Japan's Problem

Ellesmere Guardian, Volume LXII, Issue 76, 23 September 1941, Page 6

Japan's Problem

INDO-CHINA BASES

SUPPLY LINES VULNERABLE

It is quite possible to exaggerate the military importance of a Japanese occupation of Southern IndoChinese bases, writes Major George Fielding Eliot in the New York Herald Tribune. First, it should not be supposed that the Japanese are in position to bring the whole weight of their naval and military power to bear from Indo-China bases. They do .not have a continuous bloc of occupied territory stretching from their main centres of operation in the Yangtse. Valley straight on down to Saigon; very far from it. and if they did, there are no roads or railroads which would enable them to concentrate men and supplies in Indo-China for a great campaign against Thailand and British Malaya.

The communications of the Japanese forces in Indo-China are not land communications, but maritime. These forces are wholly dependent

on the ability of the Japanese Navy to maintain command of the route from the nearest point in Japan— let us say the naval base at Sasebo to Saigon. This is a distance of 2000 nautical miles, or eight days' steaming for average supply ships and transports. Hongkong land Manila Along this route Japan holds two principal points of support—the Island of Formosa and the Island'of Hainan. These are, respectively, 1300 and 800 nautical miles from Saigon. Without other complications, this would be a well-protected route along which the Japanese fleet could insure the movement of supplies. But the other complications exist—in the form of the British and American naval bases at Hongkong and Manila, both 900 miles from Saigon, lying on the opposite sides of the 600-mile northern entrance to the South China Sea. Through this channel, or else through far s narrower waterways actually in American or Dutch territorial waters, must pass all shipping moving between Japan and Indo-C'hina.

The real point is that in order to

■ develop any powerful offensive ac- > tion from their bases in Indo-China, - the Japanese first of all must se--1 cure the line of communications • from the industrial centres and supply depots of Japan itself to those i bases. This line is insecure while Hongkong and Manila are in hostile hands, and while there are, forces based on those two points which can attack Japanese ship- . ping. The only way the Japanese can overcome these difficulties is to j ' attack and reduce both Hongkong and Manila. I Immediate Threat Limited ! ! However that might turn out, the ' offensive operations of the Japanese forces in Indo-China would meanwhile be confined to these made possible by the supplies and am--1 munition assembled at the Indo- ! China bases, and the size of the forces themselves, together with their equipment in the matter of aeroplanes and shipping. An index to the actual intentions of the Japanese can therefore be obtained by taking note of the character of the military and naval 'base establishments and garrisons which they proceed to set up in Indo-China. If all this disturbance has been merely a Japanese trial balloon to try out the international wind currents, and perhaps to serve as a distraction while the real move is made elsewhere, then we may expect to see mere nominal forces of occupation, with supplies enough for normal times, established at j Camranh Bay and at Cap Saint | Jacques. If large forces of troops, with reserves of ammunition, motor transport, gasoline, and strong air support are sent, it may well be that the Japanese contemplate operations against Thailand, for which, from Saigon, fairly good road communications exist. j The Question of Supplies If great extensions of dockage facilities are also undertaken and supplies of maritime fuel oil collected, then a maritime expedition with the Indo-Chinese ports as a base may be in the Japanese mind. This might be directed against Thailand, but more probably would be either against British Malaya, British Borneo or some point in the Netherlands Indies." In case of an attack on Thailand, the Japanese might hope that Great Britain and the United States would not interfere; but such hopes can hardly be maintained in view of what has i happened at the first hint of a Japanese move into southern Indo-1 China. In the other cases Japan could hardly doubt that she would face a major war.

Therefore everything would depend, so far as her expeditionary forces were concerned, on the

amount of supplies previously collected in Indo-China and the speed with which Hongkong and Manila could be reduced, while the Japanese fleet operated to the eastward to delay the movements of the United States Pacific Fleet. Problem Difficult at Best Considering that Japan could not hope to station in Indo-China air forces capable of dealing with the combined air strength in the South China Sea of Britain, the Netherlands and the United States; considering further that the submarines and -torpedo craft of these Powers, supported by land-based aircraft and by a few cruisers, would be actively assailing the Japanese transports and supply ships which did succeed in getting past the guardian fortresses in the north; and considering that the necessities of the expeditionary forces might very well require the Japenese fleet to give battle to a superior force under unfavourable conditions (a fact which the American command-er-in-chief would have every means of exploiting), the Japanese High Command has a serious problem to deal with in' attempting any further offensive from Indo-China. Should these difficulties become further complicated by the need for dealing with Soviet aircraft and submarines in the Sea of Japan itself, they would become insoluble if they were not so already. The Safest Offensive The safest of the possible offensives seems to be a land attack on Thailand. Here much would depend on the character of the Thai resistance, if any, and the vigour of the steps taken by the associated Western Powers to cut off the Japanese communications. Indo-China itself cannot support a great offensive of any kind.

If the three Western Powers (witii or without Soviet aid) stick firmly together and determine to resist with armed force any further Japanese aggression, they still have every means of doing so, and the Japanese move into Indo-China does not greatly improve Japan's position. It can be dangerous to our interests in the Far East only if we permit it to become so.

breeders have purchased Battle Song and Tweed II (a son of Hotweed and Straitlace). Early this year a consignment of four yearlings (one by Feld Trial) and six brood mares were sent to Canada, while India, which buys about four or five hundred horses a year from Britain, paid £7,000 for Tant Mieux arid £2,00Q-£3,000 for several other horses. Breeders in South Africa received Blitz, Chesham, Nord Ex^ press and City of Flint.