PREPARATIONS AND OPINIONS OF THE RIVALS.

Press, Volume LXI, Issue 11790, 13 January 1904, Page 7

PREPARATIONS AND OPINIONS OF THE RIVALS.

Tie Paris newspaper "L'Eclair," of December 3rd, publishes an interesting ktter written, at Tien-tain, and dated October Slat, from the well-known writer, M. Andre Chcradame. on the prospect* of peace or war in the Far East. M. Cheradame begins by observing that in the course of thieo months he viufced tbe principal centres in, Vapan, Korea, Southern Manchuria, and along the Gulf of Pe-chi-H. During this U»ur he had an opportunity of discussing the situation with the majority of the moft influential personage* i*pre-

•anting the different countries «d isf tercets concerned. *The result of his inquiries tended to show that » rupture be- - tween Rossi* and was not inevitable. But it i» certain, he s»ys, that both countries hterm made ample preparations for war ' :

At the time of .writing the Ruesiaa and Japanese fleet* were about equal, bat M. Cheradame states that, according to information furnished to him by various technics authorities, reinforcement* from Europe wiil, before the beginning of the year 190*, render the former taperior to the latter. The Japanese have, on the other hand,, made the most careful preparations for mobilisation. In the event of war they would sot endeavour to carry hostilities into Manchuria, but would try to occupy Korea with the largest possible number of troops. Competent European military authorities well acquainted with the country remarked to M. Qier*d«ne that the Japanese General Staff, by seizing a favourable opportunity, would have a good chance of landing 120,000, or even 150,000, excellent troops in Korea before the intervention of the Russian squadron, which, moreover, would be kept in check by the Japanese fleet. If that operation succeeded, and if the Japanese ships prevented the Russians from landing, it would take * long time before the Russian, troops, who would have to cover the distance from the Ya-lu to Seoul on foot, could come into contact with the Japanese forces. The latter would, therefore, have ample time to establish themselves in the country. M. Cberadame then deals' with the conflicting tendencies of public opinion in both countries. Hβ says that the Japanese masses are in favour of "war, considering that the only result of a postponement of hostilities would be to render Russia invincible. Japanese statesmen, however, while making all the necessary preparations for war, realise that, however glorious a conflict with Ruseia might be, it would only yield ifcgative results for their own country. "Most of the Russian officers in Manchuria are likewise in favour of war. But their responsible chiefs do not seem to admit its necessity, twguing that, although the eventual victory of Russia would be certain, the war would be terribly expensive. But a different view « the situation would seem at times to gam the upper hand, aanwly, that the heavy expenditure for the maintenance inline Far East of a fleet which ,ie required in the Boltio will continue indefinitely « things are noli brought to an issue. It w contended by the advocates of this view that if Russia were now to destroy tne Japanese fleet she would for a lone time to come enjoy a tranquility in the Pacific which would permit her to devote more attention to European affairs. M. Cheradame adds that he has occasionally found this argument exercise considerable influence upon prominent Bus. oian civilians who, by charooter and position, are among the most favourably disposed towards the preservation of peace. It is on the other hand, practically certain, he says, that a war witfc Japan, - would have no chance of being popular among the great maw of the Russian population. Thus in both countries the bellicose and pacific elements counterbalance each other, and all that is needed to force the hands of the Japanese or Russian, Government is one of those unforeseen incideute —the sole but real danger of the existing situation-wbicli would suddenly inflame the national amour propre.