THE LIBEL LAW

Evening Post, Volume XCVIII, Issue 114, 11 November 1919, Page 2

THE LIBEL LAW

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

INTERESTING BRITISH CASE.

An important decision arising out of the -law., of: libel/was given by the Appeal Court in London (Lords Justices Bankes and Scruton) at the end of July. Application was mude by Mr. A. Lyle Samuel, M.P., plaintiff, in 4 suit against the owners, printers, and publishers of the National News, to have set aside the refusal,of Mr. Justice Boclie to grant an order calling upon the defendants to disclose the sources of the information upon which the alleged libel was based.

The article complained of was,published when Mr. Samuel was a candidate for Parliament, and alleged that Mi\, Samuel was not. a fit person to be a member for Parliament.. It related that his first wife, whom; he. had mar-' ried in 1905, had enougß money to keep her in comfort, but that the plaintiff had speculated and become bankrupt in 1908, his wife being his-largest creditor. Since then she had died in a pauper lunatic, asylum in London, while the husband was on the other side of the Atlantic, and he had found arid married a rich widow, This woman had been a nurse'in a hospital, had been summoned to attend an elderly millionaire, and had married him. ■ When_ he died, she became possessor of his millions. ; The defendants in the libel action had claimed that the article was -fair comment, and it was then sought by.,the plaintiffs .to secure /the interrogatory orjler. ,' '' ' Mr. D. Hogg, K. p., appearing for the appellant, opening .the appeal, said the Judge in Chambers had disallowed the interrogatories which, his client desired to,put to the respondents,1 not in .the exercise of his discretion, but because of an established rule which prevented which, sought to obtain the sources of information on which an alleged libel was based being allowed in the case of-a newspaper, except in special circumstances. He submitted .that there was no such rule, or that, ,if there was such a rule, special circumstances prevented its application in this case. Counsel submitted that' there was no direct authority for putting newspapers in a different position to ordinary people. If1 it was the fact that newspapers , were to be protected because the disclosure of their,informants might be asked for the ulterior purpose of bringing other actions against i.ibse persons, that was got over here; because he was prepared to say that if the names were disclosed no further actions would be brought. On the other hand, if it was to tie urged that it was against public policy to interfere ..with the freedom of the press in criticising public people, he submitted that that argument did not apply where .an attack was made upon private and not upon, public character, as he contended had happened in this'case. This nesxspaper had gone quite outside the'function of newspaper criticism and dragged in private affairs.

Lord Justice Bankes : Is it defamatory to say his wife was shut up in a lunatic asylum ? . . \ Mr. Hogg : No, but to say he drove her there by his/ill-treatment, and then took no more interest in her,, and went away and married . another lady is, .yre aay, a ,wicked .lie., .'.,:(■-. .:

It was desirable to know who the informants were in order to know whether they were reliable. There was no justification for this brutal attack, and no ground for depriving his client of the ordinary rule for ascertaining what was the sort of information the respondents aeted^ upon. Counsel- for the ■ respondents argued that "special circumstances" did not exist .in this case. Sir Hugh • Fras'er submitted that if Mr.' Hogg^ was right the rule would be useless to newspapers, because in three.out of five libel actions it could be said there was an attack upon the private character of the individual. ■..■'

Lord Justice Bankes: More than that; they could always answer the innuendo alleging an attack upon private character, and say that was an issue Of the action.

Lord Justice Bankes, giving judgment, said it was now well established that'in an action for libel against an individual..who was not .'carrying.-lon- a newspaper business, it was permissibld to interrogate him as to where he got "" . his information,', in order to ascertain whether 01' not he had justification' for what he had said, and whether he had been actuated by malice. But it was also established, as far as this Court; ■•■ was concerned,- that an exception to that rule was made in the case of newspapers, and that; the names could not be ordered to be disclosed except in special circumstances. No indication , was given y in the judgments of what constituted special circumstances, but.Mr. Hogg suggested that they would exist in any case in which it could be'shown that the alleged : libel must. necessarily be outside the rule. :one of the grounds upon' which the. exception was based was that the ' information ' might . be . sought for the purpose of suing the informant. Personalty,' he could not see . why that rule was more, applies We in the case.of newspapers than,in the case of an individual. ' : ;

Another ground: was that it was, not desirable in the public interest that a newspaper should be called upon to disclose the names of their informants, \lt might 'be ia the public interest ■ that "the freedom of the press-should.be main. tamed, and that it would be very difficult to maintain it if an. editor felt that he was compellable to give up the namesof his informants. But it was' not necessary to express anyopinion upon the wisdom ;of that rule, "or -the grounds upon which it rested.: Mr. Hogg reasoned that the foundations of- the rule was :that it-was to the public interest that newspapers should bo' at liberty freely to criticise the: private character only where it affected the. public posi- ■ tiou, and that special circumstances must exist if a- case was not covered by that rule. Whether that criticism was justified or not depended upon the meaning put upon . the actual language used. It. was true that by the innuendo the appellant suggested that the lan- . guage complained of. meant that he was an'unscrupulous land dishonest adyen- „' fairer: But it did not appear to' his lordship that it was for this Court to decide an issue whieluwas an issue for the. jury in order, to come to the conclusion that special circumstances existed. Mr. Field had suggested that special circumstances existed -Where the Court -was , satisfied that the respondents had got their information from unreliable sources.! He failed to see .how the Court was to ascertain by a. perusal' of the libel whether the respondents in this case had gone to unreliable -sources. They might have, or they riiiglit not. All he could say was that;it:was well established that in the case of:, news-..'. papers there was an exception to the rule,, requiring them to disclose the .. source of their information, and he was unable to accept any of the;tests suggested as to what, constituted special circumstances. The: appeal niust therefore be dismissed.