POLISH POLICY

Evening Post, Issue 19, 23 July 1934, Page 16

POLISH POLICY

A SIYSTERY TO.EUROPE

LITHUANIA THE KEY

The unpardonable crime tor a diplomat, it is saifl, is to confess that something is unknown to him. , That is why in the diplomatic world an ex-, planation is forthcoming usually of things quite understandable (writes a London correspondent of the "New York Times"). Still, at the piesont time, a nijsteiy exists in the affairs of Europe, which the- various foreign offices frankly avow that they are quite unablo'to read. Tho mystery is that of the motives behind the present foreign policy of the Polish Government. Yet it is possible that the solution may be provided in what follows. Ever since tho Primo Minister, Mr. Mac Donald, had the unfortunate idea of backing tho proposal of the pact of tho four great - Powers, Poland has pursued a policy strictly her own. Apart from the fact that by its attitude'the Polish Government succeeded in paralysing the attempt to create in 'Europeping the hegemony for an Anglo-Franco-German-Italian group, tho important consideration is that from that time Poland on all occasions demands recognition for her claim to rank among the great Poweis in Europe. From now on the Poles rely not' upon the assistance of others, but principally upon their own resources for whatever these are worth.

In practice tills national policy may bo expressed by the formula: ' "Bo strong "and live in peace with your neighbours." For let us not forgot that behind Marshal Pilsudski's diplomacy there stands always tlio supreme argument' of the strength of the army ho has been at such pains to create. The strong 'Polish army is the motive of the acceptance by Hitler of an agreement with Poland which embodies a German surrender of tbo claim for the so:called Polish Corridor. FRIENDLY WITH MOSCOW. With Moscow, too, Marshal PiJsudski has established decent relations, based not' on '.'sentiment,, but a; mutual respect for the force of each other. Thus between the two great enemies— Hitlerite Germany and Soviet lhissia— stands Poland ou terms.of decent relationship with both and dependent ou neither. At Geneva the Polish delegation pursues an independent line, too. Poland does not give up the alliance with France, yet it cannot be .said that Polish policy is subordinated "tw French advice. Tho diplomats see all this, and still they are in doubt about,the real object of Polish policy. . • , . Yet I think the truth is not as difficult .to discover, as they imagine. It is contained in the word Lithuania. Marshal: Pilsudski; will not consider his work of national building complete so long as relations between Poland and Lithuania are not' normal.. In days gone by tho greatness of Poland really began when the two countries entered into a pact, of co-operation. A' close union with tho Lithuanians in tho futuro of the" solid guarantee of tho position,of Poland in the new Europe. Those who have eyes cannot "fail to see that the dearest wish of • the Marshal is the union with Lithuania. For fifteen years the Lithuanians have resisted the idea of a_ union of any sort with Poland.' The violence of this1 resistance, 'however, itself suffices to show that the thing is possible For fifteen years Germany and Russia bolstered up Lithuania, but now by their agreement with Poland the Hitlerlites not only have betrayed the German claim to tl\e so-called Corridor, but they, have withdrawn also from their support of the Lithuanians. In addition -they have' been foolish enough to prepare a regular attack upon ilemel, tho only outlet Lithuania possesses on tho Baltic S«a. ' LITHUANIA ISOLATED. Russia, at the time sho renewed a few weeks ago her pact of non-aggres-sion, with Poland, definitely withdrew from all active support for the Lithuanian claim to Wilna. Thus Lithuania stands"' isolated and the need for an understanding with Poland is, evident even to fanatical Nationalists. • The reconciliation would go swifter, of course, were not- tho .politicians in Kaunas, the Lithuanian capital, afraid of thejjand of zealots which they have tolerated and pampered for tho last fifteen years. Still, it looks as if Marshal Pilsudski's great moment is at hand. I suspect that foon he will extend his friendly hand to the small neighbour, and his conditions will be of the lightest. Like tho Scots in England, Lithuanians have always in the end had the best end of a bargain with the Poles. Thp foregoing, I think, is the solution of tho mystery which baffles European diplomats. What interests me is to penetrate the future sufficiently to discover what is to, happen afterwards. An understanding with Lithuania is something quite'different'for the Poles from any Pact with Berlin or Moscow. Its irrevocable nature would ipipose lasting obligations upon the principal partner, obligations incompatible "often with friendship with other State?. So, for example, no understanding between Poland and Lithuania could bo arrived-at without the duty being imposed" upon the Poles to defend with all their might and resources the'sovereignty of their -ally over the port of Memel. This would imply a definito stand against' Hitlerite plans of aggression. Marshal PiLsudski is too shrewd to have neglected to consider the consequences of a common front between Poland and Lithuania. Once already, in 1410, that front hasled to concorted and vigorous action against German aggression. The famous. battle of Grinwald, when the Teuton' knights were destroyed by the joint effort of Poles and Lithuanians—aided by the Russians, be it said—was fought largely to prevent tho spread of German influence over Lithuania. Shall history repeat itself? And how? This is what we would like to know.