PURSUIT OF PEACE

Evening Post, Volume CVIII, Issue 82, 3 October 1929, Page 9

PURSUIT OF PEACE

DISARMAMENT ISSUE

LABOUR LEADER'S VIEWS

THE NAVAL QUESTION

(By the Eight Hon. H. A. L. Fisher.) (Copyright.) The advent of the Labour Party to office in England has been widely heralded as portending an acceleration in the advance towards disarmament and ■peace. The hurried visit of the American Ambassador to Scotland in order that he might converse with Mr. MacDonald, the American's (speech at the Pilgrim's dinner, the announcement that the British Prime Minister proposes to seek out President Hoover at Washington, are very properly taken as indications that the new Cabinet, in this matter, rightly interpreting the sentimont of the British people, is anxious to hasten the pace along the road to .disarmament. ■ . . Mr. MaeDonald's concern in this question is perfectly genuine. On the subject of the League of Nations, of peace, and of disarmament, Mi;. Mac Donald -has very strong convictions. He can be trusted to throw the whole weight of his influence into-the scales in favour of a relaxation of international suspicion, and a more energetic search for the saving formula, which will lessen the burden of armaments throughout the world. DOMESTIC POLITICS. Even if he were not a man of tho pacifist temperament, ho would be driven along this path by the- force of party expedience. In domestic politics he is beset with difficulties. Is he i.ttf compel the mines to le'sort' to the seven hours' day? If so, he will add 10 per cent, to their working epsts, and increase the difficulties of the export trade in coal. If not, he will go back upon the oft-times proclaimed policy of his party. Is he to nationalise the coal industry1? Liberals and Conservatives would coalesce to prevent it. Is he to refuse to nationalise the coal industry? The miners of the Labour Party would point to_ broken pledges. The one uncontroversial achievement of great, indeed, of surpassing Parliamentary and electoral value, would be a naval agreement -with the United States, and the adoption by the League of a concerted plan for disarmament on the,Cont;nent. Success in this field would be success indeed, and would overbalance many disappointments in tho field of domestic policy. Unfortunately it takes more than one country to make peace. When Mr. Mac Donald became Prime Minister Sn 1924,. Ms success synchronised with the triumph of M. Herriot in France. On either side of the Channel there were minority Governments specially pledged to pursue a League of Nations policy, and this fortuitous coincidence produced the well-known protocol. But the present Prime Minister of France is at. the very opposite polo of political opinion to M. Herriot, and can have very little personal sympathy with the pacifist views of tho British Labour leader. It is unlikely that the psychological, harmony between England and France, which was so remarkable and promising a feature of the international situation in 192-i, will be reproduced in 1929. M. Briand, indeed, is a mau more after Mr. Mael'onald's heart. 110 is a Celt; he has a genuine horror of war; and a deep-rooted contempt for its fundamental unreason; and M. Briand is Foreign Minister. M. Briand and Mr. MaeDonald may be very far before they are brought up against M. Poincare and the inveterate diplomatic tradition of France. Nevertheless now, as during his former Administration, Mr. Mac Donald has been well served by fortune. Just as the adoption of the rentenmark by Germany rendered the Dawes Plan on reparations possible, and enabled Mr. Mac Donald to secure the principal triumph of his first Administration, so now he comes into office on the heels of a settlement of the reparations question which will greatly facilitate the evacuation of Germany by the Allied troops. POTENTIALS OF WAR. It seems to be taken for granted that 'the British contingent will be with, drawn at once, and it is hoped in London that German soil may be clear of Allied armies before the cold weather comes. If these things happen, .the Labour Government in Great Britain will carry the initial part of its foroign programme. What of the remainder? Land disarmament will present a much more. \ difficult problem, for here, according to the French school of opinion, the potentials of war must be taken into account. Now the potentials of war are naturally difficult to estimate. ..Who can say what tests we should apply to measure the comparative potentials of two highly civilised and industrialised countries like Franco and Germany? ' ■ The difficulty of estimating potentials has led British statesmen and soldiers to advocate concentration upon the limitation of peace;effectives, and in the calculation of peace effectives they include trained reserves. Tho British view has been, and is, that any limitation over and above the limitation of peaee_ effectives is impracticable, and that if _ trained reserves are to be excluded in the calculation of peace effec- • tjves, conscription is fastened on the Continent for all time.. , , At the close of Mr. Baldwin's Administration the British representatives so far conceded to tho French view as to announce that they would be willing to waive their objection to the exclusion of trained services for the sake of a general agreement. It is doubtful, however, whether Mr. MacDonald, in view of the strong repugnance to any system of conscription which prevails among his followers, will be so compliant. In any conference in which British delegates are engaged, they are bound to press, and. to press strongly, for the inclusion of trained re serves. DEETEBENCE OF OPINION. _ The same difficulty about the potentials of war will confront Mr. MacDonald in dealing with the United Htates over the naval question. It will be remembered that the Geneva Conference of 1927 broke down because the Americans insisted on the 8-inch gun, and the British on the 6-inch gun "How trivial!" cried the critics. But the Americans did not think the difference trivial, for they argued that if the 6-inch gun was conceded, it would be easy to arm merchantmen, and that Britain m proposing the lighter armament was, in fact, proposing the higher potential. Tbfi discussion of these difficulties in connection with disarmament has at least shown the world how impossible it is, even with the best intentions,- to nx exact standards of comparison between the -armaments of countries differently situated. Mr. Mac Donald will have achieved much, if he can arrive at an ■arrangement with the United States which, however imperfect from the technical standpoint, will avoid competition in shipbuilding, and appease the suspicions of the peoples, and if in addition a lormula eaa be found at Geneva which will lead to somo immei¥sL ler ? uc,! 10ns, in the.land armaments or the Continent.

r^tti Wigs* s\«£S