FIRST JAP. BLOW

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIII, Issue 171, 22 July 1942, Page 5

FIRST JAP. BLOW

AMERICAN INERTIA

Paper's Revelations Of Russian Strength And U.S. Weakness

United Press Association.—Copyright.

NEW YORK, July 21

Further remarkable evidence of the lack of alertness at Pearl Harbour on December 7, when the Japanese struck their first effective blow against the United States, is included in a hitherto unpublished story of an intercepted radio message to the approaching Japanese carrier fleet. The message boldly informed the enemy: "There are no harbour nets and no barrage balloons. Pearl Harbour is wide open." This message was actually sent to Washington before the attack on Pearl Harbour, but officials did not decode the message until it was too late. This, together with other dramatic disclosures, is told in the concluding instalment of "How the War Came," by Messrs. Davis and Lindley, in the Ladies' Home Journal, from official documents.

The authors endeavour to show that, whoever was at fault for the lack of alertness, it was not the Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, who correctly sensed the belligerent intentions of the Japanese and warned all concerned several times.

The article in the Ladies' Home Journal tells how the hitherto inscrutable M. Stalin laid all his cards on the table. Mr. Harry Hopkins, the Administrator of Lease-Lend, said Stalin unlocked the inner chamber of Soviet defence secrets and paraded them before him. Mr. Hopkins was astonished at the sight, being shown endless tables of charts and reports of Russian armed and industrial might. M. Stalin revealed where his forces were disposed, information for which battalions of German S.S. men gladly died.

M. Stalin's Amazing Frankness

M. Stalin said to Mr. Hopkins: "All this you may see. You may go anywhere, to any front, to any factory, and verify the truth for yourself." Mr. Hopkins brought from Moscow the impression that M. Stalin was tough, single-minded, granitic and straightforward. Both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill were delighted with Mr. Hopkins' report, but generals at first were very sceptical. Later they came round and accepted M. Stalin's view that the Germans could not take Moscow in 1941.

It is also revealed by the articles that certain reinforcements for the Philippines were just a few days too late, therefore they were diverted to Australia. It is also said that 60 per cent of the planes in the Philippines were destroyed on the ground in the first Japanese raids, therefore the battle of the Philippines was lost in the first few days. The Japanese picked off American planes like sitting pigeons.

In the last week before Pearl Harbour all eyes in Washington were fixed on Siam. The Japanese moves toward Siam were genuine enough, yet they served the purposes of a great ruse that diverted the gaze of Americans, including responsible officers of both Services, from the danger to Hawaii and the Philippines. Thus the first bombers over Pearl Harbour on December 7 caught more than the naval and military off their guard. They caught the whole of the United States asleep.

The authors ask why were the Japanese able to surprise America? They claim, at the risk of seeming to be smug, that Pearl Harbour was a moral victory, furnishing a sound basis for eventual victory. They point out that United States civilisational standards are incapable of striking a potential enemy by stealth and without a declaration of war, raining death unannounced on women and children. The standards of our civilisation do not allow that kind of behaviour.