FUTURE OF THE SUBMARINE

Evening Post, Volume CIX, Issue 81, 5 April 1930, Page 20

FUTURE OF THE SUBMARINE

As a. naval weapon the submarine is much over-rated. In no future war will she be able to play the conspicuous part she did in the last one. Why that is so may be usefully explained at the present moment when discussions at the Naval Conference and the attitude t- Trance towards them tend to give the public an entirely erroneous view of the importance of under-water craft in sea armaments, says the "Observer" (London).

They represent a form of fighting that is repulsive, and for that reason are generally, and rightly, disliked. In the popular mind it is inevitable that any consideration of the submarine question should be coloured by a recollection of wh t happened during'the U-boat campaign of 1917-1918. In that, under-watcr craft reached the limit of their effectiveness, and scored a success which, under modern conditions, could not be repeated. How to counter successfully ' a submarine offensive was one of the lessons learned in the war. And it was so well learned that the submarine has been reduced almost to impotence. ■ Within the past ten yjars she has grown larger and, on paper, more formidable. But the invention of "anti-submarine" devices of one sort or another has progressed also. , ■ ' ■

Special schools exist for training sailors in the use of certain instruments which aro ablo to detect the presence of a submarine and locato her with uncanny accuracy. Neither on the surface nor beneath it is she any longer a free rover of the seas. She cannot, rove at all. The "anti" devices have her beaten. Ono might explain at some length, and quite interestingly, how they beat her, but a simple statement of the fact, and fact it is, mustsuffice. No moro is permissible.

Giant submarines come- off no better than midgets. Much has been written at one time or another about the large submarines that are being added to

AN OVER-RATED WEAPON

the principal fleets. They have been credited with attributes which they do not possess. None of these big craft has' proved wholly satisfactory, partly for the reason that large size is a disadvantage to a submarine rather than an advantage. One certain thing is that the advent of the super-submarine can do nothing towards "humanising" submarine warfare, although one has seen it suggested. that she would be able to take off the crews of ships she sank instead of leaving them to their fate. A big submarine carries a far larger crew than a small submarine, and consequently has no more space for

"passengers." Great Britain and America are- willing, to abolish submarines because they do hot attach much importance to them, as well as on moral grounds. France believes in them. French naval opinion on the subject was expressed the other day by an officer of the Gallic Navy, who wrote: "Our Ondino of 700 tons is a David that with a single torpedo could sink the British Goliath Nelson of 35,000 tons." It is this utterly mistaken belief in her powers that induces Prance to cleave so closely to the submarine. No submarine would have a chance of sinking the Nelson by a single torpedo. She could not get near enough the Nelson to attack her at all.

The argument that tho submarine,-is the weapon of the weaker Power, and that it should be retained as a defensive weapon only, is based on fallacious promises. Inefficient weapons are of small use to the.weaker Power, and in war dofensivo weapons are employed offensively at every opportunity. From a purely utilitarian point- of view, all navies would benefit by the abolition of the submarine. Her day is practically over, and the money spent on maintaining under-water flotillas might well bo devoted to more useful craft, or —better still—kept in the taxpayer's pocket.