WHAT WILL SENATE DO?

Evening Post, Volume CIX, Issue 88, 14 April 1930, Page 11

WHAT WILL SENATE DO?

TOO EARLY TO SAY

CONGRESS AND THE TREATY

NEW YORK, 12th April. Anything that may be said as yet concerning: Senatorial reaction 'to the impending three-Power Naval Treaty would bo purely conjectural. Senator Borah, who would not represent the United States as a delegate, so that he might maintain his freedom of action, has not yet spoken, and t'-o London announcements coming toward the end of the week with the Senate not sitting, few facts are available. It seems indicated to-nightj however, that, duo to the congressional elections this year, President Hoover will make every effort to keep the treaty out of politics until early in 1931. /The present session of Congress will probably end in June, and the next session will not convene until December. ■ ■ . ■ Meantime there is a possibility that the political complexion of Congress may change radically. It has done so in the past at middle-term elections. What the fate of the treaty would be if the Republican majority in the Senate were seriously reduced it i 3 impossible to predict. EDITORIAL OPINION. The fact that only a limited comprehension of the true state of affairs exists concerning the Naval Conference can be seen in certain kinds of editorial opinion which, avoiding any discussion of the important elements of the situation, belabours the "parity" issue. The Now York "Herald-Tribune," one of tho leading journals of Republican opinion in the country, takes up "military merchant ships." To-mor-row's leader stresses the point that Britaiu is superior in this class of vessel, and concludes: "Parity with Britain seems clearly in sight as far as the fleets are concerned, but parity in sea power is still far away." The "New York Times," in a care-fully-prepared leader, pursues its traditional attitude as concerns AngloAmerican affairs, namely, that anything which advances the friendship of the two countries advances world peace. Indicating that details of the agreement have not yet been annuonced, it adds: ''Frankly, they do not greatly matter. Naval experts, to be sure, will seize upon them with avidity." The article concludes: "The principle of establishing and maintaining friendly relations between Britain and the United States should result in benefits not only to our two peoples, but to others." NO GREAT ENTHUSIASM. American reaction to the naval decisions in London is curiously mixed. It cannot be said that popularly the Three-Power arrangement has aroused much interest, chiefly because of the ingrained insularity and provincialism of the great bulk of the American people. Mr. Hoover's explanatory statement, moreover, caused hardly a ripple of excitement. The international meaning of the London Conference^ work does not seem to be generally understood. Although there is an attempt to outline the important considerations and sacrifices behind the British decisions to permit of American parity, there is even less understanding of tho necessity for a Five-Power agreement before Britain can feel secure in making reductions. A few American observers, however, do point out that ;the British are "world-minded," and must regard European troubles with clear eyes, and as a result must express some dissatisfaction with the announced agreement. These observers do try to. make clear that without a definite assurance of limitation of the French and Italian forces the British must always see at least a strategic threat to their vital lines of communication in the Mediterranean.