THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 21, 24 July 1918, Page 6

THE WAR

A small sketch map in this issue illustrates the battles of the past few days. A footnote to the map explains its principal features, and little further reference to, it is necessary her& The battle has now reached a stage at which it seems probable that the Germans, while suffering the complete defeat of their aggressive scheme, will be able to escape a big disaster such as appeared possible at the opening of the Foch offensive at Soissoiis. Such a disaster would have been brought about if the Allies could have made a rapid advance beyond Soissons, and also from the positions south-west of Reims, so as to bite off by means of two wedges all or some of the German armies between the Vesle and Marne rivers. It was probably to try to. effect such a manoeuvre that General Foch had British troops sent to the front between the Marne and Reims; or, if "it was not intended actually to pierce the side of the German wedge, the object would be to demand and retain the presence there of as many Germans as could be held. In the circumstances the Germans had only one course open to them. They must at all costs hold apart the Allied ajraies on their fla-nlw; and because of the great peril of the position they must also withdraw -wholly or partially from the wedge. By _ bringing as many troops as were available within the wedge, and calling also upon the main reserve (which meant a partial robbing of Prince Rupprecht's forces, they have, succeeded for the time in stopping the Allied advance at Soissons. Meanwhilf, the withdrawal has been going steadily on, partly at discretion, and partly hastened by the Allied pressure.

Frequently, when a withdrawal is made as the result of a battle, the retiring side alleges that it was effected in a masterly fashion, with no losses at all, or "unobserved," or wjlth as few losses as conld be expected; and the advancing side declares that the opponents were driven off the ground. Generally, the withdrawal is carried out in a mixture of these circumstances. In some cases, when the retirement has' been carefully planned beforehand, it: may be effected without any serious loss—as at Gallipoii, or as in the German retreat to the Hindenburg line. But. as a general rule, whon the retreat is suddenly made necessary, it is covered by rearguard actions, as in the case of. the compulsory retreats of the Allies in front of the German offensives this year; and then the amount of fighting which goes on depends partly upon thoirate at which the offensive can be pressed, but still more on the rata possible in the rearward movement of the retiring army. In such a hattle as is now in progress that rate is low, because the communications—roads and railways—are not numerous enough for rapid movement of the men and guni> and stores; and because the country generally is steep and broken, and to a considerable extent covered vnth woods. It is necessary for the Germans to regulate the retreat to such a pace that the available communications (which have to maintain the battle-front as well as convey the men and material being withdrawn) shall not be choked.' It is tjie sign of successful defence in such a case that the attackers make progress mainly upon the most advanced parts of the territory in process of abandonment; and so far this sign has been in favour of the Germans. Tney have crossed the Marne, and have thus abandoned tho most dangerous of all the positions of their holding. The next point of peril was the sharp angle at Chateau Thierry. Thj town itself was taken by the French without fighting, and the angle has been somewhat rounded off by the loss of Oulchy and Epieds, to the north of the Marne; while on the east the Allied forces have advanced slightly on the bulge at the Conrton and Boi Woods, which formed the south-eastern angle of the German position. But at the base of tho great wedge the Germans have held firm, as they were bound to do in ordor to leave as much room as possible between the wings 'for the great traffic within the wedge.

It Was ibeen suggested, and it seems very likely, that the enemy will withdraw to the line of the river Vesle; which,, as the sketch-map shows, would give a fairly straight front; If this can be done, and the line held, the enemy will .probably secure good support for his position iby reconstructing the Aisne valley railway and joining; it up with a short link to the line (not shown on the sketch-ma/p) joining Laon to B«ims, a few miles behind the old front. The line in the Vesle valley will probably be of little value, as it will be under fire. But the newest developments of the battle make it possible that the Germans may not stop there. According to an unofficial report, the drawing in of Rupprocht's reserve divisions is being- answered by t-ne despatch of corresponding numbers of British forces from Foch's reserves. This may not, of course, be true; probably it is a. guess. If it should prove correct, it would indicate that General Foch feels that his strength before Prince Rupprechi is ample—or he would not remove his troops from a front inherently dangerous. It would also point to tihe possibility of a great change in the whole Western scheme: the trans-, ference of the Teal storm area from Picardy and Flanders to the Champagne. For the process, once begun, might go on indefinitely.

It is, however, of little use to attempt to develop such an idea. The forecasting of military events is at best speculation, and to arrive at anything more than a reasonable probability, which may be 'diverted by the most triviallooking- . incident, is impossible. The point is well put in the. course of a recent article by Mr. Hilaire BeMoc, in which, he says: "What we do know is that certain factors, of which there i» and can be no pubic knowledge, ore the real essence of the situation. In other words, our judgment must be almost completely negative. We can say only that . the issue depends upon certain elements which, when they become known, will explain the opposing manoeuvres, but which at present are known to no one alive, only one-half of these elements being, as a matter of fact, fulj<y known to a handful of men on cither side in the opposing commands."

A new French offensive north-west of Montdidier is briefly announced to-day. 2&>n,t4idi9P »s atojtf 40. miles wort-iwrta-

west of Soissons, and is just off the_ lefthand margin of the map in this issue. The battlefront skirts it closely and tarns north-west and then north, to pass ten miles east of Amiens, so that Montdidier occupies almost the most advanced 'angle of the biggest salient of the West front. There is no reason to suppose that the French attack ie intended as a great affair, if only because the pomt* of a salient 16 a poor place to begin a big battle. The front of the present attack stands upon some hills on the west side of the Amiens-Montdidier railway, and overlooking the valley of the small river Dons. On the opposite side of this river the Germans possess a group of hills, behind which the town of Chanlnes, about ton miles away, is an important distributing centre. The French object is pror bably to secure those hius, with the effect of taking the sharp nose off the salient and of dominating Chanlnes and damaging the enemy's supply system.