "British policy is near-sighted and determined by selfish motives. The aim of the British Government is to effect a compromise with Japan in order to maintain her economic privileges in China. This, however, will prove illusory, for experience has taught that our neighbour across the Yellow Sea will advance by leaps and bounds. If Britain persists in holding on to her 'realistic policy' her course of action in the Far East will be even more erratic than was the case in regard to Abyssinia." Chinese with whom the question was discussed echoed the "Shun Pao's" sentiments. One of them summed up the position in this way: "In 1931 Great Britain let Japan have a free hand in Manchuria, thinking tha^ this would help to make British interests safer in China proper. In 1932 when Japan began' to penetrate into North China the British still held this view. "However, it is now clear that the Japanese have no intention <of respecting the traditional British sphere of interest in the Yangtse Valley, and this has put the British in an awkward dilemma. They want to preserve their Far Eastern interests but do not know how to deal with Japan. If they let Japan go too far their position out here will ba endangered. On the other hand they are not in a position to stop the Japanese, and Sir Frederick LeithBoss's attempt to reach an understanding with Tokio ended in failure.

"Under these circumstances we Chinese picture John Bull as a shrewd and calculating old gentleman scratching his head as he tries to figure out how to keep friends with everybody and go on making a profit into the bargain. China was never more greatly in need of British help, but we do not dare to hope that it will be forthcoming."